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ДИСЕРТАЦІЯ

БОГОСЛОВСЬКА АНТРОПОЛОГІЯ
ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ПРЕДСТАВНИЦТВА

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Дисертація містить результати власних досліджень. Використання ідей, результатів і текстів інших авторів мають посилання на відповідне джерело
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ABSTRACT

Bakirov D.R. Theological Anthropology of Political Representation. – Qualification scholarly paper: a manuscript. Thesis submitted for obtaining the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Humanities, Speciality 033 – Philosophy. – V. N Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Kharkiv, 2023.

This dissertation is a critical study of the concept of political representation from the vantage point of theological anthropology. The following problems are treated in the study: I. The question of the role of political representation in anthropology; II. The question of the role of political representation in the European history of governance; III. The question of the role of political representation in the Orthodox Church. The *relevance* of the research topic is determined by the need for clarity in the definition of democracy in the time of the rise of the axis of the autocracies across the world which present themselves as more democratic than the liberal democracies by virtue of representing people in a more immediate fashion. For this *purpose*, a dichotomy is developed between the "orthodox" theory of politics, based on the "constitutive theory of representation" and the "unorthodox" theory, based on the "instrumental theory of representation". The *urgency* of this research is the looming risk that the rise of populism within in West will reduce liberal democracies to mass "plebiscitary" democracies, thereby causing the demise of the democratic world from within. The *scientific novelty* of this study consists of (1) a nuanced anthropology of political representation which delineates the criteria that allows scholars to assess whether a "people" is substantially present in the acts of their government; (2) a *theory* of modern representative democracy as a legitimate "learning outcome" of the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of the Christian Church; and (3) an "orthodox" theory of politics based on the practical application of what can be called the "high" conciliar theology of representation that posits that irreducibly different realities can

"stand for" each other and the "spiritual exercise" that constitutes the Church – the practice of living in another's "name". Political representation whose cornerstone is the "name", a democracy where politicians act in the "name" of the people and not according to the popular "will", since the "will" is that which possesses extant goods and coercers rival claimants of selfsame goods, whereas the "name" unites various acts of volition into an intelligible developmental timeline, is worthwhile because the "name" is a part of language, a non-zero-sum game that creates from nothing, attunement to which turns politics into "building a city with words" (*Republic* 369a), whereas the emphasis on the "will" of the people makes negotiation impossible by sacralising the popular definitions of rival interests and therefore reducing politics to the immediate clash of the warring wills.

In the first part, it has been proven that the most refined articulation of the "unorthodox" theory is the "non-dialectical" reading of Hegel, both by the so-called Left Hegelians like Karl Marx and Alexander Kojève who supplied an ideological foundation for the Soviet and European Unions [Howse 2004; Kletzer 2006; Barigazzi 2017] and the Right Hegelians like Carl Schmitt and Ivan Ilyin whose work is used to provide intellectual legitimation for the current autocracies in Russia and China [Auer 2015, Snyder 2019, Lewis 2020, Brang 2020, Che 2020, Mitchell 2020, Libin and Patapan 2020, Reinhardt 2020, Goldman 2021, Harvey 2021, Karolewski, Libin, Patapan et al. 2023]. Contra these thinkers, it is argued that Hegel is misread if we reduce dialectic from a literal exchange of words to an ostensiblyx more relevant order of reality, be it a struggle for the "means of production" (*Produktionsmittel*) or for "living space" (*Lebensraum*). Both the Left and the Right schools of Hegelianism criticise liberal democracy because the level on which it operates – parliamentary committees, party polemics, public hearings – fails to do justice to the level where the actual dialectical struggle is alleged to occur – be it Marxian "base" instead of "superstructure" or Schmittian "war" instead of "peace", in either case, the claim is that it is the contest of wills and not the exchange of words where the "enemy" is to be faced because the most substantial "enemy" is simply not there – it conspired

against us – be it a conspiracy of Communist International or "global capital". The common refrain of these anti-intellectual movements is anti-Semitism because they consider the Jews, whose history is the embodiment of the dialectic of intellectual governance ("Come, let us reason together, says the Lord", as reads Isaiah 1:18), to be the main enemies because they "break the laws of nature", that is, pretend as if it is possible to transcend the immediate contest of wills with the laws, agreements, ideologies, etc. Because of the aforementioned variety of "non-dialectical" readings of Hegel, we should not be surprised that the justification of the military campaign of the Russian Federation against Ukraine can be heard both from the Left, e.g. from the postcolonialists, anti-capitalists, and critics of US foreign policy, and the Right, e.g. isolationists, acolytes of geopolitics, and anti-liberals, who insist that the advocacy of universal norms and values, such as human rights and democracy, is but a cynical facade above the underlying attempt of the West to dominate the rest of the world [Negri 1999, Muffe 2005, Kalyvas 2008, Amariles 2008]. (The school of "realism" in international relations is a singularly fine example because it blurs the boundaries between the aforementioned Left and the Right movements).

To elucidate the "unorthodox" theory of politics, the trajectories of its application in Russia's two recent declines into autocracy were examined – Marxian Stalinism and Schmittian Putinism. First, Joseph Stalin declared the sovereignty of language over both the "base" and the "superstructure" in a discussion about linguistics with imaginary "young comrades" in the pages of the Pravda newspaper from 1950 to legitimise the medium of his dictatorship – his commands, orders, decrees, resolutions, in one word, words. However, Stalin's orders were arbitrary because language was not sovereign over Stalin himself – since Stalin believed that his mastery of dialectic absolved him from the necessity to stand corrected by the Platonic dialectic of friendship (instead of which Stalin has fictional "comrades") and the Hegelian dialectic of the party politics (Stalin's political opponents were either shot or sent to death camps). Consequently, in Stalin's Russia, the

"word" functioned not as a sovereign pedagogue but as a weapon of arbitrary will. Second, we suggest that the cynical disillusionment in the wake of the communist and liberal democratic experiments has prepared Russians to adopt Putin's style of statecraft shaped by the counter-intelligence education of suspecting and detecting malicious inauthenticity in the public *persona* compared to subaltern intentions, of a mismatch between the "name" and the "face", of a conspiracy that can be exposed only through torture. This secret servicemen's suspicion of inauthenticity and conspiracy served as a pretext to delegitimise public debate, tackle the opposition, and consolidate society around the "strong leader" whose autocratic governance is cast as the only kind of political arrangement that is qualified to confront the "enemy".

As an alternative to the "unorthodox" theory, a theory of politics is developed which is rooted in the orthodox belief in the centrality of the "word". The trait that distinguishes the "orthodox" theory of politics is the underlying anthropology that treats language and representation not as instrumental but as constitutive. Equipped with this anthropology, we can read Hegel "logocentrically", i.e. without reducing dialectics to anything beneath or beyond language and thereby reconcile his system with orthodoxy by showing how it gestures toward something like "secular theocracy", the state that witnesses to the sovereignty of the "word" by surrendering any claim to divinity. We locate "logocentric" readings of Hegel in a lineage of Ukrainian and Russian scholars from Alexander Potebnja to Aleksei Losev and a loose movement christened as "the New Hegel" – Charles Taylor, Gillian Rose, Andrew Shanks, Peter Hodgson, Stephen Holgate, John Burbridge, Nicholas Adams, Gavin Hyman, Catherine Malabou, Rebekah Howes, Béatrice Longuenesse, and Rowan Williams [Hyman 2020]. Based on these readings, we sketch the anthropology of representative democracy by developing such concepts as "name-hallowing", "free indirect speech" and "exchange of sins". Similar to how the "name" is said to be the main subject of the *imiaslavic* prayer practice, authentic democracy – one where the "name" is the main subject of representation, where representation is first and foremost the

"exchange of names" – transforms relations between people and government into "redemptive education" – since the "exchange of names" unites their voices into "free indirect speech" that makes them more than their sum and their sins into an exchange that makes them less than their sum.

In the second part, it has been proven that the development of Western governance is a transformation of political representation from a means to an end, from a mere tool of the king to expand his "will" into the practice that educates the "will" and legitimises all exercise of power. The two steps are emphasised in this transformation. First, Christian subversion of the imperial cult identified divinity with representation in a manner opposite to Octavian Augustus. Whereas Augustus was a representative of the people (*tribunus plebis*) in virtue of being a god (*divi filius*), Christ was God in virtue of being a representative of the people, in virtue of incarnating the *tribunicia potestas* of the God of the Hebrew Scriptures. Second, the "deprivatisation" of the three clauses from Roman private and corporate law into "trinitarian" constitutional theory: *quod omnes tangit* into constitutive power, *plena potestas* into constituted, and *corpus mysticum* into the constitutional mediation between the two). This development reaches its acme in Hegel, who builds an intellectual foundation for representative democracy by grounding simultaneous sovereignty of the constituent, constituted, and constitutional powers in the doctrine of the eternal "interpenetration" of a Three-personed God. To bear witness to the "mutually constitutive gift of life between the trinitarian persons" [Williams 2023, p. 13], the constituent, constituted, and constitutional secular powers have to tactfully circumambulate the "vacant throne" (*hetoimasia*) of sovereignty by gallantly surrendering power to one another. Thus, instead of forsaking the language of sovereignty altogether, Hegel gestures toward celebrating the punctuality of its transfer. All of this is afforded by Hegel's constitutive theory of representation, where the act of the Spirit, the mutual constitution of the civil society and the government, is afforded by the corporatist mediation between the two.

In the third part, in the wake of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dorothee Sölle, Oliver O'Donovan, and Rowan Williams, it has been proven that political representation is the doctrinal and spiritual nucleus of the Christian Church. All a Christian can say about God she can say only because God substituted her. To make sense of this fact, the theologians of the oecumenical councils developed what can be called the "orthodox" doctrine of representation. The divine act is the act of letting the other be other and establishing solidarity with the other without compromising the other's otherness – the act of stadial accretion and atonement of otherness: generation, procession, creation, and incarnation. This crescendo of hypostatisation and solidarisation is seen in the ultimate act of letting creation "fall" into absolute otherness and the ultimate act of solidarisation through the incarnation, corporeal presence amid the fallen world. In terms of "spiritual practice", this study posits that the talk about deification apart from substitution is senseless. If the Church is constituted through the act of substitutionary atonement, then deified humanity cannot possibly have a different shape than Christ's – it must be a logical continuation of Christ's corporeal presence, his "Mystical Body". Hence, the deification of the human race, the Church, is the community of mutual substitutionary atonement. And, if the "word" is indeed central, then this substitution, this exchange of sins, begins with the exchange of names. In this sense, the Church is but a "democratisation" of the biblical discipline of "name-hallowing". In the Torah, humans discover and begin to live in the Name of God, Jehovah. In the Gospels, humans discover God who takes on and lives in the name of humans. Lastly, in the Acts, humans are commanded to live in the name of one another. A doer of prayer enters the network of intercession which is the Liturgy, where the sinners are presented to God as saints because of being represented as such by one another. If conducted thus, political representation becomes the genuine "liturgy after liturgy" [Bria 1977].

The overall outcome of the dissertation is a theory of representative democracy as a "learning outcome" of the teaching and practice of the Christian Church. It is claimed that

the theologically literate anthropology organically endorses the constitutive theory of representation. That is to say, it treats political representation not as something to be done with as quickly as possible, let alone circumvented in favour of ostensibly preferable direct democracy, but as the activity which is ultimately worthwhile because it is coextensive with education and redemption – and the farther the distance, the longer the duration, and the bigger the difference between the constituent and constituted powers, the more there is learning and loving to do – which is the ultimate spiritual exercise; and hence it is beautiful and fun – for representation is not a means to make our desires heard, it is the process by which we learn to desire better until we recognise that our ultimate desire is representation itself – knowing and loving what is other as other without end, finding a place (χώρα) within us for the weirdo, queer, and stanger – and within them for us; the discipline of "interpenetration" (περιχώρησις). By turning this interpenetration into the law of the land, representative democracy makes language sovereign over the whole of human life. Thus, if the Church is constituted by the act of representation – by the act of being-in-the-other, then the politics that naturally emerges from it ought to begin not with defining and neutralising the enemy but with the divine act of recognising oneself in the stranger, even in the enemy; the act of solidarisation for the sake of the good which is impossible to attain without coordination and enjoy without company.

АНОТАЦІЯ

Бакіров Д. Р. Богословська антропологія політичного представництва. – Кваліфікаційна наукова праця на правах рукопису. Дисертація на здобуття ступеня доктора філософії за спеціальністю 033 Філософія. – Харківський національний університет імені В. Н. Каразіна Міністерства освіти і науки України, Харків, 2023.

У дисертації розглянуто політичне представництво з точки зору богословської антропології. У дослідженні розкриваються наступні проблеми: (1) питання ролі політичного представництва в антропології; (2) питання ролі політичного представництва в історії європейського врядування; (3) питання ролі політичного представництва в християнській церкві. *Актуальність* теми дослідження визначається необхідністю досягнення ясності у визначення демократії в контексті зростання осі автократичних режимів, які позиціонують себе як більш демократичні, ніж ліберальні демократії, оскільки представляють людей більш безпосередньо. З цією *метою*, в дослідження побудована "антропологія представницької демократії", що виходить з "ортодоксальній" теорії політики, заснованій на "конститутивній теорії представництва", та протиставленій "неортодоксальній" теорії політики, заснованій на "інструментальній теорії представництва". *Актуальність* цієї роботи зумовлена ризиком того, що хвиля популізму на Заході призведе до перетворення ліберальних демократій на "масові" "плебісцитарні" демократії, змодельовані на основі "неортодоксальної" теорії політики, де успіх представництва вимірюється безпосередністю копіювання "волі" народу. Щоб запобігти цьому сценарію, розроблено нюансовану антропологію політичного представництва, яка дозволяє оцінити, чи є "народ" значуще присутнім в діях уряду. *Доказано*, що сучасна представницька демократія є продуктом вчення і дисципліни християнської Церкви – практичним застосуванням "високого" соборного богослов'я репрезентації, яке стверджує, що незрівнянно різні реальності можуть представляти одна одну, і

політичним застосуванням "духовної вправи", яка є конститутивною для Церкви – життя в "ім'я" іншого, за умови, що політики діють в "ім'я" народу, а згідно з народною "волею", оскільки "воля" – це те, що володіє вже наявними благами та бореться проти ворогів, які претендують на ті ж самі блага; тоді як "ім'я" об'єднує різні вольові акти в логічну історію розвитку. Політичне представництво, центральним референтом та суб'єктом якого є "ім'я", варте свого часу, тому що "ім'я" є тією частиною людини, що живе в мові, тобто бере участь в грі з ненульовою сумою, яка творить з нічого, а тому перетворює політику на "будівництво міста словами" ("Держава" 369a); тоді як акцент на народній "волі" сакралізує вже чинні визначення інтересів, унеможливлює переговори, і, таким чином, зводить політику до безпосереднього зіткнення між волями – "друзями" і "ворогами".

У першій частині доказано, що найбільш витонченою артикуляцією "неортодоксальної" теорії є "недіалектичне" прочитання Геґеля як так званими лівими геґельянцями, такими як Карл Маркс та Александр Кожев, які забезпечили ідеологічну основу для Радянського та Європейського Союзів [Howse 2004; Kletzer 2006; Barigazzi 2017], так і правими геґельянцями, такими як Карл Шмітт та Іван Ільїн, чиї праці використовуються для інтелектуальної легітимації сучасних автократій у Росії та Китаї [Auer 2015, Snyder 2019, Lewis 2020, Brang 2020, Che 2020, Mitchell 2020, Libin and Patapan 2020, Reinhardt 2020, Goldman 2021, Harvey 2021, Karolewski, Libin, Patapan et al. 2023]. На противагу цим мислителям, в цьому дослідженні припускається, що редукція діалектики Геґеля з буквального обміну словами до нібито більш релевантного порядку дійсності, будь то боротьба за "засоби виробництва" (Produktionsmittel) або за "життєвий простір" (Lebensraum), є помилковим прочитанням Геґеля. Як "ліві", так і "праві" школи геґельянства критикують ліберальну демократію за те, що вимір, в якому вона функціонує – парламентські комітети, партійна полеміка, громадські слухання – не відповідає рівню, на якому нібито відбувається актуальна діалектична боротьба – чи то

марксівський "базис" замість "надбудови", чи то шміттівська "війна" замість "миру", в будь-якому випадку, стверджується, що саме змагання між волями, а не обмін словами, є тією сценою, де слід протистояти "ворогу", оскільки "ворог" змовився проти нас – чи то в змові Комуністичного Інтернаціоналу, чи то "глобального капіталу". В будь-якому випадку, ці антиінтелектуальні рухи є антисемітськими, тому що саме євреїв, чия історія є втіленням діалектики інтелектуального врядування ("Приходьте, давайте посперечаємося" говорить Господь в Ісайя 1:18), вони вважають головними ворогами природного стану речей, тобто безпосередньої боротьби між волями. Через вищезгадане розмаїття "недіалектичних" прочитань Гегеля не варто дивуватися, що виправдання військової кампанії Російської Федерації проти України можна почути як з боку лівих, наприклад, постколоніалістів, антикапіталістів і критиків зовнішньої політики США (школа "реалізму" в міжнародних відносинах є прекрасним прикладом), так і з боку правих, наприклад, ізоляціоністів, націоналістів, прихильників геополітики та антилібералів, які наполягають на тому, що захист універсальних норм і цінностей, таких як права людини і демократія, є лише цинічним фасадом, що прикриває приховане прагнення Заходу домінувати над рештою світу [Negri 1999, Muffe 2005, Kalyvas 2008, Amariles 2008]. Щоб висвітлити "неортодоксальну" теорію політики, досліджено траєкторії її застосування на прикладі двох російських автократій – марксистському сталінізмі та шміттівському путінізмі. По-перше, Йосип Сталін проголосив суверенітет мови як над "базисом", так і над "надбудовою" в дискусії про мовознавство з уявними "молодими товаришами" на сторінках газети "Правда" з 1950 року, щоб легітимізувати засіб своєї диктатури - свої команди, накази, укази, постанови, одним словом, слова. Однак сталінські накази були довільними, оскільки мова не була суверенною над самим Сталіним – оскільки Сталін вважав, що володіння діалектикою звільняє його від необхідності коригуватися платонівською діалектикою дружби (замість якої у Сталіна були вигадані "товариші") і гегелівською діалектикою

партійної політики (політичні опоненти Сталіна були або розстріляні, або відправлені до таборів смерті). Отже, в сталінській Росії "слово" функціонувало не як суверенний педагог, а як зброя свавільної волі. По-друге, ми припускаємо, що цинічне розчарування після комуністичних і ліберально-демократичних експериментів підготувало росіян до прийняття путінського стилю державного будівництва, сформованого контррозвідувальним вихованням підозрювати та виявляти зловмисну неавтентичність публічної персони порівняно з підлеглими намірами, невідповідність між "ім'ям" і "обличчям", змову, яка може бути викрита лише шляхом катування. Підозра спецслужб у неавтентичності та змові слугувала приводом для делегітимізації публічних дебатів, боротьби з опозицією та консолідації суспільства навколо "сильного лідера", чиє авторитарне правління подається як єдиний вид політичного устрою, здатний протистояти "ворогові". Щоб запропонувати альтернативу "неортодоксальній" теорії, окреслено теорію політики, засновану на православній вірі в ключову онтологічну та антропологічну роль "слова". Рисою, яка відрізняє "ортодоксальну" теорію політики, є антропологія, що трактує мову та репрезентацію не як інструментальні, а як конститутивні. Завдяки цій антропології, ми можемо читати Геґеля "логоцентрично", тобто не зводячи діалектику до чогось, що знаходиться за межами мови, і таким чином узгодити його систему з православ'ям, показавши, як вона уможливлює те, що ми називаємо "світською теократією", державу, яка засвідчує суверенітет "слова", відмовляючись від будь-яких претензій на божественність. Ми знаходимо "логоцентричне" прочитання Геґеля в низці вчених від Олександра Потебні до Олексія Лосєва та руху, охрещеного як "Новий Геґель" – Чарльз Тейлор, Джилліан Роуз, Ендрю Шенкс, Пітер Ходжсон, Стівен Голгейт, Джон Бербрідж, Ніколас Адамс, Ґевін Хайман, Кетрін Малабу, Ребека Хоуз, Беатріс Лонгенесс та Роуен Вільямс. Спираючись на ці праці та на традицію "ім'яслав'я" в православній теології початку ХХ століття, ми окреслюємо антропологію представницької демократії, розвиваючи такі поняття як

"невласне-пряма мова" та "обмін гріхами". Подібно до того, як "ім'я", як кажуть, є головним предметом ім'яславської молитовної практики, справжня демократія – та, де "ім'я" є головним "дієвим лицем" представництва, де представництво є насамперед "обміном імен" – перетворює відносини між людьми і владою на "освіту" та "спокуту", оскільки "обмін іменами" об'єднує їх голоси у "вільну непряму мову", яка робить їх чимось більшим, ніж їхня сума, та "обмін гріхами" робить їх гріхи чимось меншим, ніж їхня сума.

У другій частині доказано, що розвиток західного державотворення є трансформацією політичного представництва із засобу на кінцеву ціль, з інструменту правителя для розширення своєї "волі" на практику, яка виховує "волю" і легітимізує владу. Запропоновано два кроки в цій трансформації. По-перше, християнський переворот імперського культу ототожнив божественність з представництвом у спосіб, протилежний Октавіану Августу. Тоді як Август був представником народу (*tribunus plebis*) в силу того, що був богом (*divi filius*), Христос був Богом в силу того, що був представником народу, в силу того, що втілив *tribunicia potestas* Бога з єврейського Писання. По-друге, "деприватизація" трьох положень римського приватного і корпоративного права в "тринітарній" конституційній теорії: *quod omnes tangit* – в установчій владі, *plena potestas* – в конституції, та *corpus mysticum* – в конституційному посередництві між ними. Цей розвиток досягає свого акме у Гегеля, який будує інтелектуальний фундамент для представницької демократії, обґрунтовуючи одночасний суверенітет установчої, конституйованої та конституційної влади в доктрині вічного "взаємопроникнення" Триєдиного Бога. Щоб засвідчити "взаємно конституюючий дар життя між триєдиними особами" [Williams 2023, p. 13], конституюча, конституйована і конституціональна світські влади повинні тактовно ходити навколо "порожнього трону" (*hetoimasia*) суверенітету, галантно поступаючись владою одна одній. Таким чином, замість того, щоб повністю відмовитися від суверенітету, Гегель натякає на

святкування пунктуальності його трансферу. Усе це забезпечує конститутивна теорія представництва Гегеля, де акт Духу, взаємне конституювання громадянського суспільства і держави, забезпечується корпоративним посередництвом між ними.

У третій частині, слідом за Дітріхом Бонхеффером, Гансом Урсом фон Бальтазаром, Дороті Зьолле, Олівером О'Донованом та Роуеном Вільямсом, доказано, що політичне представництво є доктринальним і духовним ядром християнської церкви. Все, що християнка може сказати про Бога, вона може сказати лише тому, що Бог "заступив-ся" за неї, щоб відповісти за гріхи, асоційовані з її іменем. Щоб осмислити цей факт, богослови екуменічних соборів розробили те, що можна назвати "ортодоксальним" вченням про представництво. Божественний акт – це акт дозволу іншому бути іншим і встановлення солідарності з іншим без шкоди для його інакшості – акт поступового нарощування і спокутування інакшості: генерація, процесія, творення та втілення. Абсолютний приклад цієї "гіпостазації" і солідаризації проявляється в акті дозволу творінню "впасти" в абсолютну інакшість і акті солідаризації через втілення, тілесну присутність серед "падшого" світу. З цього слідує, що розмова про "обожнення" у відриві від "заступництва" неможлива. Якщо Церква конституюється через акт замісної спокути (*substitutionary atonement*), то обожествлене життя людей не може мати іншу форму, ніж заступницька дія Христа – воно може бути лише логічним продовженням тілесної присутності Христа, його "Містичним Тілом". Отже, обожнення людського роду, Церква, є спільнотою взаємної "замісної спокути". І, якщо "слово" дійсно є центральним, то це заміщення, цей обмін гріхами, починається з обміну іменами. У цьому сенсі Церква є лише "демократизацією" біблійної дисципліни "іменування". У Торі люди відкривають для себе і починають жити в Імені Бога, Єгови. В Євангеліях люди відкривають для себе Бога, який бере на себе і живе в ім'я людей. Нарешті, в Діяннях Апостолів людям наказано жити в ім'я один одного. Той, хто молиться, входить у мережу заступництва, якою є Літургія, де грішники представлені Богові як святі, тому що

вони представлені як такі один одним. Політичне представництво в дусі цієї традицію є справжньою "літургією після літургії".

Загальний висновок дисертації полягає у позиціюванні представницької демократії як системного наслідку вчення і практики християнської церкви. Стверджується, що теологічно грамотна антропологія свідчить про конститутивну теорію представництва. Тобто, вона розглядає політичне представництво не як щось, з чим потрібно покінчити якомога швидше, не кажучи вже про те, щоб обійти його на користь прямої демократії, а як діяльність, яка є абсолютно вартою свого часу, тому що вона є синонімічною з освітою та очищенням – і чим більша відстань, тривалість та різниця між представниками та представленими, тим більше є простору для мислення та любові, що і є найвищою духовною вправою; а отже, представництво є прекрасним і веселим - адже представництво не є засобом зробити так, щоб наші бажання були почуті, це процес виховання наших бажань, кінцем якого є усвідомлення, що саме представництво і є наше кінцеве бажання – вчитися пізнавати і любити те, що є іншим, знаходити місце (χώρα) для іншого всередині нас та для нас всередині іншого, дисципліна "взаємопроникнення" (περιχώρησις). Представницька демократія просто робить це взаємопроникнення сувереном. Таким чином, якщо Церква конституюється актом представництва – життям-в-іншому, то політика, яке природно з нього випливає, розуміється не як визначення та нейтралізація ворога, але як божественний акт впізнавання-себе-в-іншому, навіть у ворогові, акт солідарізації задля благ, які можна здобути лише в координації та скуштувати лише в спільноті.

Ключові слова: антропологія, політична філософія, політична теологія, філософія культури, секуляризм, представницька демократія, філософія мови, філософія освіти, теорії відкуплення, громадянське суспільство, радикальна теологія, діалектика, православна церква, корпоратизм, Гегель.

СПИСОК ПУБЛІКАЦІЙ ЗДОБУВАЧА ЗА ТЕМОЮ ДИСЕРТАЦІЇ

Наукові праці, в яких опубліковані основні наукові результати дисертації:

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• Bakirov, D., and Filonenko, O. (2021). Science, Law, Art, Their Feedback. Збірник наукових праць ΛΌГОΣ. № 2 (2021), pp. 122-128 https://doi.org/10.36074/logos-10.12.2021.v2.39

Особистий внесок: Автором описано процесс, за яким певні "форми життя" продовжуються через людей, чиї способи пізнання та кодекси поведінки пристосовані до порядку складності, який орієнтований на його мимовільне відтворення. Автор продемонстрував, що свідомість є "дивною петлею" двох соціальних процесів - абстракції мови та розширення права. Також автор запропонував гіпотезу, що абстрагування мови і розширення права запрошують людство до все більш творчих "форми життя", тому що абстракція привертає нашу увагу до вищих перспектив, з яких речі розглядаються як такі, що можуть "сказати більше" в якості учасників все більш складних розмов.

• Bakirov, D., and Filonenko , O. (2021). Consent or Contest? Dating Appts and Sexual Choice. Збірник наукових праць ΛΌΓΟΣ. № 1 (2021), pp. 87-89. https://doi.org/10.36074/logos-26.11.2021.v2.27.

Особистий внесок: Автором описані критерії повноцінного поняття згоби як коммуникативної зрозумілості вибору. Таким чином, автор концептуалізував критерії викорінення маніпулятивних змагань у людських стосунках: маніпуляція завжди ховається за аутсорсингом суджень на змагання, прихованих від відкритої розмови; також, нерівність потенційних сексуальних партнерів унеможливлює розумну розмову. Щоб бути повноцінно консенсуальним, вибір партнера має бути винесений за межі ринкової конкуренції. Це відбувається лише тоді, коли життєві потреби людей задовольняються на рівні держави - їжа, охорона здоров'я, психологічна підтримка, спільнота, дозвілля.

• Bakirov, D. (2023). The Deathcamp Realism as a Source of Putinism. On the Platonic Hierarchy of Human Faculties in Varlam Shalamov's GULAG Stories. Grail of Science, (24), pp. 493–497. https://doi.org/10.36074/grail-of-science.17.02.2023.093

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Justification of the research topic. The war between Ukraine and Russia is but an inaugural rencontre in the global collision between democracy and autocracy. However, far from everyone shares this optic. In certain areas, particularly in the countries of the South and the East, and even among the disenfranchised targets of populism in the West, this war is often framed as a proxy conflict between civilisationally distinct but morally equivalent geopolitical rivals. A *hypothesis* of this study is that the "right" and "left" schools of thought that promulgate this optic, the school of realism in international relations and certain branches of postcolonialism, stem from a common root in the political theology of Carl Schmitt. Noteworthy and symptomatic is the wide reception of Schmitt's constitutional thought both by Russian conformist political technologists and Chinese universities under Xi [Brang 2020, Che 2020, Mitchell 2020, Libin and Patapan 2020, Reinhardt 2020, Goldman 2021, Harvey 2021, Karolewski, Libin, Patapan et al. 2023]. From the vantage point implicit in these schools, united under the umbrella term "unorthodox theory of politics", the "plebiscitary" mass democracies akin to Putin's Russia are considered more democratic than Western liberal democracies because, allegedly, their "strong leaders" represent people better. Thus, by using democratic discourse to legitimise illiberal governance, the "unorthodox" theorists invert the dichotomy in the incipit of this paragraph. The situation is further complicated since modern intuitions about representation work in favour of Schmitt. To put it provocatively, should modern ontology alone be available to us, then we would have to acknowledge that Schmitt is correct. This is why it is worth reacquainting ourselves with the ontology that underpinned representative democracy in its naissance. Another *hypothesis* of this study is that the task of reinventing classical ontology was partly accomplished by Hegel. Consequently, in the course of this study, a lineage of thinkers is examined whose readings

of Hegel align him to the wider tradition that is christened as the "orthodox theory of politics", curiously coordinated around the theme of "*imiaslavie*", the discipline of "name-hallowing" which preserves names' "metonymical power" of making their referents present.

It is demonstrated, the claim that illiberal systems represent people than liberal democracies stems from a "poor" definition of representation. To say that, say, Mr. Putin is a better representative of the people than the liberal politicians of the West because he "resembles" them better, because he "tells it like it is" and "expresses their will more directly", is not only to reduce people to inarticulate consumers who exercise their freedom of will solely through electoral choice, but also to reduce the very concept of representation to "mimetic" or "descriptive" representation, whilst losing the richer sense of representation which is expressed by using the terms like "constitutive", "perichoretic", "triadic", "hypostatic", "eucharistic", "iconic", "imiaslavic", "substantive", "metaphorical", "trustee", "corporatist", "syndicalist", "kenotic", "paratactic", or "analogical". It is demonstrated that this impoverishment is the result of a blindness to what is at once most fundamental and eccentric in language – its ability not just to "describe" the world but also to "respond" to it. Rowan Williams accounts for this distinction in the following way: we are describing "when we produce a reasonable catalogue of the sorts of things we see around us in the world… we have good and reliable criteria of knowing what is a good description and what is a bad description…" We are representing "when we respond to the world around us in words, images, and gestures, which we believe hold or carry some dimension of the world we are in but do not fit into the neat categories of describing. So we may say that a certain kind of reaction to circumstances represents the full seriousness, the full range of a situation, even if it does not try to describe exactly what is going on." [Williams 2013]. In other words, representation "furthers the agency" of what it represents, it "saves" some logic of the life of the encountered reality in a new context. This study explores the possibility that

Western representative democracies are based on the practice and theory of this "richer" kind of representation, developed at the Oecumenical Councils.

This "rich" view of representation informs the anthropology that underwrites the "orthodox theory of politics". Within its framework, the difference between the representatives and the represented is not an impasse but a pretext for proper representation as a learning process whereby the "will of the people" is verbalised and transfigured. Every theory focuses on a particular phenomenon to illumine the general dynamics. The defining trait of the "orthodox theory of politics" is the centrality of the "word" – it is the "word-centeredness" that distinguishes it from the "unorthodox theory of politics" whose main subject is the "will". Schmitt attends to what already exists in the most immediate, tangible, and visceral sense – the land. Since the land easily lends itself to being seen and used as an object of possession, it often becomes a pretext for coercion, the imposition of will on the rival claimants over its patches. Consequently, the "will" is the key faculty of humans in our relations with the land. Since the above-mentioned realism justifies Russia's war against Ukraine with the discourse of maintaining the balance between the "great powers" by granting them the exceptional right to use legitimate coercion in their "spheres of influence", it disables negotiation and creation of the new contexts of shared life "out of nothing" – that is, it disables real politics as a project of "building a city with words" (*Republic* 369a) and devalues language as the main "faculty" of human race in relation to this project.

In the wake of the word/will dichotomy arises the derivative dichotomy of coordination/contestation. For the "orthodox theory of politics", politics is education, the "articulation" of the will, that is, the education of taste and interest. Instead of imprisoning us in the struggle for what already exists, the "orthodox" theory directs attention to the stages of human development, to the cultivation of cooperation and openness to reality as an inexhaustible "gift". An appeal to such a view of history is an appeal to the philosophy of history of G. W. F. Hegel, who theorised the "rational progress" of the state as the

development of consciousness, creativity, and freedom [Hegel 1837/1991, pp. 22-23]. Thus we come to the final dichotomy between "orthodox" and "unorthodox" political theories: scarcity/excess. The "will" competes for limited resources. The "language" creates social worlds out of nothing because, as said Wilhelm von Humboldt, language is "the infinite use of limited means", it is infinitely generative. According to Kervégan's apt expression, Schmitt tried to reconstruct Hegelianism without dialectic and speculative reason [Kervégan 2005]. He borrowed the vision of the fruitful contest between the opposites but failed to acknowledge the dominant role of reason in Hegel's oeuvre. Therefore, to construct a credible alternative to Schmitt's theory, it is necessary to complement Hegel in the area to which he paid too little attention, i.e. language. "All modern philosophy," wrote Sergii Bulgakov, "... passed by language, one might say, without noticing the problem of the word. Neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Hegel noticed language and therefore repeatedly became victims of this ignorance" [Bulgakov 1953].

It is demonstrated that the controversy over *imiaslavie* ("name-glorifying") that erupted in the Orthodox world at the beginning of the 20th century can contribute to an anthropology of political representation. Siding with the apologists of *imiaslavie*, Sergii Bulgakov defended their view that God is present in God's name by positing that words and names indeed carry in themselves something of the "life" of the represented realities. Bulgakov draws an analogy between an icon and a name as a "verbal icon". Consequently, the commandment "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain" (Exodus 20:7) and the prayer "Hallowed be Your name" (Matthew 6:9-11), can be seen as part of the practice of "venerating" names so as to preserve their "representative power" to communicate the life of the persons they refer to [Bulgakov 1953, p. 188]. The outcome of this study is the demonstration that representative democracies are rooted in the theory and practice of this "imiaslavic" representation; that it is this reverent discipline of "name-hallowing" that allows the politicians to act in the true interest of their constituents by focusing on acting in their "name". Based on the principles of this "orthodox theory of

politics", it has been developed an "anthropology of representative democracy", which frames representative democracy as based on the spiritual exercise *par excellence*, "name-exchange" and "name-hallowing", which makes language sovereign by subjecting both a politician and a people to each other's lives in language, each other's "names", which in turn transfigures their relations into mutual learning and substitutionary atonement, co-education and co-redemption.

The degree of the scientific development of the problem.

- Among Ukrainian researchers, the question of political representation was examined by Ovchar I. V. [2009] Zayats N. V. [2009] Dreval Yu. D. [2012a, 2012b] Bedrak N. M. [2014], Lomzhets Yu. V. [2018], Kroytor, A. V., Yakovlev, D. V., and Aleksentseva-Timchenko, K. [2019], Shapoval V. M. [2015] Kovalchuk V. B. and Zabokrytskyy I. I. [2015], Vinnykova N. A. [2017a, 2017b, 2019, 2020, 2021], Bohiv Ya. S. [2019], Bondar G. [2020], Nikitenko L. O. and Grabar O. S. [2021], Gedulianov V. [2022], Mishina N. V. [2022].

- "Constitutive" or "constructivist" theory of representation is developed by Saward [2010], Disch [2015], Severs and Dovi [2018], Disch, van de Sande, and Urbinati [2019].

- The study of the history of political representation has been conducted by such scholars as Eric Voegelin [1952], Hanna Pitkin [1967], Jane Mansbridge, David Stasavage, Anna Boucoyannis, Monica Vieira and David Runciman.

- Carl Schmitt's influence on autocracies in Russia and China is investigated by Auer [2015], Snyder [2019], Lewis [2020], Brang [2020], Che [2020], Mitchell [2020], Libin and Patapan [2020], Reinhardt [2020], Goldman [2021], Harvey [2021], Karolewski, Libin, Patapan et al. [2023].

- The "logocentric" reading of Hegel by Gustav Shpet is examined in the 2021 dissertation of Liisa Bourgeot. I aver that the way British neo-Hegelians [Hyman 2020]

read Hegel has an affinity to the reading of Shpet and the readings of the apologists of *imiaslavie*.

● A "linguistic" reading of Sergii Bulgakov by Joshua Heath, particularly of Bulgakov's intervention in the *imiaslavie* controversy, in which he draws a parallel between the icon and the name as a "verbal icon" (Rus. *slovesnaia ikona*), and also the oeuvre of Aleksei Losev, helps me approach the problem of political representation from the standpoint of Orthodox theology and vice versa, thus adding the "imiaslavic" line of argument to the theologies of representation and mediation of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hans Urs von Balthazar, Dorothee Sölle, Lars Thunberg, Oliver O'Donovan, and Rowan Williams.

● The elaboration of Hegel's vision of the state as a "community of communities" was conducted, in varied ways, by Gaston Fessard, Charles Taylor, Andrew Shanks, Gillian Rose, and Rowan Williams.

● The ecclesial and scholastic roots of representative democracy were explored by Neville Figgis, Joseph Costanzo, Jørgen Møller, Anna Grzymała-Busse, and Sean Messarra.

● The "republicanism" of the Christian Church was explored by Brian Tierney, Francis Oakley, Paul Valliere, and Cyril Hovorun.

The purpose and tasks of the dissertation research.

The **purpose** of the study is to prove a substantial agreement and historical-causal relation between Christian orthodoxy and representative democracy (To develop the "orthodox theory of politics", the "anthropology of representative democracy", and to demonstrate that the two converge in virtue of sharing the "constitutive theory of representation").

The realization of the purpose made it necessary to solve the following research tasks:

●　　To construct a methodology that uses the "word" and the "name" as elemental objects of study, based on anthropology where the two are understood as constitutive both of the speaker and the referent.

●　　To conduct two case studies of the misuse of the "word" and the "name" – weaponization and derealization.

●　　To differentiate between the "unorthodox" and the "orthodox" theories of politics.

●　　To examine the progress of representation from Satrapal representation where it is a mere tool in the repertoire of divine kings to the convergence of divinity and representation in Augustus.

●　　To examine the process of deprivatization of the "good faith" in the development of Christian doctrine and the three clauses of representation from the Roman private and corporate law in the mediaeval glossators and commentators, and their subsequent application in the mediaeval ecclesial and secular governance.

●　　To examine the process of secularisation and politicization of the trinitarian dogma in the European constitutional theory by such thinkers as Vitoria, Hobbes, Rousseau, Sieyès, and Hegel; and to frame Hegel's vision of the state as the corporation of corporations as the final stage in this process, whereby the communication between persons who represent various communities becomes the locus of political decision-making.

●　　To examine Christian doctrines as they stand in relation to political representation.

●　　To examine the Marian titles as they stand in relation to political representation.

●　　To frame the overall ministry of Christ as a political office.

The object of the study is the theory and practice of ecclesial and secular representative governance in Europe.

The subject of the study is the historical development of the key concepts and methodological frameworks of representative governance.

The author had also developed the following hypotheses:

● The practice of political representation is constitutive in relation to the human race;

● The history of political representation progresses from antiquity wherein representation was merely instrumental to the mediaeval age wherein it became constitutive of sovereignty;

● Representative democracy is a legitimate secularization of the doctrine and liturgical life of the Church;

Methodological and theoretical principles of the research.

Methods:

● The platonic dialectical method is expedited in 1.2. to assume "types" of personhood behind different "language games". Besides, the Platonic theoretical framework is used in the selfsame chapter to link these "forms of life" to a hierarchy of human faculties.

● The scholastic dialectical method, recently reconstructed by Cyril Hovorun [2023], is deployed to draw dichotomies in 1.2., 1.3., that are laid at the foundation of differentiation between the "orthodox" and "unorthodox" theories of politics; lastly, in 3.1., Scholastic method is used to categorise the orthodox dogmas as casting light from different angles on various facets of the "constitutive theory of representation".

● Hegelian dialectical method is reconstructed in 1.3. based on the works of Gillian Rose and Rowan Williams. Selfsame dialectic is used to assume teleological development when narrating the genealogy of political representation in 2.1, 2.2., and 2.3.

● The typological method is taken out of the exegetical context to extend biblical and spiritual notions to the realm of politics. Just as Christians saw the themes and events of the Old Testament as a precursor to the events of the Gospel, so I read contemporary political concepts and frameworks as typological successors to the events and claims of the Gospel concerning the Kingdom of Heaven.

Theories:

● Rowan Williams' theory of representation, developed in *The Edge of Words* [2014] and Charles Taylor's "constitutive theory of language", developed in *The Language Animal* [2016] (which he traces to Johann Georg Hamman, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Johann Gottfried von Herder) determine the study's attention to language in the first chapters (1.1., 1.2., 1.3.) and allows to develop a "constitutive theory of representation" based on the centrality of the "word" in both theories.

● Rowan Williams' theory of the direction of the development of the Christian doctrine (focused on Christology) elaborated in *Christ the Heart of Creation* [2018] is assumed in the discussion of the doctrinal development in 2.2; also in the discussion of the atonement in 1.3 and in the account of the emergence of Christianity in 2.1; besides, it is in the background of the 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

● Wittgenstein's approach to the analysis of language is assumed to link "language games" to the "form of life" that they work to sustain, especially in 1.2.

● Boris Groys' framework of the sovereignty of language is used in 1.1 and 1.2.

● "Areas of interaction" thesis of Brian Tierney [1982] is assumed to examine the process of "secularisation" of the conciliar theories and practices throughout the mediaeval period. (2.2.).

The scientific novelty of the research results.

For the first time:

● It has been developed an anthropology based on the constitutive theory of representation, wherein the natural state of humanity is identified with the state of co-inherence, life in one another, which is the life in language, life that is "word-like"; Since our "names" is that part of us that exists in language, the sovereignty of language is attained through our exchange of names and subsequent "name-hallowing" (Rus. *imiaslavie*); the conjecture of the political implications of the *imiaslavie* movement, based on the works of Sergii Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev; an appropriation of concept from linguistics and philology, "free indirect speech" (Fr. *discours indirect libre*) to delineate an outcome of the proper work of representative democracy based on the discipline of "name-hallowing" – the coalescence of the "voices" of the represented and the representative into a "dual voice" that develops beyond their separate capacities.

● Deployment of Plato's theory and Varlam Shalamov's personal witness, to examine the "language-games" within the GULAG as the "forms of life" that cast light on the dysfunctionality of Stalin's and Putin's regimes.

● Reception and critique of the core principles of Carl Schmitt's *Political Theology* from the perspective of orthodox theology; Presentation of Vladimir Nabokov's work as a method of politician's activity; Applying the theological concept of "substitutionary atonement" to conceptualise relations between politicians and their constituents in the representative democracy.

● Historical analysis of political representation as a development from having an instrumental role to constitutive.

● Comparative analysis of the relation between divinity and representation in Octavian Augustus and Jesus of Nazareth; Reading of the development of the doctrines of the oecumenical councils as "deprivatisation" of the *bona fides* ("good faith") that enables the "constitutive theory of representation".

- The rise of representative democracy is framed as the secularisation of the doctrine of the practice of the Christian Church, which ends in Hegel's corporatist conception that fully secularises the act of the Spirit as corporate mediation between the head and the limbs that makes the state one *corpus mysticum*.

- Categorization of the orthodox doctrines as keys to the "constitutive theory of representation": "perichoretic" representation, "hypostatic" representation, "triadic" representation", "iconic" representation, "ketarimic" representation, etc.; also: framing the development of conciliar dogmatics as the development of the "good faith" in the possibility representation, the one's capacity to substitute another without either losing anything but being transformed in the process;

- Comparative analysis of the orthodox liturgy as the articulation of the community of mutual intercession and the framework of representative democracy; drawing analogies like one between the *Deësis* row and the "chain of representation"; Examination of the Marian titles as they stand in relation to the practice of political representation;

- Study of the shape of Jesus' ministry as determined by the plebiscite and conspiracy and the proposed idea that this is how the "will" of the people misunderstand its own interest; whereas it is the representative who acts in the "will" of the Father who knows what their interest is because the "will" of the Father is nothing but the will of the good of the other; (the political implication of the Gospel is that the politician should neither refer to the "will" of God nor to the "will" of the people, because people do not know what they want and the "will" of God is simply the "exchange of names" between the two, that governance takes the shape of Christlike substitution and solidarization).

- The outcome of the dissertation is the "orthodox theory of politics", a framework that clarifies the exact nature of the connection between the Christian Church and politics, and the "anthropology of representative democracy" (ARD), a framework which clarifies the ethical and religious foundations of representative democracy. Implicit

in ARD is the orthodox doctrine that gestures to a "constitutive theory of representation", and the orthodox spiritual discipline of "substitutionary atonement" that gestures toward the *imiaslavic* or *perichoretic* model of political representation.

- *Improved*:

- A definition of democracy as based on the "imiaslavic" discipline of acting "in the name" of the people, the practice of *martyria* whereby a person makes the life of another person or a group of persons in whose name she acts present in her conduct.

- Definitions of "secularity" and "theocracy" as compatible and mutually enabling, whose simultaneous existence is an antidote to "autocracy", where the secular power confuses itself with divinity, which is an elaboration of Ernst Kantorowicz and Giorgio Agamben's accounts of trinitarian constitutional theory.

- An elucidation of the "atonement theories" debate between the recapitulation theory, ransom theory, deification theory, penal substitution theory, and *Christus Victor* theory of Gustav Aulén, through emphasis that it is impossible to think about deification without thinking about substitution and vice versa.

Received further development:

- approaches to the interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel's are generalised into "anti-dialectical" (both "right-" and "left-wing" readings of Hegel) and "dialectical" (Russian and English-speaking neo-Hegelianisms).

- Synopsis of the various narrations of "deprivatisation" of the clauses of representation from Roman private and corporate law by the Glossators, the Postglossators, the church legists, and the secular jurists, during the mediaeval age.

- Development of the thesis that substitution and deification cannot be thought in separation. In this light, Maria Freeman's remark that "Athanasius believed that the Word's humanity was progressively deified during his life as man [Freeman 2019, p. 44], is read as saying that deification is simply a countdown before Jesus's Crucifixion, his

penal substitution of the human race.

The theoretical and practical significance of the study. The practical significance of the obtained results:

● In the academic sphere – anthropology of representative democracy (*further* – ARD) can be applied to assess whether a given political regime is democratic and to theorise the structures of mediation between government and civil society; "orthodox theory of politics" can be deployed to assess whether certain ecclesial and secular practices of governance can be understood as logical development of "orthodoxy";

● In the political sphere – ARD can be used for designing and organising institutional framework of mediation between civil society and representative democracy (to draft solutions akin to Andrew Shanks' "State-institutionalization of the public conscience" [2023]);

● In the social and cultural spheres – ARD can be used to raise awareness regarding the moral and spiritual essence of the practice of political representation; to resolve the false contradiction between the ideal of purity and engagement in politics;

● In the religious sphere – the "orthodox theory of politics" can be used to teach a broad framework that theologically justifies representative, argumentative, deliberative, and parliamentary democracy; the churches may rethink their relation to the state, encourage people's participation in democratic institutions, and encourage emancipation within the church by reconstructing the practice of original synodal or conciliar decision-making;

● In the legislative sphere – the "constitutive theory of representation" can inform the development and improvement of legal frameworks that sustain the functioning of the institutions of representative democracy;

● in the educational sphere – the obtained results of the research can be used in the development of educational and methodological materials for the disciplines like

"History of Philosophy", "Political Science", "Political Philosophy", "History", "Philosophy of Culture", "Sociology", various religions and theological studies, "Anthropology", "Theory of Art".

● ARD can be used as a playbook for the establishment and designing of the curricula of the schools that educate politicians, activists, state officials, and corporate leaders;

Personal contribution of the acquirer. The dissertation research was carried out by the applicant independently, all the provisions and conclusions with recommendations formulated in it are based on the author's own research. The works of other scientists, to which references are made, are used for the argumentation of individual provisions. Only the author's ideas and developments are used in individual scientific papers.

Approbation of the results of the dissertation. The main theoretical provisions, conclusions and proposals contained in the dissertation were discussed and approved at the meetings of the Department of Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science of Kharkiv National University named after V. N. Karazin.

Publications. The results of the research are reflected in 7 scientific publications with a total volume of 7.85 dr. sheets, including 5 articles in domestic specialized publications, 3 foreign articles, 3 articles in a collection based on the results of scientific conferences and 3 theses of reports at scientific conferences.

The structure and scope of the dissertation. The dissertation is comprised of an introduction, three parts divided into six chapters, conclusions, and a list of references. The total volume of the dissertation – 339 pages, of which the main text – 212 pages. The list of references contains 952 citations, of which 913 are in foreign languages.

PART I.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE STUDY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.

1.1. Introduction to the Relevant Literature on the Theoretical and Terminological Apparatus of the Study of Representative Democracy.

1.1.1. Review of the Recent Scholarship on Political Representation. The "Representative Turn" in Democratic Theory; the "Constructivist Turn" in the Theory of Political Representation; and the "Hegelian Turn" in Political Science.

Unlike theoreticians in the old days and a vast number of citizens in our days, for whom there is a contradiction between democracy and representation, the recent scholarship concurs that democracy is necessarily representative [Barber 1984]. In 2011, Sofia Näsström observed the "representative turn" in democratic theory, citing such authors as Urbinati [2008], Saward [2010], Vieira and Runciman [2008], and Shapiro, Stokes, Wood, and Kirshner [2009]. Two years later, Kröger and Friedrich noted that this "representative turn" follows the "participative" and "deliberative" turns in "both democratic theory and EU studies" [2013]. In its turn, the "representative" turn is linked to the "constructivist" turn in the study of political representation, that is, framing the activity of representation as not as something which merely amplifies the voice of certain political identities but as something which brings new political identities into being. Citing Urbinati and Warren [2008], Severs and Dovi indicate that "political representation is not simply a principal-agent relationship that is structured by formal elections…", and that a "representative's role is not simply to respond to preconceived and already-existing interests and preferences" [2018, p. 309]. Instead, Severs and Dovi concur with Saward's "constructivist" or "constitutive" theory of representation which defines representation as "claim-making" [Saward 2010]. "Through their words, gestures, and even silences,

representatives can construct political identities" [Severs and Dovi 2018, p. 309]. That is, the political identity in question is not just a number of people who can say that a given politician "represents" them because this or that action or statement corresponds to their pre-existing preferences but a number of people who are surprised to find themselves drawn to a vision of the future that they would love to share, even if it implies that they would have to change in the process of getting there. According to the constitutive theory of representation, "as a political subject, "the people" does not exist prior to its representation. It originates, instead, within claim-making processes through which representatives construct and select claims that reflect, appeal to, and – in turn – shape the values and norms of the audience". [Severs and Dovi 2018, p. 310]. Thus, the constitutive theory of representation "underscores both the creativity of representatives (as claim-makers) and the role of audiences: representative claim-making is bound and responsive to the culturally specific norms that apply in distinct sociopolitical and historical settings." [Severs and Dovi 2018, p. 310].

There are two implications of this view. First, the emphasis on the *ethical responsibility* of representatives. Second, the emphasis on the *judgment* of the audience. These emphases raise two questions. First, "How do we cultivate ethical representatives?" Second, "How do we cultivate competent audiences that evaluate the claim-making of the representatives?" My answer to these questions is the suggested "anthropology of representative democracy". To think about the cultivation of ethical representatives, this anthropology offers to resee political representation as a "spiritual exercise". To think about the cultivation of competent audiences, it offers to rediscover the roots of representative democracy in the mediaeval proctorial representation of professional corporations conceived as juridic *personae repraesentatae* – communities of character, virtue, and interest [Møller 2018, 2019].

To answer the question regarding the ethical cultivation of politicians, I follow Rowan Williams' theory of representation, developed in *The Edge of Words* [2014], and

offer an idiosyncratic political reading of the *imiaslavie* tradition, recently treated by Joshua Heath [2021]. The fruit of this work is an educational framework that teaches to abstain from hastily reducing politics to an immediate implementation of the popular opinion, from the illusion that the golden standard of democracy is the direct expression of "will" – i.e. referendums, elections, plebiscites, and mass gatherings. Instead of the "will", the anthropology of representative democracy gestures toward acting in the "name" of the people. The impetus behind this terminological fastidiousness is that the emphasis on the "name" clarifies that representation is a *creative* act. The emphasis that a politician must act in the "name" of the people is the emphasis on making people's life in language the cornerstone of politics, in sync with the order of the imperatives in the "Lord's Prayer", where the "name" is antecedent to "kingdom" and the "will" consequent. To act in the "name" is to *summon* people into conversation, into exchange of questions and answers, views and standpoints. A politician's task is to offer a vision of the future to which the people might subscribe; and, most importantly, the vision of their future selves. A politician constructs sentences where the subject is the "name" of the people, and the people respond whether they recognise themselves as subjects of the offered scenarios.

To answer the question regarding the mediational framework, I follow the scholarly critique of both the adversary and plebiscitary or "acclamatory" democracy [Auer 2022, pp. 131–174]. Thus, on the one hand, Fourie and Sands criticise what they call "neoliberal" adversarial democracy for perpetuating unevenly distributed power [Fourie and Sands 2018]. On the other hand, among the Ukrainian scholars, Vinnykova enumerated and examined the "traps" of plebiscitary democracy [Vinnykova 2017]. Democracy is indeed supposed to be about the protection of the minorities and not about the implementation of the will of the majority, the crucial thing is what these minorities are. I interpret both adversarial and acclamatory democracies as systems that fail to orchestrate a *public conversation* between the government and the individuals because they cannot orchestrate a comprehensive hierarchy of representation linked by mediators

who are trusted to represent their constituents *substantively*, not merely *descriptively*. That is, to represent people not as ossified mythical "identities" (be it the postcolonial construction of marginalised minorities or the Schmittian construction of the majority), but as subjects of communication and growth who have a say in the negotiation and elucidation of their interests in the neutral summit of the public square so as to achieve a functional compromise between their interests and the interests of other parties to the State. Representation of a people's interests is the representation of people as partakers in relations of creative complementarity with the rest of society.

Where are people actualised as such speakers, students, and producers? Where do people's interests become most salient? Hegel's answer is people's concrete relations with other people, people's life as members of various communities of character, craft, and conviction – churches, charities, corporations, schools, sports clubs, etc. In this dissertation, I follow a number of corporatist and syndicalist scholars who criticise modern liberal democracy for its inability to garner the political potential of the multifoliate communities of which the civil sphere is composed. Instead of being represented as persons in relations with other persons, as members of communities, elections-centered democracies strip people down to their life as private consumers who "pay" for this or that policy product with their votes. The State thus loses its greatest resourse – an already political life of people as "communicants" of concrete traditions of human finesse. To put it provocatively, contemporary politics risks becoming politics without political animals. Why should natural communities be artificially broken apart into the smithereens of individual electors? Why do we ignore already functioning institutions where people are actualised as "hypostatic", as persons? Why do we ignore communities that can display their role models in the public square? Why do we ingorate the actual network of interdependent interests that sustain the life of the State? [Milbank 2014]. The depoliticization of the workplace and the compartmentalisation of the artificial silos of elections and referenda cause a widespread sense of many a citizen that her vote does not

count. Because the concrete interests of the people as members of estates (socio-economic classes) and corporations are not articulated, people's political energy is channelled into "identity politics". To compensate for the distance between politics thus construed and the concrete concerns of the people, to compensate for the artificial atomization of the people, this political setting is vulnerable to representation on a visceral descriptive basis, to identitarianism that reduces solidarity to the immediate bonds of *Blut und Boden*, "blood and soil".

Furthermore, paradoxically, by sanitizing the political system from being contaminated by the corporate bonds of civil society, the selfsame system becomes vulnerable to civil society reduced to its purely financial dimension – the money of the biggest corporations [Sandel 2012]. Moral judgment is asphyxiated, and things come to be settled by money, and since the modern monetary system is unhinged from the governmental caretaking [Ferguson 2018], through money, the arbitrary fate of antiquity returns to govern human lives. [Groys 2009]. In this sense, is not a coincidence that we call great wealth "fortune". The affinity between the fate of antiquity and money of modernity is that humans cannot speak to that which governs their lives – because there is no one to speak to, no *person* decides but inarticulate arbitrary passions – "…the general mess of imprecision of feeling / Undisciplined squads of emotion" [T. S. Eliot, East Coker, p. 190]. In short, today's liberal democracies are so easily reduced to the level of descriptive representation because they lack the framework of corporate mediation. Today we are represented on a spatial basis, our constituencies are essentially geopolitical – deputies stand for provinces, shires, etc. The eerie fact is that both the postcolonial social justice advocates and Schmitt-inspired advocates of strongmen statecraft share this "descriptive" view of representation and share irreverence with the established institutes of representative democracy.

Hegel foretold this problem [Avineri 1972] and prescribed a solution – to politicise civil society and envision the State as a "neutral summit of society" [MacCarthy 2018]

where the complementarity of various interest groups that comprise it is crystallised. [Kervégan 2000; Yeomans 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019; Znoj 2017; Buchetmann 2023]. Hegel's vision can be interpreted on a spectrum between "corporatism" [Nederman 1987, Sata 2010] and "syndicalism" [Harris 2011, pp. 467–522], which differ by the degree of State's interference. In any case, Hegel's corporatist mediation allows people to be represented by deputies who understand their problems because they kenotically "condescend" to "taste and see" the problems and gifts of their constituents, to share their lives. Hegel's vision is distinctively neo-mediaeval in the strict sense that his framework of "corporatist solidarisation" restores the vision of the state as communication between the so-called *personae repraesentatae* of the various communities [Hirvonen 2017]. In the rest of the first part of this dissertation, I build the conceptual apparatus of the anthropology of representative democracy by examining the recent scholarship on the terms "word", "name", "representation", and "politician" in Potebjna [Fizer 1987, Tytar 2018], Shpet [Bourgeot 2021], Bulgakov and Losev [Heath 2020].

1.1.2. The Concept of the "Word" in Alexander Potebnja (1835-1891) and Gustav Shpet (1879-1937).

In the upcoming discussion, I follow a lineage of thinkers whose readings of Hegel help me in reconciling Hegel with an orthodox theological tradition that emphasises the centrality of the "word". We are accustomed to the two great Russian readers of Hegel in the XX century, Alexander Kojève and Ivan Ilyin. Roughly speaking – and I stress the adverb – in line with the usual division of the readers of Hegel into the Left and the Right camps, Kojève is on the Left and Ilyin is on the Right. Ilyin, whose fascist reception of Hegel [Ilyin 1925/2005] antecedes Carl Schmitt's and whose definition of politics as the "art of definition and neutralisation of the enemy" [Ilyin 1948] is hardly distinguishable from the German jurist's *Der Begriff des Politischen*, was recently popularised by none other than Vladimir Putin who occasionally cited and mentioned him as his philosopher of

choice. Kojève, a self-proclaimed Slalinist who dismissed Marxism as naïve, was described by Shadia Drury as a harbinger of "postmodern politics" in her controversial book of 1994 and simply as "a dangerous psychopath" by Roger Scruton [2006]. Kojève, a close friend of Schmitt, admired Ilyin's Hegelianism and quoted him during his Paris seminars in the 1930s that cultivated a vogue for Hegel and nurtured a new generation of French thinkers, including including Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Georges Bataille and Gaston Fessard SJ, perhaps the most unfairly understudied Hegelian of the XX century.

Inasmuch as both Ilyin and Kojève represent a considerable advance from the preceding generations of German Hegelian Right (Johann Eduard Erdmann and Johann Philipp Gabler) and Left (David Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx), they are indispensable links in the unfoldment of Hegelian scholarship. Nevertheless, some scholars have convincingly argued that their Hegel is so profoundly idiosyncratic that it comes off as non-Hegelian [Grier 2021]. Ilyin simply stated that "the "dialectic"" is neither the main content nor the highest achievement of Hegel's philosophy" [Ilyin 1918/1994, p. 113]. Consequently, and rather like Schmitt, Ilyin locates politics at the outer boundaries of body politic, in its confrontation with the alien other (and the minorities who act as its agents). Kojève, in contrast, having turned the adversarial "master-slave dialectic", a fragment of one stage ("Unhappy Consiousness") of Hegel's system into the key to reading the whole of Hegel [Newell 2016], locates the legitimate violent "break" at the very centre of body politic. In this chapter, I want to bring to the table the alternative and largely neglected reader and translator of Hegel, philosopher Gustav Shpet, born in Kyiv in 1879, killed in Stalin's purges of 1937. Whereas Kojève explains historical dialectic in terms of the underlying struggle of desire and Ilyin in terms of the overlying ideals and duties, Shpet does not explain dialectic in terms of anything beyond our beneath it, for him, it is the order of intelligible public utterance that casts explanatory light on all other phenomena. Shpet, if you like, grounds Hegelian dialectic in the original Ancient Greek understanding of διαλεκτική as literal dialogue between persons, a reasoned

converse.

Johann Georg Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Wilhelm von Humboldt overturned the relation between thinking and language. Humboldt, the founder of the nascent science of linguistics defined language as "the formative organ of thinking" [*die Sprache ist das Bildende Organ der Gedanken*], arguing that "[t]here are no thoughts without language, and human thinking only becomes possible through language" [*Es gibt keine Gedanken ohne Sprache, und das menschliche Denken wird erst durch die Sprache*]. Despite Hegel's contemporaneuty with the aforementioned thinkers and enthusiastic perusal of Hamann, he did not pay close attention to language and considered it to be "the tool of reason, the child of intelligent beings" [Hegel 1988].

Alexander Potebnja, a professor at the University of Kharkiv, "a leading Ukrainian linguist of the nineteenth century" [Fizer 1989], developed Humboldt's concept of the "inner form of language", proposing the term "inner form of the word", denoting a certain "life" that the word "saves and carries in itself". "According to Potebnja, this depth (or internal form) reveals itself as a semantically multivalent image that induces self-knowledge and transforms the primary data of consciousness into syntagmatic wholes" [Fizer 1989] For Potebnya, the word is the realisation of thinking (Rus. *osuschestvlenie mysli*). In the word, thought becomes actual and real. Potebnja described the development of language as the death and resurrection of thought and meaning in the word. The usage of the word gradually leads to its "self-emptying, *kenosis*". A word "forgets" its inner form – this is the law of how language develops. The development of language is the "eclipse" of the original experiences and their "dawn" in new words. The word loses its direct connection with the primary meaning and becomes independent. I take it that Potebnja's description's of language as a "cemetery of metaphors" antecedes that of Lakoff and Johnson.

Gustav Shpet criticises Potebnja but engages in the polemics with his students. Shpet reinterprets Potebnja's concept of "inner form of the word". In doing so, Shpet

reinvents the great scholastic principle that the knower is changed by the object of knowing. For Shpet, the word is an "inter-realisation" (another possible translation is "co-hypostatisation") of the thinker and the object of thought. The inner form of a word, that is, an image, an action, a feeling, an experience, in short, that which is represented, is but an "embryo" for speech. Shpet refers to the "word" as *principum cognoscendi*, "the final form which objects of experience take in cognition" [Bourgeot 2021, p. 192]. "In the word, he claims, we can find a direct expression of being itself." [Bourgeot 2021, p. 194].

For Shpet, language is not born out of human necessity to communicate, rather, humanity is born out of language as if from its internal spirit or nature. Moreover, language has its own, external life, which influences humans. According to Liisa Bourgeot, "Shpet postulates a collective consciousness, in which meaning-constitution takes place, and discovers the "word" as the foundation for any cognition. Shpet's phenomenology remains ontological, as he considers language or culture as the "form of being" in which human beings live." [Bourgeot 2020, p. 169]. In Shpet, "Husserl's pure consciousness as the 'place' where the constitution of reality occurs is replaced by a collective rationality in which each individual consciousness takes part. According to Shpet, this rationality is ultimately language, which thus formulates our vision of the world at the most fundamental level" [Bourgeot 2021, p. 176].

According to Radunović, "Shpet's rejection of the idea of art and language as autonomous phenomena could be seen as 'a rejection of the project of intellectual modernity as a whole'" [Radunović 2017, p. 148.]. Bourgeot agrees with Radunović: "Shpet indeed goes against a founding idea of modern language theory, namely, Saussure's argument that the relationship between the 'signifier' and the 'signified' is arbitrary." [Bourgeot 2021, 249]. Yet this does not mean that the "word" and the represented reality are connected by similitude, for they can "look" and "sound" nothing like each other. This "mimetic" view of representation would have failed to conceptualise the "word" as the centre of sense-making and will turn it into a mere sense-transmitter, a

conduit of prefabricated knowledge. As soon as we begin to think that only things that "resemble" each other can stand for each other, we lose the sense of representation as a *continuity of interaction* whose parties affect and learn off each other – which is precisely how Shpet understands representation, arguing that its parties are connected analogically, almost by a kind of "exchange of life", a concept close to Hamann's idiosyncratic rendering of *communicatio idiomatum* [Hamann 2007, p. 99]. However, Shpet goes further and asserts that the word "saves" not just some properties of represented entity but its organising principle, it enacts its integrity and individuality in a wholly novel milieu.

Shpet wrestled a lot with Hegel. Shpet's latest work is a translation and notes to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. (In the 1930s, he was singled out by his peers as the only scholar who could accomplish this task). According to Shpet, Hegel's principal aim is the "reconciliation" of the private and the common. "Since", according to Hegel, "the state is the reality of the moral idea", it is clear that the reconciliation sought now is an example of this reality. Because reality for Hegel is reason, so he directly defines the task of his *Philosophy of Right* as "an attempt to understand and depict the state as something reasonable in itself." Hence the conclusion: "Since morality in its true form of the state is an objective spirit, the individual himself has objectivity, truth and morality only as a member of the state." [Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §156]. As a student of Humboldt, Shpet substitutes the state by language (which includes the state). Shpet interprets "absolute knowledge" as life in language. As a student of Husserl, Speth reads Hegel's "absolute knowledge" as a spiritual exercise that is to be practised. Liisa Bourgeot writes: "For Shpet this total reality can be entered by engaging in the shared consciousness that in theory can experience 'everything'. In turn, this consciousness is by its nature linguistic, that is, logical. The rationality of the word permeates reality and all our experiences of it. Therefore, Shpet concludes, 'on earth, on the waters and in the sky, all is ruled by the word. *Logic*, that is, the science of the word, is the greatest power on the earth and in the heavens. *Alogism* as a system is mental atheism; an alogist is an empty soul, deprived of

the feelings of verbal grace… an alogist is in a progressive paralysis of thought.'" [Bourgeot 2021, p. 258]. Thus, for Shpet, representation of reality through words that do justice to it signifies attunement to the "Absolute", the "word" that rules the world.

Shpet conceptualised the task of representation when he described himself as speaking as an "echo of the other" (Rus. *eho drugogo*). On the occasion of this poetic formulation, it is hard to abstain from proposing another adjective for the "rich" kind representation – "musical" representation, since it can be described as requiring the representative to act as a variation on the "theme" of represented life, an idiosyncratic performance of its "score", a living "echo" of its "melody". But to proceed to the discussion of political representation, to see how this "high" view of language translates into a vision of politics, we ought to turn to Sergii Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev, religious thinkers who explored the question of not just how a "word" but a "name" is capable of representing not just any entity but a person.

1.1.3. The Concept of the "Name" in the *Imiaslaviac* Theologies of Sergii Bulgakov (1871-1944) and Aleksei Losev (1893-1988).

In Shpet, we see how the "word" presents the world into being. In Bulgakov, we see that this "wording" of the world is inherently personal and political. Joshua Heath indicates that Bulgakov's analogy between Being and language is "an extended development" of Solov'ёv's 1878 lecture on divine-humanity [Heath 2021b, p. 811]. Solov'ёv wrote: "Since grammatically the verb "to be" is just a copula of the subject and the predicate, then, accordingly and logically, being can be thought only as a relation of a being to its objective essence or content, – the relation in which, in one way or another, he affirms, posits, or manifests its content, its essence." [Solovyov 1995, p. 77]. For Bulgakov, writes Heath, "it is the *personal* subject, the *I*, which is the subject *par excellence*. The fundamental form of the proposition is not 'A is B', but rather 'I am A'; the proposition is the structure of *personal* life and all creation is [...] understood as *within*,

not beyond, the personal" [Heath 2021, p. 5]. Bulgakov defines personal consciousness as a living "I", the subject of a certain predicate/assertion. "The personal consciousness "I" is characteristic of the nature of the spirit: "I am that I am", "Jehovah", says the Lord" [Heath 2021, p. 15]. When God reveals his name to Moses (Exodus 3:14), God reveals himself as *personal* and *personhood* as propositional, that is, always the subject of a certain predicate – in God's case, it is self-referential, "I" = "I", now and always. This is the "subject" who is equal to its predicate, its "word", who is absolutely trustworthy. In the words of Heath, "the identity between subject and predicate is always an identity-in-difference, with the copula 'to be' signifying the 'miraculous', dynamic act by which such an identity is established and maintained." [Heath 2021, p. 5].

The acknowledgement of the personal nature of language allowed Bulgakov to think of Trinity in linguistic terms. The pronoun or subject is "the first hypostasis of being, in which is generated the second hypostasis, the word, and which, perceiving its bond with this verbal expression […] accomplishes its third hypostasis [the copula]" [ibid]. Then, says Heath, "...with the revelation of the propositional structure of personal life ('the subject of a certain predicate') it becomes possible to articulate without equivocation the nature of the Trinitarian relations: the Father is the subject, who exhaustively realises Himself in the predicate of the Son, with the Spirit being the copula, the act whereby subject and predicate recognise themselves as subject and predicate to one another" [Heath 2021, p. 15]. "The subject is the entire, integral movement of which the three elements of the proposition are the moments: 'three points take shape in the development of the *absolute subject* [*absoliutnogo sub'ekta*]: the subject [*sub'ekt*], the object, and being, subject [*podlezhashchee*], predicate and copula" [Heath 2021, p. 15]. Sergii Bulgakov thinks the Trinity in terms of personal pronouns, the starting points of language: I (identity-closeness), You (difference-closeness), He-She-It (difference-distance); "by embracing these two 'kinds' of *not-I*, the *I* exhausts all possible *forms or dimensions of difference* – difference in kind, and difference within the same – and so is exhaustively

real." [Heath 2021, p. 15]. In this model of linguistic Trinity we can see a vindication of Erik Gustav Geijer's insistence expressed one century before Bulgakov, that Christian way of relating to the world is not one between "subject" and "object" but one between "I" and "Thou".

§2. *Imiaslavie* as Discipline. Having established the linguistic nature of personhood, we can start thinking about the way in which the "name" makes persons – i.e. subjects of speech – present. This question brings us to the *imiaslavie* ("name-glorifying") movement in the Orthodox Church at the beginning of the XX century, violently suppressed by the Russian army but endorsed by Fr. Pavel Florensky, Fr. Sergii Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, Osip Mandelstam, monk Andronik (Aleksei Losev), and later by Fr. Sophrony Sakharov, Fr. Grigoriy Lurie, Fr. Sergii Baranov and others. Losev characterised *imiaslavie* as "the purest example of Eastern Patristic mysticism, descending through the Palamites and Hesychasts, Simeon the New Theologian, Maximos the Confessor, Dionysius Areopagite, Gregory of Nyssa, to Neoplatonism and Plato." [Losev 1997, p. 55; *my translation*]. The supporters of *imiaslavie* asserted that the name of God somehow *is* God, that God is fully present in his name. As writes Gutner, to Osip Mandelstam (1891-1938), "who believed that the signified was the shadow of the signifier, the thing the shadow of the word and the body the shadow of the name, the suppression of such a heresy could have been nothing short of tragic." [Gutner 2012, p. 28]. In 1915, Mandelstam wrote the poem "And Still on Mt Athos", in which he argued that we come to understand the truth of *imiaslavie* when we fall in love:

> "Publicly, loudly
> The monks are condemned;
> But from their beautiful heresy
> We shouldn't be saved.
> Every time we fall in love

We fall into it as well.

Together with the "name"

We kill the nameless love"

[Mandelstam 1915; *my translation*].

Bulgakov thought the Name of God on the analogy with the icons and the gifts of the Eucharist. God's revelation *as* Jesus is God's revelation *in the whole* of Jesus, including his Name – of God's body in the bread and wine on the altar, of God's "face" on the icons, and God's "name" on our lips and on this very page. Bulgakov described the Name of God as a "verbal icon": "The Name of God is not just a means of designating the Deity or invoking Him but it is also a verbal icon, and therefore it is holy. So, the names of God are the verbal icons of the Divine, the incarnations of Divine energies. As theophanies, they bear the seal of Divine revelation" [Bulgakov 1953, p. 186]. Bulgakov's rationale behind siding with the "name-glorifiers" stemmed from his understanding of language: "Names belong to and reveal their referents" [Heath 2021, p. 4]. Consequently, "If names thus function as modes of being and acting of that which is named, rather than conventional labels, then the same must be said of the Name of Jesus: Jesus somehow *is* His Name" [Heath 2021, p. 4].

Some apologists of *imiaslavie* argued that it is logically inferred from John 1:1 [Losev 1997]. The Word is the ontological and epistemological centre of being. This Word is Jesus Christ; and since Jesus Christ testifies not just to some type of thing, some abstract nature, but to God as a concrete Person, to the Father, Jesus Christ is not just the "Word" but the "Name". The Second Person is the "Name" of the First since the Second Person's whole being is in representing, naming, and simply *living in* the First. Therefore, to say that the Name of God is not God is to say that Jesus Christ is not God. Now Jesus Christ is the "Name" not in the sense of a sequence of sounds and letters; His whole life, whole person is the "Name", his whole act of being *points to* the Father. However, in the way that

the whole person Jesus Christ is the "Name" of the Father, the name that reads "Jesus Christ" is the name of the Son. In the way that Jesus Christ makes the Father present, the name "Jesus Christ", "*Iesus Nazarenus*" scribbled on the Cross, makes the Son present. Consequently, to say that this name fails to communicate the presence of God, that it is not God, is to annihilate the whole edifice of divine-human communion. In this sense, as Sergii Bulgakov wrote, *onomatoclasm* renders language as such something artificial, an arbitrary convention invented by humans. The tradition we have been following in this study, hinges on an opposite view, namely that there is *nothing* arbitrary in language, that language is the supremely intelligible heart of the intelligible world.

Unlike a "word" that identifies a "type of thing", a "proper name" identifies a specific referent, a unique thing. Hence, its "inner form" as it were dissolves in its referent, if not reaches "definitive adequation" – "the strength of agglutination or oblivion does not always engender the complete loss of the original semantic meaning of the "proper name"... yet, the more "proper" it becomes, the closer it comes to that" [Bulgakov 1953, p. 218, *my translation*]. Take the name "Vladimir", although originally it meant "the one who owns the world", this is not the relevant knowledge we infer when we use this name, what we intend to infer is this or that person who goes by the name Vladimir. On the one hand, this utterance, this sequence of letters and sounds, has its "centre" elsewhere, it is the enactment of a person's life by alien means. On the other hand, this enactment is a "sample" of a person's life, nay, even a person's "ontological core", that is fully at our disposal. Knowing someone's "name" simultaneosly gives me power over the person and gives the person power over me, it inhers in me, affects and transforms me, so that this person becomes recognisable in my conduct.

The phrase "hallowed be Thy Name" [αγιασθητω το ονομα σου] (Mathew 6:9) is pertinent to this discussion. When we meet, we introduce ourselves into each other's lives, we exchange names. So that a part of me stays in you and a part of you in me. When you act there is always a myriad of direct and indirect ways in which your actions may affect

me. If you keep me and my interest in mind, then I am present in your conduct. This is what happens with friends or people in any sort of community, including the state. Hypothetically, say you have hurt someone. There is a sense in which you did it "in my name" even though I did not command you to do it. There is a sense that I gave consent to it because I did not exert influence that might have prevented you from doing so. This means that I can be meaningfully held responsible for your misconduct. Not because I was fully represented in your action but precisely because I *was not*, because I did not make myself sufficiently present in your action. The task of the people in the community is to become present in each other's conduct, to become each other's representatives. My task is to become present *to* others and *in* others – to make myself clear, so that you will know that you go against my will when you act in this or that manner. If I succeed in doing so, your action turns into a witness of me. This means that my name is "hallowed" – instead of being instrumentalised or forgotten, it comes to be "operative" in you. Consequently, representation can occur only in a community where people "hallow each other's name". The "name" is the "gate" of *perichoresis*. If we surrender ourselves and become vulnerable to language, that is, if you will honestly express yourself and thus become present in your name; and if I will let language work, if I will "hallow" your name, then you will cast light (or a critical eye) on how I should live.

Now we have likely reached the point when it becomes clear why Bulgakov and Losev linked the way in which the "name" as it were "saves" the life of represented phenomena to love. If my love is real, my lover is never absent from my mind and conduct. At no point do I act as if she does not exist, as if she is not in some serious sense present.

Thus, we can read the commandment "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless who takes His name in vain" (Exodus 20:7) as prohibiting the irresponsible usage of the name which drains it of its representative power. If the the name's representative power is but a convention or

illusion, if were are not in our "names", we lose the trust that we are identical to our words; Hence the exchange of names becomes impossible; we lose sight of each other, we become disoriented; we hide the truth and hide from the truth, we hide from the presence or face of God; we are expelled from the "garden" of truthful converse. "Name-hallowing", on the other hand, cultivates the dialogical space on which the meaning of words depends; to be more poetic, name-hallowing "waters" the garden so that the "names" grow into their representative power – so that we come to live in one another; we "give birth" to each other. Thus, being mortal, rarely do we have courage to lend ourselves at others' disposal, rarely become present in our names. Our names are often not identical to us – we hide hidden certain dimensions of our lives from truthful converse. Yet God's name is identical to God. "Whereas the name in inherent to God in the infinite degree of its being, it is inherent to creature in some degree, more or less" [Losev 1997, p. 135; *my translation*].

Losev identifies three themes that underwrite *imiaslavie*. First, "communication of creature with God is possible only through God's Name (this is one of the means to prevent pantheistic depersonalization)." To say otherwise is to make God *less than personal*. Second, "communication of creature with God is possible only if the Name is not creature but God Himself". Third, "as creature comes closer to God, the Name of God becomes more and more inherent to creature and creature more and more embodies this Name in itself and enacts it more and more freely." [Losev 1997, pp. 136-137, *my translation*]. The thread that weaves these themes together is the insistence that God's act and our contact with this act is not an arbitrary affair, on the contrary, it is the most rational, natural, and meaningful dimension of our lives. Consequently, the name of every thing is its active centre, the reality of its availability, intelligibility, and relatability to all other things.

Pavel Florensky saw the name as a "thinnest flesh" that is the point of contact that turns both the knower and the named object into subjects – its very "thinness"

simultaneously affirms the reality of the border and the reality of its transgression, which enables interpenetration. For Florensky, "every act of prayer is a synergy of divine and human activity, by which the person in prayer comes into communion with the one named (God), and it is the Name of God that makes this possible by establishing the link" [Kenworthy 2020, p. 335]. As Losev puts it, "The name of the essence is the sphere of its communication with "other-being" [*inobytie*] – that side of essence that is open to "other-being"" [Losev 1997, p. 136, *my translation*]. The incarnation of God as the Second Hypostasis, the Word, casts God infinitely intelligible without casting doubt on God's transcendence precisely because it stresses that God is inexhaustible. Knowing that God, that on which everything else depends, has a "name" like everything else, wakes us to the importance of not overdoing our suspicion to the order of intelligible utterance. As Hegel stated in the Preface to *The Philosophy of Right,* "What is rational is real; And what is real is rational". The Word, the Light, reasoning in public, is the theatre of creation; everything else is its dialectically derivative rhetoric.

This view cultivates trust in mediation, not in the sense of trust that mediation will left us unchanged, but that the very change it will bring is for the better, that it will make us more authentically ourselves. To begin with, it requires us to believe that those whom we entrusted to speak and act in our name are actually capable of doing so, that they will not necessarily misrepresent us. One example of what is impossible without this trust in mediation is the love that takes effort. Be it love for the complex concert music or for strangers of different opinion and skin-colour; the endeavour to love things that are not immediately "loveable" is at best adroit pretence, at worst a perversion of what is "natural", where "natural" means simply what passion dictates. But for early Christians, say Origen, freedom was the freedom from this passion; and the freedom from this passion implied the *effort* of discerning the presence of God in all persons and things, seeing them as they stand in relation to the rest of things, as "words" and "names" that make them party to communication, not as a "standing reserve" from which we stand to gain our

power – woods as firewoods, rivers as electricity, animals as calories [Heidegger 1977, p. 20].

§3. Free Indirect Speech. Now can we proceed to the discussion of political representaiton. In Genesis, "Jacob asked, saying, "Tell *me* Your name, I pray." And He said, "Why *is* it *that* you ask about My name?" And He blessed him there" (Genesis 32:29). In Exodus, in contrast to Jacob who sees God's face but never hears God's name, Moses hears God's name but never sees God's face. The difference between the "face" and the "name" is that, whereas the "face" indicates immediate presence (say, Genesis 3:8 and Exodus 33:14-15 expedit the same word *pânîym* (פָּנִים) for "face" and "presence"), the "name" can be "learned" and communicated to many people and hence used as a token of political representation. It is only after God reveals his Name to Moses that Moses is enabled to represent God *politically*, to become God's first political represenative who establishes the fist Jewish polity – who speaks, commands, and legislates "in the name" of God yet emphatically *not as God*. The fact that this representation created a body politic is attested by the operative idea that the representative can take the sin of the whole body politic on him- or herself so as to expiate it. On one occasion, as a true political representative, Moses took upon himself the wrath of God for the sin he did not commit – "[God] said He would destroy them Had not Moses his chosen one stood among them in the destruction before Him, to turn away his wrath so as not to destroy them" (Psalm 105:23), saying "please forgive their sin – but if not, then blot me out of the book you have written" (Exodus 32:32). Another example of the vicarious suffering of the leader is provided by David: "When David saw the angel who was striking down the people, he said to the LORD, "I have sinned; I, the shepherd, have done wrong. These are but sheep. What have they done? Let your hand fall on me and my family." (2 Samuel 24:17). This Mosaic political representation becomes possible because God reveals not just any name but one that indicates its identity to God, "I am that I am". It is this identity between God and God's public revelations, especially God's promises, that afforded Jews a level of

communal trust and solidarity that made their polity genuinely *political* – it encouraged Jews to think that the future toward which they are headed is the valid object of hope and that this future can only be attained in company of one another.

Many of the Jews saw Jesus as the very "word" to which the God of their Scriptures was identical. Whereas Jacob only knew the "face" and Moses the "name", in Jesus, many of the Jews recognised both the "face" and the "name" of God because his "face" and "name" were united in the single act of being, there was no discrepancy between the two. Jesus in is "Jesus", there is no contraction between the two, because Christ's act is the "pure act" of facing the other. The whole of Jesus's life is identical to his "name" because Jesus has made his life a "sign", has staked himself into the order of language and "became a life-giving spirit" (1 Cor 15:45). He, as it were, became "what used to be called a *règle vivante* in monastic communities – someone from whose conduct you could reconstruct the text on which it was based" [Williams 2003, p. 197]. To say that Jesus is fully in his "name" is to say that the Spirit makes him present in the lives of those who invoke it, who gather in his "name". The formative expression is found in the Johannine identification of Christ with the Word. Having established earlier that the "word" is the pure act of representation, we can infer that Christ is a representative in whom no one is lost and all are saved: "Therefore He is also able to save to the uttermost those who come to God through Him, since He always lives to make intercession for them" (Hebrews 7:25). What is often left unsaid is that Word became flesh because flesh became Word, that the Incarnation of the Word is the verbalisation of the flesh. Like a "word", Christ effaced and bestowed his life unto those whom he represents; and it is this act of being gifted to others that makes flesh "word". At the Last Supper and on the Golgotha, in the act of giving himself to be eaten alive and killed, Jesus becomes supremely intelligible, turns his life into a witness (*martyria*) of "what God is like" and "what humanity can be like", that is, of human ability to do likewise. Since Jesus' name was at once divine and human, he as it were "democratised" this practice of "imiaslavic" representation, transforming it from

the model of relating to God alone to the model of relating to all persons. With the belief in his "name", people come to live in representation not just as members of body politic where representation is mediated by the Law and where the people act in the "name" of God by obeying this Law, but as persons who are empowered by the spirit of love to act in the name of one another.

Of course, in human politics, we are as a rule not identical to our "word", we lie, hide, betray, or simply keep quiet, which means that our political representation is never impeccable – something of us is chronically absent in the "name" in which our representatives act. However, without the formal assumption that a person is present in her "name", that the "name" *is* the person – the activity of political representation does not add up. To be a politician is to be a representative. To be a representative is to let the constitutive logic, the "logos" of the represented life to be actualised in a new medium. In political representation, this "logos" ("word") is the "name". My name is in others rather than in myself, it is for others to use. And, if I am communicative, if I surrender to language, I will be present in my "name" and my "name" will be the centre of my life, and thus I will become "presented to" and "present in" those who remember it, the centre of my life will be located in others. And to have the centre of one's life in others is to become genuinely *personal*, "hypostatic". If my name is not instrumentalised but "hallowed" by those who act in it, then it preserves its representative power of making me present. My name is "hallowed" if my representative "tastes" what it is like to be me, if she lives the life of my community. This means that she does not have to "imitate" or "resemble" me. In fact, it is crucial that my representative may be altogether unlike me. Shall our identities coincide, the distance necessary for the human work of understanding and recognition, and hence for education and growth, shall eclipse. If what is represented is my "name", not merely my "interest", "will", or "likeness", then what is represented is me as a *subject of speech and growth*, in one word, a person.

Having examined the "hypostatic" results of "imiaslavic" representation, let us now

explore the possibility of it having a "triadic" subject. If what is represented is my "name", then me and my representative coalesce into "free indirect speech", a "dual voice" that unites the two of us but is property to neither. In this sense, "free indirect speech" has three subjects and hence can be said to make up for "triadic" representation, as in Charles Pierce's argument that "representation… cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of merely dyadic relations since it is of an essentially triadic nature" [Nööth 2011]. In "triadic" representation, represented and representative continue to be subjects *of* communicaiton yet simultaneously become subject *to* communication, subject to the "spirit" of language that "blows where it wishes", even though they "cannot tell where it comes from and where it goes" [John 3:8]. It is crucial to clarify what we mean by saying that the pivotal actor of "free indirect speech" is the "name". When others act in our "name", they represent us not as "already formed and immediately willing subjects" but as "work in progress", "persons in the making". They have to further, not arrest our development. Therefore, they ought to do neither "our will" nor "their will", the speech that represents us ought to be neither "direct" nor "indirect", instead, it has to be "set free". This "free indirect speech" aligns our conversations into a cascade of intercession that ascends to the upper echelons of decision-making, wherein our "names", the rational development of the substance of our feelings, concerns, and ideas, are mentioned, invoked, taken into consideration, and empowered to make a difference. Shall the governance become accountable and subordinate to this "imiaslavic", "hypostatic", and "triadic" representation, language shall at last attain sovereignty and our political world-building shall be attuned to the creation of the world through the Word.

1.2. Two Case Studies:

Stalinism and Putinism as "Misreadings" of G. W. F. Hegel.

1.2.1. Joseph Stalin (1878-1953). Weaponization of Language.

Tracing a theory of politics that can be seen as a corollary to the tradition of *imiaslavie*, I characterised it as one that considers the act of "state-building" to be essentially the act of communication, not dialectic in some wider sense. If language as such is the activity of representation, construction of polity "with words" ought to include the politicians who act like "words" who "stand for" their constituents. If we take what was said about language seriously, it takes only one step from this vision of state-building as a dialectic to the vision of politics in which the act of political representation is central and constitutive. Catastrophically, although Stalin does see the state as a product of dialectic, he does not take this step. Instead, Stalin assumed that, in virtue of having a "correct take" on the Marxist theory with its all-encompassing explanatory scope, he does not need to stand corrected by others' critique and hence that his state-building dialectic does not need to be anything other than unilateral and irreciprocal dictatorship.

In his essay *Communist Postscript*, Boris Groys portrayed social progress as the "linguistification of society" [Groys 2009]. For Groys, Western history, directed by Plato's *Republic* towards the sovereignty of language, has indeed already albeit partially attained its aim in the totalitarian reign of Stalin. Stalin's statecraft can be likened to an unbridled and unmediated artistic generativity of the speaking subject. Stalin treated the Soviet state as the "artwork produced with blood", a definition from Groys' study *Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin* [Groys 1988]. What is more, Stalin's scholarly interventions on certain controversies in the field of linguistics illustrate that he was conscious of his critical role in this arc of development toward the sovereignty of language. In what follows, I claim Stalin as a partial inheritor of the "orthodox" theory of politics. It would have been disingenuous (although convenient) to ignore Stalin's reign as a fruit of the tradition I have been

sketching. Therefore, we have to come to terms with what exactly went wrong in Stalinism.

In a number of issues of Pravda newspaper from 1950, one can track a series of scholarly exchanges on the discipline of linguistics between Stalin and certain nondescript "young comrades". On its pages, Stalin contributes to the controversy around the theory of Mr. Marr, who argued that language has a "class" nature and is derivative from the "class", i.e. that language is a product of the so-called "labor cries" and a part of the "superstructure" dependent upon the "base". Contra Marr and in continuity with the apologists of *imiaslavie*, Stalin argued that "Bare thoughts, free of the language material, free of the "natural matter" of language – do not exist" [Stalin 1951, p. 34]. Instead, in the first letter, Stalin claims the language is the nucleus that links "substructure" and "superstructure", that connects thinking with material production, culture, and economy. However, "after the publication of his first self-conducted interview", writes Gross, Stalin becomes "aware of the danger that the medium of language could be understood merely as something that connects base and superstructure, not as something that rules over them" [Groys 2009, 24]. Therefore, in subsequent letters, Stalin argues that language does not merely mediate between the "base" and "superstructure": "Language, on the contrary, is connected with man's productive activity directly, and not only with man's productive activity, but with all his other activities in all spheres of work, from production to the base and from the base to the superstructure . . . That is why the sphere of action of language, which embraces all spheres of man's activity, is far broader and more varied than the sphere of action of the superstructure. More, it is practically unlimited." [Stalin 1951, p. 13].

Why was it so important to Stalin to declare the primacy of language over the "base" and "superstructure"? According to Groys, he did it to justify the authority of his orders, that is, his construction of the state and society by means of language, the absolute subordination of economy to politics "that operates with words – with arguments,

programmes and petitions, but also with commands, prohibitions, resolutions and decrees."
[Groys 2009, xv]. "In contrast to classical monarchy, power was not legitimated by the
body of the monarch – to be more precise, by the ancestral line of his body… The body of
the communist leader, conversely, is irrelevant to his claim to power. The communist
leader can only legitimate himself by thinking and speaking more dialectically – that is,
more paradoxically and totally than any other person. Without this proof by language,
legitimation would sooner or later be withdrawn from the leader." [Groys 2008, p. 65].
Groys synopsises Stalin's take on language in this manner: "language is capable of entirely
replacing the economy, money and capital because it has a direct access to all human
activities and spheres of life. What is decisive for the functioning of language as such is
therefore not its role as raw material in the production of various linguistic commodities
that are economically connected with other spheres of life, so that the circulation of these
linguistic commodities is subjected to general market conditions. Rather, language
possesses the capacity to connect base and superstructure directly and immediately,
thereby eliminating the market economy" [Groys 2009, p. 61]. (This passage appears
pertinent to the contemporary development of the language-models-based AI which may
become capable of developing intricate economic policies and thus solve the problem of,
say, appropriate pricing of goods which previously could not be solved by the Soviet
apparatchiks but was naturally solved by the free market).

Stalin not only regards language as constitutive of "base" and "superstructure", he
also regards language as operating under the "rich" concept of representation we have
been so far outlining. For Stalin, the thing that keeps representative power of language
alive is the paradox. The paradox is that which that makes representation truly creative.
Paradox is the language that is alive. With a tone that has a fatherly touch to it, Stalin
chides a correspondent who fails to embrace the paradox: "Obviously, having discovered a
contradiction between these two formulas, and believing deeply that this contradiction
must be eliminated, Comrade Kholopov considers it necessary to get rid of one of the

formulas as the incorrect one and to clutch at the other formula as the correct one for all times and countries, but he does not know exactly which formula to clutch at. Comrade Kholopov does not even guess that both formulas may be correct – each for its time." [Stalin 1951, p. 45]. Boris Groys describes the Soviet Communism as the system where paradox reigned. All parties to the debate that refused to acknowledge the truth in the opposite standpoint "were accused by the Stalinist leadership of wanting to kill communist language, which was living because it was paradoxical, with their one-sided, universalist, formal-logically valid and ostensibly contradiction free formulations. Only those who were prepared to speak in a living way remained true to the general line, and thus remained alive – that is to say, only those who had understood that the validity of a given assertion fell far short of establishing that the opposite of this assertion was invalid" [Groys, p. 42]. For Stalin, only thinking that tolerates the paradox can be "alive", can represent without mortifying, convey reality without compromising its complexity. On this account, Stalin coincides with the leitmotif of this study, the idea that language, when its exercise is free and natural, allows the constitutive logic of the represented reality to come alive in a new context.

So where does Stalin take a wrong turn? Although the sovereignty of language is finally achieved in Stalinism, there are several caveats that show why, at the end of the day, Stalinism deteriorated into the unprecedented sovereignty *over* language, reduced to a tool of the arbitrary will. As I have already hinted, Stalin's mastery of "Marxism" make him fall prey to the illusion that his "correct contemplation of the source of things" can explain all other things without council and counsel of other people, in short, blinded him to the necessity of mediation in the operation of language since he thought that his command of dialectic lends him (and him personally) the unmediated command over the "base" and "superstructure". It is remarkable that the Russian word for both "council" and "counsel" is *soviet*. Soviet party discourse operated paradoxically but the absence if independent intermediate institutions and communities has turned the whole system into

the command chain at the mercy of the arbitrary decisions of one man who stood above the discourse, who was exalted beyond all critical "feedback loops". From another angle, Stalin's politics was defective because it only cared to represent "being", the "true" relation between "base" and "superstructure", but not the people – for, thanks to being in the know of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Stalin saw himself as already in the know of people's "true interest" as distincts from whatever they themselves think their interest is. People cannot have a say in decision-making since they do not know what they really need – stuck in the "rearguard" position, they have no valuable perspective to add to the discourse of the "vanguard". Thus, most crucially, whereas the people and the economy were subordinated to language, Stalin was not. He defined which words people could and could not use, he defined which people could and could not use words. In short, Stalin's relation to language was that of a proprietor to a property. But language cannot be owned. In personal terms, Stalin's problem was the one Plato already warned of in his *Seventh Letter* – the lack of friendship. Stalin's orders were arbitrary due to the absence of the Platonic dialectic that can only happen between friends who are equals – as distincts from imaginary "comrades" of Stalin's newspaper polemics. In political terms, Stalin's orders were arbitrary due to the lack of the Hegelian dialectic of "party struggle" in which there is a place for criticism of the regnant "party line". Stalin's feigned self-conducted interviews unveil the isolation at the core of his regime. He became a philosopher-king who thinks totally, who uses dialectics as a technique, but fails to exercise it as a communal practice. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, the "word" functioned not as a sovereign educator, but as an instrument of the uneducated "will". Which is exactly the diagnosis of the Soviet malaise offered by Varlam Shalamov who repeatedly, even compulsively, pointed to the "will" (Rus. *volia*), as the source of the illness of which all other Soviet dysfunctions were mere symptoms.

1.2.2. Varlam Shalamov (1907-1982). *Politiki*, *Siloviki*, *Blatari*: Platonic Estates in GULAG.

§. "No man can tame the tongue". Many a scholar assume that by the end of his life Shalamov went mad and effectively backpedalled and betrayed his anti-Communist prophetic witness. In my view, those who think thus err. Shalamov knew exactly what he was doing – he dedicated himself to the task he recognised to be most relevant, that of preventing the new generations of Russians from adopting the so-called *blatnaia fenya*, the language-game (*Sprachspiel*) of the criminal underworld. In contrast to reactionary Solzhenitsyn, another pivotal intellectual source of Putinism alongside Schmitt and Ilyin [Plokhy 2017], Shalamov understood that we cannot do justice to the essence of the failure of the Soviet experiment at the level of the critique of communism, instead, he knew that it must be addressed at a deeper level – the level of theology. I contend that the collapse of communism would not have brough Shalamov any peace of mind; he would not have been surprised to see that *en masse* depoliticisation of Russians endangered the rise of a new form of tyranny, i.e. Putinism. Shalamov realised that the real problem was a deeply anti-social lifeform of the *blatari* ("thieves") that was propagating itself through communicative contamination, infecting people with the language that perpetuates it. Shalamov's reading of the Soviet history up to the death of Stalin can be expressed by the word "politicide", the annihilation of what I call the political "form of life", the *intelligentsia*, by the state apparatus that preferred to align itself with the criminals. Hence, being freed from GULAG in the wake of Stalin's departure, Shalamov realised that the crucial task is to arrest the further contamination of Russian language. For him, the adoption of the *blatar* language was tantamount to the end of the world.

Shalamov diagnosed the source of Soviet terror as the inversion of the natural hierarchy of "forms of life". To better understand Shalamov's death-camp anti-hierarchy, we can draw parallel with the threefold hierarchy of human faculties in Plato's *Republic*:

(1) *nous* (*logos* in *Phaedrus*); (2) *thumos*; (3) *epithymia* (*eros* in *Phaedrus*). These faculties – rational, willful or irascible, and erotic or appetitive – correspond to Shalamov's anthropology of *politik*, *silovik*, and *blatar* lifeforms. These three groups can be distinguished by their relation to law – respectively as law-makers, law-enforcers, and law-offenders. If we look at Soviet history in the light of these lifeforms, then, instead of the *Bolshevik* revolution (1917) and the collapse of the USSR (1989-1993), we can divide it into the periods punctuated by the three "revolutions in language": the *Politik* revolution (February and October 1917), the *Silovik* revolution (the Great Purges of the 1930s), and the *Blatar* revolution (the 1990s, a complete merger of the KGB and the crime syndicates). After 1927, with Stalin's gradual enthronement as a semigod leader, the language of state stability (maintenance of the status quo) began to blot out the language of politics (challenge to the status quo through language). One crucial thing to note is this: in contrast to the eerily negative ambience of the word "politician" in today's discourse and despite the attitude of hatred and contempt of *politiki* prevalent in his days, in Shalamov's literary corpus, this word has an unfailingly dignified valence. The so-called *politiki* are the main victims of the Stalinist purges. Word *politik* was a pejorative moniker for the people who were convicted of "crimes against the state", that is, for the "enemies of the people". To use Plato's framework, as members of *intelligentsia*, the *politiki* could not help but wrestle with abstract ideas – could not help but think society in its totality. Therefore, Shalamov portrays them as the people whose mode of action was oriented not toward their private good but toward the common good, and thus as the people who could not make peace with the injustice of Soviet system simply because the conditions of their private lives were made comfortable by it; consequently, these were the people who dared to raise their voice against it. By the time of 1937, most of the politically active people of the USSR ended up in the labour camps, including the majority of the prominent memebrs of the first generation of the Bolshevik party. Meanwhile, a new sort of people came to fill the ranks of the Soviet state-apparatus, men interested in simple pleasures of comfort rather than the

asceticism and aestheticism of the revolutionaries of the 1920s, men whose "will" was inclined to "eros" rather than "logos". Distrustful of the politically minded *intelligentsia*, they preferred to cooperate with the members of crime syndicates, the *blatari* whom they incited to torment the *politiki* in the prisons and labour camps. One can venture that, whereas Abbe Sieyès has levelled the three estates of the realm (*les trois ordres*) in his pamphlet "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État?", Bolsheviks have inverted them.

As a result, individuals from all the strata of Soviet society went through the camps of GULAG, which stood for "The Main Directorate of Camps" and was a child agency of the NKVD, the secret police. There, they were exposed to the world that was ordered after the "law" and "morality" of the criminal world, *blatnoi zakon* and *ponyatiya*. In *Krasny krest*, Shalamov writes that "Hundreds of thousands of people who have been imprisoned were corrupted by the "thievish" ideology and ceased to be human. Something *blatar* forever settled in their souls; thieves, their morality, left an indelible mark on the soul of all inmates" [Shalamov 1998, p. 101; *my trans*lation]. But how could this criminal form of life enter the lives of people who stayed away from criminal conduct per se, let alone the GULAG? Shalamov's answer is the language. At first, we adopt the vocabulary and grammar, later, the corresponding behavioural repertoire. According to Shalamov, the intermingling of *politiki* (prisoners of conscience), *siloviki* (the wards), and *blatari* (the outlaws) in Stalin's death-camps led to the adoption of some aspects of *blatar* sublanguage on all levels of Soviet life. Why would anyone want to adopt the language of the thieves? The reasons were varied. *Blatari* often had the real power in many camps. Their cynical language did better justice to the zero-sum conditions of the GULAG (and the scarcity of the Soviet life writ large). Hence, their language appeared to be a kind of an uncompromised critique of the system. Since the genuinely *political* critics of the system perished, the *blatari* were the only ones left to critique the authorities without repercussions – consequently, their inarticulate but sincere and stubborn resistance to the state was seen by many Soviet citizens as something akin to a prophetic witness against

the injustice of the Soviet state. And the Biblical idea that prophets who speak truth to power somehow speak in behalf of God could not help but instil a sense of admiration for the *blatar* way of being, a sense that there is a certain vague "truth" that only *blatari* possess.

It is worthwhile to examine the specificity of the *blatnaia fenya*. The word comes from the so-called *ofeni*, the "wealth-seekers" of old who travelled from village to village to resell valuable goods, mostly icons. They developed an argot to communicate among themselves unbeknownst to the customers with an eye to rip them off. By the time of the XIX century, the Russian criminal world adopted the *fenya*. The language which is used to make speech unintelligible to outsiders is "anti-language". This term was coined by the linguist Michael Halliday. Halliday defined anti-language as a language created and used by an anti-society – that is, a society that is "set up within another society as a conscious alternative to it" [Halliday 1976]. I will condense the principles of "anti-language" as described by Halliday into the two key principles.

First, the effective usage of anti-language consists in "exchanging meanings which are inaccessible to the layperson". What can be deciphered from this description is the precise opposite of the Christian community during the Pentecost. Whereas the speech of the Pentecostal community became suddenly intelligible to the multitudes who spoke various foreign tongues, the "anti-society" deliberately uses unintelligible language so that even the people who speak the same tongue as them cannot understand them. The aim of the Pentecostal community is to share their joy with others, the aim of the anti-society is to defraud others.

Second, "[anti-language] is not just an optional extra, it is the fundamental element in the existence" of the anti-society. "The most important vehicle of reality-maintenance is conversation. All who employ this same form of communication are reality-maintaining others". This principle is key to the study which the reader peruses at the moment: new "forms of life" enter our conduct when we adapt their language. They cannot come to

govern our life until they enter our speech in the guise of new vocabulary, intonations, gestures, idioms, accents, metaphors, etc. According to what Taylor calls the "constitutive theory of language", availability of the new concepts enables new experiences to take place [Taylor 2016]. This means that a new vocabulary, a new language, draws a perosn into a new world and a new way of being: "he clothed himself with cursing like a garment, and it entered like water into his bowels, and like oil into his bones" (Psalm 108:18). It is irrelevant which of these languages – *politik*, *silovik*, or *blatar* – does more descriptive justice to reality, which one corresponds to the "truth". As a part to this world, when we speak, we invite a new world into being – praise enacts a praiseworthy world, and cynicism enacts disaster. As a rule, people with a certain "operative cosmology" will unwittingly turn the world into a place they take it to be. To use Wittgensteinian terms, as soon as we start to participate in certain "language-games", the corresponding "forms of life" start to suggest themselves. At first, we do it playfully without recognising that these "ways of speaking" will come to determine the way we live. And yet, this ignorance does not make us innocent. If there is a choice over which human beings have control it is the choice of what to say. For a human being there is always an option to refuse an invitation into the corrupt patterns of speech – "to refrain his tongue from evil" (1 Peter 3:10). Being aware that evil enters our lives once we adopt its language, Jesus' brother James prescribed the discipline of watching one's tongue: "See how great a forest a little fire kindles! And the tongue *is* a fire… The tongue is so set among our members that it defiles the whole body, and sets on fire the course of nature; and it is set on fire by hell… With the tongue we praise our LORD and Father, and with it we curse human beings, who have been made in God's likeness… My brothers and sisters, this should not be" (James 3:5-10).

1.2.3. Vladimir Putin (1952). De-realization of Language.

§1. "Stealing of Names": The School of Secret Security Service that Prepared Russian Society to Adopt "Unorthodox" Theory of Politics. We can read Russian history

of the XX century as a cautionary tale of how the language of criminality outdoes the language of politics. As Inglehart and Welzel [2005] argued, the "survival values", a zero-sum-game view of the world underwritten by exposedness to scarcity and violence, are detrimental to democracy. It stands to reason that the *blatar* language carried in itself the "operative cosmology" of the deathcamp that spelled the demise of the democratic experiment in the 1990s from the outset. Starting with this inception of the *blatar* "language-game", we are on a path of convergence between *siloviki* and *blatari*. Thus, I suggest that the collapse of the USSR in the 1989-1993 was in fact another revolution conducted by the merger of the secret police and the crime syndicates. Contaminated with *blatar* "grammar of life", their "plutocratic" morality, the *siliviki* wanted to turn the immense state resources under the control of their institutions into their private property. In one word, to steal from the commons. There are scholars who argue the KGB itself has turned into a kind of crime syndicate [Belton 2020].

Now the contrast between the new *silovik* regime of Putin and the old regime of Stalin is that the latter was still a *bolshevik*. As we discussed earlier, even though Stalin's regime was despotic, it was still political, one where the security service was appropriately *in service* of the *political agenda* of the Communist Party of which Stalin was a dedicated member. After Stalin's death, the Communist Party consolidated its control over the security service, executing its powerful chief Lavrentiy Beria and downgrading it from the Ministry of State Security (MGB) to the Committee of State Security (KGB). Cast in terms of Platonic estates, although Stalin was a tyrant, he was still an aspiring philosopher-tyrant, whereas Putin is first and foremost a *silovik* who has put politics *in service* of the security apparatus. The tragedy is that, if during the great purges of the 1930s the political form of life was almost annihilated, during the liberal 1990s it was fully discredited. These historical lessons taught people the twin vices of cynicism and apathy and thus severed them from politics, their "faces" from their life in the language, their "names", thus allowing their "names" to be usurped by the authorities who make decisions not in behalf,

but instead of them.

Shalamov bequeathed Russia with the choice between two language-games – political and criminal. Putin saw to it that she chose the latter. He began to speak the language of the *blatari*. A choice example is his figure of speech from 24 September 1999, "to soak in the toilet", adopted from the *blatar* phrase "*mochit v sortire*", that means to "kill the snitches [informers, traitors]" [Gorbanevsky 2012]. With regard to political language, Putin refused to speak it and repeatedly emphasised: "I am not a politician" [Kriger 2006]. For Putin, "politician" is a pejorative term. Normally, the task of the *siloviki*, which means "strongmen", is to enforce the law legislated by the politicians against the law-offenders. But Putin's elite underwent a process of "anti-selection" – the *siloviki* who staff the highest echelons of today's Russia are programmed to protect the law-offenders against the linguistic challenge of the law-makers. To understand this inversion, we have to examine a peculiar kind of the *silovik* caste, the secret service, of which Putin was a dedicated member (Putin's career in KGB reached its peak in Dresden, the backwaters of its enterprises in East Germany, but, in the end of the 1990s, he served as a chief of the security service renamed as FSB). It is the character of the education of the secret agents that makes all the difference for my narrative of Russia's descent into despotism. To simplify things immensely, the secret service consists of the intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. The intelligence and the counter-intelligence officers are locked into a kind of "hide-and-seek" game. An intelligence officer operates under a false name. His face and name *do not match*, the estrangement between the two is total. A counter-intelligence officer's work is to catch an intelligence officer. Accordingly, he is educated to doubt that anyone's name matches anyone's face. Taken together, theirs is the education of lying and detecting lying, pretence and distrust. Their *modus operandi* can be distilled to this "I am *not* what I am". This education teaches a secret agent that whatever people say is of no significance. If people are not identical to their "names", if they do not mean what they say, if there is a chasm between their words and real intentions, if behind

all public statements lurk the vile interior motives, then language is the most irrelevant, nay, even altogether fraudulent, side of reality. The humans speak the truth only under torture – only then their true nature revealed, when the physical pain and survival instinct compel even the members of *intelligentsia* to betray their principles and loved ones and be exposed the hypocrites who are, deep down, are not as different from brutes as they would like to think. Underneath all the highfalutin theories hides this ugly instinct, everything else is a façade. Public politics is a waste of time because it it is but a theatre of lies – all that is voiced publically is a-priory untrue. Public politics is not worth anything because its currency, words, are worthless.

If this is so, then there is absolutely no reason for the governance to be shaped by the dialectic of party politics. Politics is not about the exchange of standpoints, in fact, nothing can be learned in the mode of the public exchange for it is not the level that matters, not the level from which the world is made – all of that happens on the level of direct and violent confrontation of wills. The future is produced through the imposition of will on the enemies, through direct and indirect coercion, through warfare and bribes, not through debate, discussion, and deliberation; through taking hold of scarce resources, not out of thin air. From this it is naturally inferred that there can be no productive opposition, that any oppisition to the ruler always has a concealed self-interest, not voiced in the public square. Therefore, any opposition to "one party line" has to be defined as an enemy, as an instantiation of the foreign foe. If the essence of politics is not a prosaic, painful, and protracted process of defining and debating the means of attainment of the shared interest, but a decisive mobilisation against the external and internal enemies, internal political divides are always counterproductive. Since the secret service education impotentiates and instrumentalises language for the sake of justifying and empowering the autocratic will, I contend that it can be seen as a Modern reinstallment of the mythological worldview that underwrote the style of statecraft in the empires of the Bronze Age. Putin was educated as a secret serviceman: thus, in the domestic policy, he relied on counter-intelligence

techniques instead of the public politics; and, in the foreign policy, he relied on intelligence techniques instead of public diplomacy.

Through its distrust and disdain of public politics, the *silovik* education brings about a state of affairs wherein the "word" is not sovereign but subservient because, by depoliticising people into atomised invididuals whose range of cares and responsibilities is confined to their private lives, it breaks the "chain of representation" that connects political decision-making to personal communication. Consumerist electoral choices of private citizens cannot add up to democracy. In a representative democracy, the links of this "chain" are the independent intermediate institutions that connect the government with the citizens [Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020]. "Since the isolated individual is a fiction," John Milbank observes, "no individual possesses any real liberties unless he can express these through the relative freedom of the local corporate body – the school, the club, the hospital, the trade union, the co-operative association and so forth" [Milbank 2014, p. 160]. These are the "free associations – from trade unions to universities", says Milbank, "that tend to be bodies committed to an objective sense of the human good and its promotion" [Milbank 2006, p. 263]. These institutions are the communities or corporations whose members share non-arbitrary judgment of what constitutes a good decision or a fine performance, consensus with regard to the common good, and consensus that its members need each other's aid because they cannot pursue this good individually. These are the communities that cultivate virtue, character, and various kinds of finesse which are fine-tuned to the successful execution of the tasks that make up a well-ordered society. These autonomous corporate entities are the proper mediators for the liaison between the private and the political, for it allows the relevant political decisions to be shaped on the level of personal communication. In the face-to-face converse, enabled by the intermediary institutions, what is represented to the government is neither my surface likeness nor my hidden deeper "essence" but my speech "echoed" through others, elaborated, corrected, challenged, refined, "straw-manned" and "steel-manned". Through surrender to mediation,

I am crystallised into "free indirect speech" which belongs neither to me nor to my representatives, for representation blurs the border between us so as to synthesise a "dual voice" that is more than simply an amplified aggregate of our voices. What is thus represented is a person *in the making*, her hypostatic reality as her interaction with others, in short, her "name". By paralysing the independence of intermediate institutions, Putin made genuine political representation unfeasible. Hence, people's "names", formally legitimising the government that acted "in people's name", were effectively "stolen" from them. Since the dialogue between the government and the citizens has deteriorated but the government still desired to have democratic legitimacy, representation of the people was reduced to "imitation". Figuratively speaking, Putin has become a "pantomimist" and "ventriloquist" at once. On the one hand, he has to imitate the unintelligible, either too "mute" or too "loud" passions, feelings, and prejudices of no one in particular, of the "faceless" multitude. On the other hand, the connection between him and the people was manipulated through the controlled media, especially the television, which meant that he had a licence to make them "moan" whatever he wanted them to. Thus, Putin was verbalising their inarticulate reactions into the "Putinist" definition of the national interest. Yet there is a crucial caveat: no one can tame language. The dominant protagonist in the whole process was the television itself, the distorted mediation, the talking-heads in talk-shows and screens in living rooms, the exchange where both the government and the people talked past each other. It was – to use a title of one of the Soviet kids movies – a "kingdom of crooked mirrors" whose characters were becoming victims of grotesque mis-representation. The term "grotesque", from Italian *grotto*, "cave", is apt because it reminds us of Plato's narration about the people imprisoned in the underworld and kept in chains with the aid of the spectacle of manipulative representations, mere "shadows".

That fact that language, the process of mediation, remains sovereign is not a question – the only question is its quality. Since there was no place for intelligent and elaborate discussion of the national interest, the "public opinion" was shaped in the TV

studios that selected for the myths which were most successful at igniting the passions of the audience. Effectively, the public square was subordinated to the television's advertisement-centred business model that feeds on captivating human attention. Gradually, the public discourse was being addicted to spectacle, myth, conspiracy, was becoming less and less sane. Politics was pushed to the fringe of the nation, to its confrontation with other nations, thereby reducing domestic affairs to a mere branch of foreign affairs – to detection and punishment of the agents of foreign influence.

To recap what was said so far: in the absence of the independent intermediate institutions that comprise the "chain of representation" that inter-represents the people and the authorities, the constituent and the constituted powers, Putin had to maintain his representative legitimacy by representing the people in a populist manner – not as persons, as subjects of communication, as practitioners of certain professions or convictions, but as the silent electorate whose very inarticulacy is a conveniently malleable material from which to construct the definition of the national interest that suits the autocrat.

In the Russian language, one can speak of representative action by mentioning either "name" or "face" – first, *ot imeni* (literally "from the name"), second, *ot litsa* ("from the face"). These two "tokens" or "targets" of representation, the "name" and the "face", roughly correspond to political and personal representation. In the democracies of our day, any ruler is said to act "from the name of the people", *ot imeni naroda*. However, we tend to say "from the face", *ot litsa*, when we are talking about representing a particular person or a group of people – where a sustained face-to-face exchange between the representatives and the represented is possible. The task of political representation is to sustain a dialogue between the government and the people that allows the people to recognise themselves in state policies, to see their "face" in things that are done in ther "name". If we think about Jesus, the Crucifixion and Resurrection made him utterly intelligible, have put him "in the order of signs", staked the entirety of his life into his "name" – into something which is at others' dispotal, to be used by others, to be

represented or misrepresented, to be proclaimed, mentioned, praised, and lived in, or else betrayed and weaponised. The Body of Jesus, the "inner form" of his Name, his flesh and blood, is literally ministered to become food to others. This is why the life of Jesus is fully *representative*, like the "word" has "forgets" its own "body" of sounds and symbols to find new "life" in that to which it refers, so does Christ goes through self-forgetting and self-effacement that gifts the "inner form of his name", his body, to those who live "in his Name". Likewise, this means that those who live in Him, those who make up his Mystical Body, the "inner form" of his Name, have their "faces" and "names" at-oned, since Christ's Body is the "ecclesia" wherein all persons are called by their real names and the "leitorugia" wherein all persons face one God and one another. In a similar vein, a true politician presents the state to the people and the people to the state, acts as a "site" where authorities and people face one another, where they are at-oned with their "names" as their life in community with others, in language; and therefore a "site" where people are present in a glorified, even redeemed state.

People cannot become identical to their "name" unless their political leader represents them as such. A politician's duty is to encourage people's self-articulation, people's solidarisation as members of wider circles of care, their growth into the sovereignty of language, into identity with their "name". If this is so, the failure of a populist is the failure to let people "live up" to their "name". A populist channels people's non-verbal clues about their legitimate concerns in a mimetic fashion, turning them into grotesque conceptions of shared interest, into *kitsch* [Shanks 2008], but does not give people time to verbalise their discontents so as to elevate the discussion to the level of objective causes of their discontent (as Williams occasionally diagnosed Brexit, "it was a solution in search of a problem"). It is a mistake to think that a politician's task is to produce impeccable similarity between people's "will" and his public representations of it, for this would produce only slogans and clichés. Instead of servively copying the initial input, a politician's task is to translate it into a new, better language, since, so far from

necessarily distorting the text, translation is the very act that brings it to life. Lamin Sanneh's insightful remark that "the original language of Christianity is translation" frees us from the urge to unearth and take hold of the pristine source will grant us control over the thing we are trying to convey; instead, that which we are trying to convey is what it is only if it is "living", and it is precisely when the text is being translated that it is most intensely "alive". So it is with the people – throughout the process of political representation we cannot settle for the banal beauty of familiar idioms but instead have to find the new "language" for our constituents, to build a new "home" out of words – the "name" they will inhabit.

Putin claims to act in people's "name" yet instead acts in the "inner form of the name", the pre-linguistic signals of the imagined, allegedly and conveniently "silent" majority (Rus. glubinnyi narod, literally "depth-people"). Which is why, unlike the Marxism of Russia's past, Putinism is less of a system of ideas and more of an "ecosystem of catchphrases". If the "name" is not the target of representation, then it is not focal point of the feedback between the government and the population, which means that the two cannot face one another as parties to rational discourse, cannot interact on non-rivalrous terms: either the popular opinion or ruler's arbitrary judgement has to prevail, but there is no chance for the two to co-evolve into something other than either. Hence, a populist fails to represent – he either substitutes people in virtue of resembling them or resembles them in virtue of substituting – in either case, he pays superficial tribute to their passions by imitating them but he does not put them into words, does not make them intelligible. And since these passions remain vague, a populist has plenty of legroom to use their "aesthetics" to legitimise policy that is unrelated to the substantial causes of people's concerns – so that it appears to serve people's interest but, since their interest is chronically unverbalised, misrepresented and misrecognised, what this policy serves is only the ruler's "will-to-power". A populist creates an illusion of acting in people's "name" by conveniently replacing it with the mythical popular "will" – which, regardless of whether

it is fabricated or untouched, instrumentalised or sovereign, fails to do justice to the difficulty of reality and reduces solidarity to the level of aesthetics, colours of skin and colours of flags, "blood and soil".

In the case of Putin, the people are absent from the "name" in which Putin acts because Putin does not act in any "name" at all, the whole medium of political exchange is anterior to language. Putin appears to act in people's name but in fact he acts in something "beneath" it, beneath people's life as subjects of speech and growth. As a consequence, the history of their relationship does not resemble a learning curve. To be the place where learning occurs, the representative has to be continually stirred by sound arguments, because only in this case shall she be influenced by persons and communities, the relevant parties to communication. If we are represented as persons, as active members of concrete communities, we are where are "names" are – that is, we are present there where things are done "in our name". But if we are represented as mere "voters" who choose or acclaim this or that decision, who express the "will" without putting it into words, we become victims to what W. H. Auden called "the estrangement between your name and you" [Auden 2009, p. 98].

§2. The Will, the Kingdom, and the Name. As I have indicated above, the difference between exchanging "faces" and "names" is that the former presumes personal responsibility and the latter political. A sound ethical judgment requires that we do not confuse the two and do not indict anyone personally for what is done by the head of their body politic – they, although not politicians, can bear only political responsibility for it, whereas the actual politicians only personal.

In a representative democracy, politics can be likened to a public "exchange of names". Our sin becomes our representative's sin, and our representative's sin becomes ours. To use a scholastic idiom, our salvation in Christ or damnation in Adam is universal, but it is left to us to "particularise" it. To use Pauline terminology, if we are all represented

in one righteous person, we all become righteous "in name", we are all "called" righteous. Like a political representative, Christ is punished for our sins personally so as to make us righteous politically.

Yet the exchange of sins goes on in any state, regardless of its democratic credentials. But if this exchange is not underpinned by the "exchange of names", by democratic representation, the sins exchanged become not cleansed but aggravated – since there is no one to respond for another, no one to answer the call when another's name is named. A politician answers for the "collective sin" of the people personally. It is because politicians shoulder the sins of the whole system that they are universally and heavily disliked, almost to the the extent of being considered "impure". But if politicians refuse to take the "sin" upon themselves, the "sin" grows to take control of the system writ large (Genesis 4:7). Therefore, collective action comes to be hidden from truthful communication, increasingly arbitrary, *sinful*. In such a state, "collective responsibility" simply means that the punishment is indiscriminate: the land is set on fire.

In this framing, the "political sin" of Putin is that he lacks the "good faith" that allows a person to engage in the public "exchange of names". The "political sin" of Putin is that he is simply not a politician, as he himself proudly confessed. Putin's ethics is that of a secret serviceman. And a secret serviceman's "professional illness" is the paranoia that there is a conspiracy which a-priory cannot be addressed in public but has to be dealt with by clandestine and violent methods. Accordingly, he sees the articulation of the people's ideas about politics in the public square as nothing but lies and pretence – he cannot help doubting that their public utterance does not match their real intent, that there is a secret non-identity between their words and their selves, their names and their faces. Consequently, Putin is a representative in whom people's names are "lost" and they are left to wander in their private life with "faces" decoupled from their primary identity as political animals. A politician re-presents the people, he faces the people publicly so as to bring their "faces" to the place where things are done "in their name". In Putin, people's

"names", like all other words, are devalued and lost. He made it almost impossible to people live in sync with their "names". Security Service education of distrust and disdain toward the order of public utterance, Putin weaponised his control of the mediation between the "names" and the "faces" of the people to "usurp" their names as means of legitimising his reign (Figuratively speaking, Putin's style of leadership makes him something of a "name thief"). Subsequently, he reduced national interest to the security of the "kingdom", which is nothing but his "will-to-power", which he imposed back on the people and on other countries; and since it was arbitrary, people could not recognise themselves in the decisions and laws made "in their name" – it is as if the people's stolen names returned to "haunt" them in the guise of alien coercive will. As one can see, the order of the "name", "kingdom", and "will" of the Lord's Prayer was thereby reversed. This is the "political sin" of the representative – the abuse of the principle of *plena potestas*, using "authority to make decisions that are bounding for the constituency" without its informed consent. The "political sin" of the represented, on the other hand, is the unwillingness to defend their right encapsulated in the principle *quod omnes tangit*, "that which touches all ought to be approved by all" – the fact that they made peace with not having a say in the decisions that are done in their name.

The question of political sin is not a question of direct decisions; it is the failure of examining the ways in which we are implicated in perpetuating the patterns of the unjust world caused by the failure to dispel the illusion of containment within the boundaries of private life. And the eerie paradox is that empathy does not shutter this boundaries. Quite the contrary. In Ayres' reformulation of Gillian Rose, we come to terms with our complicity "[n]ot by empathising with the suffering of the slaughtered, but by exploring how we represent ourselves within the present and past drama of life… To empathise with the slaughtered is only to place ourselves further and further outside the possibility of preventing such actions in the future: it is only to identify ourselves more completely with the post-Kantian picture of the isolated individual facing the might of the state" [Ayres

1995, p. 26].

If there is a way to succinctly outline the ideology of Putinism, the narration has to begin with the cynical education that forms the character of a secret serviceman. All duties of secret police stem from one master task – to depoliticise, to expose malevolent intent beneath the surface of public speech. At the deepest level, the failure of Russians to wrestle with their complicity in the operation of Putin's regime is a result of the learned contempt for language. Russians have "sold" their political agency, their "names", to the authorities for the price of economic prosperity. In the terms of the Book of Revelation, Russians have "sacrificed" themselves to a mute, non-linguistic "beast" of the empire by which they are presently devoured. Thus, while Russians cannot be treated as culprits in the particular crimes committed by their government officials and armed forces, they are responsible for them insofar as their political inertia and apathy led them to outsource their moral judgment to those who do not represent them. Although steered by a received education of depoliticisation, these were the thousands of concrete personal *decisions* in favour of the "bestial" form of life, encapsulated in Aristotle's famed formula – "He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god" [*Politics* book 1, 1253a].

To prepare for the next section, we must synopsise the arc of the argument of the section that now draws to a close. My point of departure was the assertion that G. W. F. Hegel went beyond the philosophy of modernity by reorienting consciousness around its encounter with and response to "otherness". In the discussion that followed, I examined a loose tradition of thought that might gesture to the proper "channel" of this encounter. Alexander Potebnja and Gustav Shpet asserted that this channel is the "word", that which has its being beyond itself in the other, which functions as a "representative" of what it signifies. Sergii Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev argued that language writ large has a personal structure, it always operates "in the wake" of meaning and not "in possession" of it, therefore, human communication is ingited by the uncontainable and inexhaustible

"Subject" or "Source" of language. As apologists of *imiaslavie*, Bulgakov and Losev argued that God is present in God's Name. Since the "name" is that which is at other's disposal, and that which is scalable in a way that the "face" is not, it underwrites *political* representation of God and political representation of the people provided that they do not stray too far from the God's act of being identical to God's Name. Joseph Stalin's example illustrates that, if the speaker is not embedded within the community that sustains the exchange of critique, then the language with all the legitimacy and power it grants ceases to be the "Subject" and becomes a malleable weapon of the arbitrary will of the tyrant; Varlam Shalamov, in the aftermath of surviving Stalin's death-camps, diagnosed the source of the Soviet disfunction as the inversion of the hierarchy of forms of life and warned that the proliferation of "anti-language" of the thieves (*blatnaia fenya*) across society will teach people a depoliticised and hence dehumanised grammar of life; Vladimir Putin, who received the secret police education of living under false names and suspecting that everyone lives under a false name, the education of paranoid distrust toward the sphere of public discourse, saw to it that Shalamov's warning come true – he started to speak *blatar* language and to brag that he is "not a politician". Consequently, the society under Putin's regime experienced not just the weaponisation of language but its eclipse – whereas Stalin's rule, grounded in the communist ideology, was still characterised by the vanguard independence of the party line from the general "will", Putin's rule is dependent on popular acclamation whose loudness makes rational political discussion next to inaudible.

1.3. Prefatory Notes on the Theological Anthropology of Representative Democracy.

1.3.1. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). How the Five Principles of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology Land in Putin's Russia.

The thread that interweaves the varied fragments of this study is the distinction between what I term "rich" and "poor" views on representation. The "rich" view acknowledges representation which is, with regard to its object, "imiaslavic", to subject, "triadic", to relation, "perichoretic", to result, "hypostatic", to method, "dialectical", to aesthetic, "iconic", to linguistics, "metaphorical", to politics, "corporate", "trustee", and "substantive". Under this kind of representation, representative and represented "hypostatise" each other, make each other real. The "poor" view acknowledges the "dyadic", "mimetic", "synecdochal", "pictorial", "realistic", "descriptive", "delegate", and "populist" representation where the representative "copies" and "substitutes" the represented in virtue of achieved likeness; and so, where the representative cannot help but "de-realise" the represented because what is represented is not its identity as a growing, changing "life" as embedded in relationships, but its ossified and self-enclosed identity, strictly speaking, a fiction, a myth. The "poor" representation requires great mastery of skills; The "perichoretic" representation (this is a tautology but it serves to underline the roots of our modern concept of representation) obliges one to *continue relationships* with and be *changed* by the represented. It might not resemble but it *performs* the represented life so as to *further its development*, intimating what her next step would have been in the circumstances she has never been in.

Under the "triadic" view, the *logos* of the represented is *enacted by* and *acts upon* the representative, so that they both become subjects *of* communication; and since they also become subjects *to* communication, to the logic of language, they both get out of representation more than they had lost due to misrepresentation, they get more than they

give. Under the "dyadic" view, representation is a zero-sum-game where one has to dominate and another submit, where someone *has* to lose one's right – where either the representative "copies" without right to exercise her own judgment that runs contrary to the "will" of the people or the representative "substitutes" the people who are stripped of their right to influence her voluntarist judgment.

I suggest that Russia's central challenge to contemporary democracies is that it advocates this deviant definition of democracy, build upon the "impoverished" view of representation. Lewis writes that, "Russia's most radical argument in favour of the Crimean decision goes beyond a traditional interpretation of international law and instead argues that whatever the legality of the decision, it was legitimate because it represented the popular will" [Lewis 2020, p. 148]. According to Putin himself, "Russia created conditions – with the help of special armed groups and the Armed Forces, I will say it straight – but only for the free expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol" [Putin 2014]. Hence, "In Putin's articulation, Russia's interventions are democratic interventions, both protecting compatriots and allowing their voice to be heard, free of the pressure of external powers." [Lewis 2020, p. 153].

Putin's "poor" understanding of representation as a direct mirroring of the "popular opinion" stands behind the widespread portrayal of the "strongmen" regimes as more representative (and hence more democratic) than Western liberal democracies; yet this conclusion suggests itself only if we have an impoverished concept of representation and have forgotten the richer concept which is the process of the education of the popular will by way of its articulation via various "mediums" – public hearings, newspaper polemics, townhall meetings, and, most fundamentally, written texts, which are the "opposite to immediate experiences" [Hovorun 2022, p. 20]. Only these can become a part of a tradition, a lineage of conversation that does justice to the difficulty and abstractness of the challenges faced by the society. The impoverished concept of representation leads to the impoverished degree of solidarity that encompasses only the entities that bear direct

resemblance to one another; ultimately, it is the solidarity between those who happen to share the same "blood and soil" [Björk 2022]. This descruction of the abstract mediation leads to the reduction of politics to the contest of wills that is not mediated by anything – that is, to warfare.

Where does this vision come from? In the forthcoming discussion, I build upon David G. Lewis' *Russia's New Authoritarianism* (2020) to examine the link between Putinism and the political writings of Carl Schmitt – *On Dictatorship* (1921), *Political Theology* (1922), *The Concept of the Political* (article, 1927; book, 1932), *The Constitutional Theory* (1928), *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (1950). To think of Russia's decline into autocracy under Putin one has to revisit Carl Schmitt. In the XX century, Russia's mode of action was explicitly modelled on Karl Marx's thought, although the action itself was in many respects at odds with Marx. In the XXI century, Russia finds itself is at the vanguard of the reactionary wave – Putin was painted as the pioneering "strongman" leader in the "age of strongmen" [Rachman 2022]. And, although the Russian authorities are not in the habit of citing Carl Schmitt to legitimise their policies, the parallels between Schmitt's ideas and Putinism are uncanny. The cynicism of depoliticised Russians who felt betrayed by the political promises of both Communism and Liberal Democracy is very similar to the cynicism of Schmitt. For David Lewis, both Surkov's conception of "Sovereign Democracy" and Dugin's "Eurasianism" can be seen as Russian variations on the theme of Schmitt's political theology.

Both in the case of Marxism and in the case of Schmittism, what the Russian mind succumbed to is a simplified reading of Hegel stripped of, as it were, the "heart" of Hegel's system, the dialectic in the realm of ideation, that is, the Spirit (*Geist*). In a naive attempt to avoid being naive, both systems cut through dialectics, through language, into something which is supposed to be "more real" than it and therefore constitutive of it – be it relations of economic production or relations of war. Both Marx and Schmitt saw public

politics as nothing but theatrical performance used by the bourgeois demagogues to "gaslight" the people with "ideology". Both for Marx and Schmitt, the only genuine politics is the direct and violent imposition of will: the revolution against the internal exploiters in case of Marx and the annihilation of the external enemies in case of Schmitt.

In our day, Schmitt enjoys the renaissance of recognition. The Right celebrates his critique of Western political liberalism, progressivism, naïveté of pacifism, indecisive parliamentary mediation, and subsequent restoration of the idea of the dictator who establishes an unmediated relation to the people by representing their "popular will". The Left endorses Schmitt's critique of Western economic liberalism, U.S. foreign policy, elitist parliamentary mediation instead of direct participation of the people, and subsequent decoupling of democracy from the essentially aristocratic institutions of representation and conceptual restoration of the original view of democracy as the rule of the plebs at the expense of the elite.

In the past, representation was indeed thought in contrariety to democracy. In our day, the majority of scholars concur that democratic politics is necessarily representative [Barber 1984]. Let us contrapose the theological anthropology of representation that underwrites representative democracy to Carl Schmitt's political theology. Bernard Manin identified four principles which make representative governance democratic [Manin 1997]. In the square brackets, I supplement his points with the terms from the theological anthropology:

1. Scrutiny: Intervallic elections [περιχώρησις, the "rotation" or "transfer" of sovereignty]

2. Mediation: The representatives are independent from the immediate wishes of the represented [*plena potestas* – the agency of the constituted power]

3. Expression: The represented are independent in critiquing their representatives [*quod omnes tangit* – the agency of the constituent power]

4.   Debate: The represented-ness of controversial and contradictory perspectives in the decision-making [*corpus mysticum* – the agency of the "constitutional" power as περιχώρησις in the sense of the "exchange of standpoints", "interpenetration" or "coinherence" of the government and the people, of the constituted and constituent powers].

I contend that Schmitt's political theology allows for none of the aforementioned four principles because he collapses them into the sovereignty of the inarticulable and hence un-representable will; and this he does because he sees political representation as an immediate resemblance between the general will of the people and the will of the sovereign. For Schmitt, the distance between the representative and the represented – in terms of both duration and diffrence – makes representation untrue. Hence, Schmitt's impatience with time representation takes and intolerance of dissimilarity between the representative and the represented precludes the possibility of education. For him, to undergo development throughout the process of representation is to not be represented at all. Since Schmitt sees our interests as something that precedes politics, he does not envision the mediation as a space and time necessary for learning what our true interest is. Since Schmitt sees politics as starting from the exercise of sovereign power to define the "enemy", and since this definition tends to collapse into the aforementioned "pictorial resemblance" (*Darstellung*), it precludes the what I have called the "iconic representation" (*Vorstellung*) that is the process of co-education of the representative and the represented, by which we learn to discover solidarity despite our irreducible differences.

§1. Sovereignty, Exception, and Transcendence. In this section, I examine Lewis' list of the "five conceptual pillars that underpinned the Russian political system during two decades of Putinist rule during 1999–2019" [Lewis, pp. 216-217]. Schmitt developed "the concept of sovereignty, understood not in legalistic terms, but as the capacity to take decisions free from the constraint of liberal ideas of rule of law or international norms and

agreements" [Lewis 2020, p. X]. The will of the sovereign has to be exalted beyond the constraint of juridic procedures and regulations. But this very exaltation has to be a part of legal order, a kind of sacred right. Hence, Schmitt develops the idea that the sovereign has a right to step beyond the juridic order by "declaring exception", defining a situation in which the normative expectations and rules are abolished. According to Lewis, "a search for sovereignty of decision-making, defined as the freedom from both domestic and international constraints on political action, was evident throughout political and social life in Russia, expressed above all by the declaration of the exception. From Chechnya to Crimea, from the workings of the law to electoral politics, the exceptional case came to define Russian politics under Putin." [Lewis 2020, p. 216]. Agamben conceptualises this exceptionalism by excavating a term from Roman law, *homo sacer*, used to signify a person outside of the legal order, the normal relations between the citizens of the republic [Agamben 1998]. *Homo sacer* is exempted from the fabric of the law. In autocracy, both the autocrat and the people are gradually transformed into such a *homo sacer*, because the state of exception widens and draws both of them into the domain of unmediated domination.

If we are to draw parallels between Schmitt's exceptionalism and orthodox theology, we will land on the side of heresy. Schmitt's stress on the sovereign's freedom of decision as an end in itself potentially makes action unintelligible, unrecognisable and unavailable for sense-making and negotiation. The Arian doctrine of the transcendence of the Father was read as the doctrine of the transcendence of the sovereign from the public inquiry of the citizens and thus was used by the emperors and their apologists to legitimate their arbitrariness. Arianism "stipulated the superiority of the Father in God, and of the emperor in the empire. Most emperors who ruled during the fourth century endorsed this doctrine. They linked political monarchy with the idea of one God and the Father on the top of the Trinity" [Hovorun 2023, p. 11]. In contrast to this, according to Cyril Hovorun, "Many people in the empire, especially among the political elites, were able to accept the

orthodox tenet about the Son's equality and consubstantiality with the Father, by analogy with the republican idea of power-sharing and accountability" [Hovorun 2023, p. 24]. In his towering treatise *Arius: Heresy and Tradition* [1981], Rowan Williams demonstrates how the "Arian" autocratic view which was associated with the traditionalist sense of the unintelligibility of God to the finite mind, was ruled out by the thinkers, now remembered as orthodox, who innovatively argued that there is a parity between the Father and the "Son of man" that enables the latter to meaningfully contemplate and comprehend the former. More recently, Joshua Heath meticulously reconstructed and emphasised Sergii Bulgakov's argument that the transcendence of the Father has little to do with unintelligibility; in fact, this transcendence is the infinite intelligibility: "Bulgakov's understanding of precisely how the Trinity transcends thought is rooted in his analysis of the structures of language and personhood: rather than being a docile tool for human use, language outruns our comprehension, in a way that points toward the incomprehensibility of God." [Heath 2021, p. 2].

§2. Plebiscite. For Schmitt, sovereign entities are defined by their power over language: "It is one of the most important phenomena in the entire legal and intellectual life of humanity that whoever has real power is also able to appropriate and determine concepts and words. *Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam*: the emperor is ruler over grammar as well". [Schmitt 2011b, p. 44]. If language is just an object of mastery, a means for reaching our ends and not the ground from which we rethink our ends, then parliamentary debate, indeed all thinking in public, can be dismissed as a sham and, consequently, all pluralism can be dismissed as an unnecessary and counterproductive division of the nation. In general, for Schmitt, the "liberal ideal of decisions being reached among independent representatives on the basis of informed parliamentary discussion became a mere 'empty formality', behind which stood 'social and economic power-groups calculating their mutual interests and opportunities for power'" [Lewis 2020, p. 82].

Scornful of the idea that language can bridge the distance and difference between the representative and the represented, Schmitt aims to collapse them into pure identity, sustained by permanent public presence. "The people is not a collection of individuals, to be represented at a distance through a parliament, but a collective public presence" [Schmitt 2008a, p. 272]. This presence is achieved by measuring the pulse of public opinion: "Rather than the secret ballot, the will of the people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better through acclamation, through something taken for granted, an obvious and unchallenged presence…" [Schmitt 1985c, p. 16]. In modern democracies, says Schmitt, "public opinion is the modern type of acclamation" [Schmitt 2008a, p. 275]. This is another instance of how Schmitt's preference for immediacy puts him fundamentally at odds with Hegel, who argued that, "To be independent of public opinion is the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational." [Hegel 1821, Philosophy of Right, Third Part: Ethical Life. iii. The State. § 318.]

It is crucial to understand that Schmitt's polemic is not anti-democratic but emphatically pro-democratic. In *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (1923), Schmitt "did not seek to suppress popular sovereignty but rather to capture its potential, to channel 'the plebiscitary integration of the masses into a "homogeneous" national democracy'" [Lewis, p. 18]. "Schmitt claims that his understanding of democracy offers a more genuine mode of representation than a one-time vote in a parliamentary election, a representation that is emotive, affective and identity-constructing" [Lewis 2020, p. 84]. "Representation is not a normative event, a process and a procedure", he writes, but "something *existential*" [Schmitt 2008a, 243]. Although it has to be granted to Schmitt that he desires to resuscitate a more personalistic concept of representation that tends to be downgraded in the conditions of economics-focused liberal technocracies, the representation he advocates tends to be reduced to the aesthetic, irrational and illiterate, almost biological level – tapping into "the apparently voiceless majority, which finds its voice and agency only through the sovereign leader" [Lewis, p. 96]. The requirement for social homogeneity at

the heart of Schmitt's democracy too easily metastasize into exclusionary racism, or what he terms "the existential bond" formed by belonging to "a species and a race" [Mehring 2014: 313]. It is thus of no surprise that, in 1933, Schmitt characterises Hitler's rule as reflecting an "absolute species identity between leader and followers" and argues that "only this species identity prevents the Leader's power from becoming arbitrary or tyrannical" [Agamben 2016: 465–6].

In sum, it is this distrust of language that led Schmitt to "conceptual uncoupling of democracy and parliamentary representation… Schmitt reconnected democracy to its old meaning of the juxtaposition of the demos or plebs against the elite. Schmitt managed "to force apart the two concepts of 'liberalism' and 'democracy', and instead propose forms of authoritarian democracy, a forerunner of Russia's own initiatives of 'managed democracy' or 'Sovereign Democracy'" [Lewis 2020, p. x]. Schmitt preferred "a form of authoritarian politics in which a sovereign leader monopolised decision-making power to the detriment of other institutions, but also sought a democratic mandate, albeit one shaped by constant media manipulation." [Lewis 2020, p. 221]. "Schmitt – and many of his Russian followers – found the everyday world of constitutional and parliamentary procedures mundane and uninspiring. The exception was always more exciting than the norm" [Lewis 2020, p. 221].

In a similar vein, Putinism comes to terms with "the democratic spirit of the age by representing the popular majority within the system, not through free elections, but through the assertion of a shared identity between the leader and the people." [Lewis, p. 81]. Putin eliminated the distance between the government and the people: "in early speeches, 'we' represented primarily the collective government, but in later periods he increasingly constructed the all-encompassing 'we' of the majority, while 'they' is already identified as the external enemy, complemented by an internal 'fifth column'" [Lewis 2020, p. 93]. "In Surkov's later vision of what he terms an 'ideology' of 'Putinism', outlined in a widely read article in 2019, the Russian people and the leader had formed an unmediated form of democracy, largely unconstrained by liberal principles of rule of law

or parliamentary process. The people in this system plays a role as a kind of political sediment, which constrains the leader and acts as an inchoate veto-wielder over elite initiatives" [Lewis 2020, p. 82]. The people "constrains the fantasies of theoreticians, and forces practitioners to take concrete steps" [Surkov 2019]" . The eerie detail is that the people does not know that it is doing it – it impacts its representatives unconsciously, inarticulately, non-verbally.

§3. Enmity. Schmitt's seminal definition of the "political" runs as follows: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy."   [Schmitt 2007c, p. 26]. As it is with Kojève, the friend–enemy dialectic lies at the core of Schmitt's reception of Hegel. "Friend" and "enemy" are existential concepts that "receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy." [Schmitt 2007c, p. 33]. Paradoxically, Schmitt's concept of the political leads to a framing of democracy as something that has to be *depoliticised*. On the one hand, it frames democracy as necessarily adversarial. It is a system where "many" and "few" can flourish only at a mutual expense – be it "demos" at odds with the oligarchical elite, or the "majority" juxtaposed against varied kinds of "minorities". On the other hand, it frames the sovereign as having a duty to represent the majority in such a way that sublates the conflict altogether and unites the nation into one identity of "friends" whose duty it is to fight against the "foe" situated outside the national border. As writes Lewis, "The location of the political at the edge of the community depoliticises society inside its boundaries" [Lewis 2020, p. 2020]. For this sake, the sovereign expedits a myth of homogeneous popular "will" whose demands are to be satisfied immediately, lest democracy be betrayed. As a result, this adversarial view of democracy pairs well with populism that casts all the prerequisites of peaceful pluralism – nuanced argument, institutional expertise, bureaucratic routines – as suspicious obstacles

to the genuine rule of the people. By bridging the distance between leadership and popular will, the populist eclipses the space where the will could yield to reason, volition acquiesce to cogitation, and learn to do justice to the abstractness and difficulty of reality. By barring the otherness between leadership and popular will, it makes the ruler what Nabokov called the "prisoner of people's will", since he is denied legroom to exercise independent judgment that contradicts popular opinion, and yet, at the same time, where the popular will is so amorphous and ambiguous that the ruler, provided he has power to manipulate it, can refer to it to justify anything, except that which does not go past the confines of simplicity and vulgarity – the geopolitical game of gaining space and power. (That is to say, they grant him the license to act voluntaristically, to veer astray from the bounds of legality and morality, as long as they see him as one of their own, as their synecdochal representative who stands for them against the ostensibly hypocritical elites who enforce behavioral norms which they themselves neglect. The allegedly "liberating quality" of such a ruler is that he encourages and legitimises people's opinions and habits which they were previously taught to be ashamed of.) In this scenario, both the constituted and constituent powers fall prey to the parasitic process of preserving power for its own sake; within the relation where both cannot *learn*; cannot go past the immediate disposition of passion, which – due to the reign of the "popular opinion" – comes to be understood as almost sacred. Yet the biggest victims of populism are the proverbial spiritual authorities of guidance and learning – human rights activists, experts and professors, the "priests" and "prophets" of old, the aforementioned intellectual elites, *intelligentsia*. Ultimately, the catalyst of Schmitt's politics seems to be anti-intellectualism. For Schmitt, representation of what is absent is impossible. Hence, Plato's old dictum that governance has to be in the hands of the philosophers who are concerned with ithe invisible, with the abstract ideas, is betrayed. What is more, Schmitt fails to secularise Paul's assertion that the Spirit makes him present where he is absent: "Though absent in body, I am present in spirit" (1 Corinthians 5:3). For Schmitt, the secular domain is one where there has to be sustained a

direct presence of the people in the government by means of resemblance – emotions, ways of speaking, symbols, descriptive likeness, dress, etc. But as soon as we shift communication to this essentially *passionate* media, politics turns into "us-them-ing". From this perspective, the Russian propaganda's incorporation of an arbitrary symbol "Z" may be seen as a culmination of the reduction of politics to mere aesthetics that marks "a definition of the Russian political entity in terms of a Schmittian friend–enemy distinction" [Lewis 2020, p. 2020]. In the Russian context, it is the "Anti-Westernism" which "became a constitutive discursive element in a new state identity project… which also produced an internal politics of division and marginalisation of political opponents, at times expressed in extreme terms as a 'fifth column'" [Lewis 2020, p. 2020].

§4. Geopolitics. Schmitt stresses the "spatial" and "earthly" origins of the Greek word for "law", *nomos*: "*Nomos* comes from *nemein* – a [Greek] word that means both 'to divide' and 'to pasture'. Thus, *nomos* is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible – the initial measure and division of pasture-land, i.e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete-order contained in it and following from it . . . *Nomos* is the *measure* by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity . . . In particular, *nomos* can be described as a wall, because, like a wall, it, too, is based on sacred orientations". [Schmitt 2003, p. 70]. At first, the land comes to be appropriated as a "reward of labour"; then, the "fixed boundaries" underwrite the political basis for law [Schmitt 2003, p. 42]. As a result, the law is thought as a kind of balance of powers ossified in the divisions of land. Thus, the only way to ensure lasting international order is to sustain the balance between the great powers – i.e. to honour their claims to rule over the "spheres of influence", the "great spaces" (*Großräume*) whose sizes correspond to the projected military might of the "great powers" that claim them. As a consequence of this

understanding of the law, Schmitt rejected "universal, detached, abstract norms" as "a veiled pretext for US imperialism". "Ultimately, law is not a set of spaceless, cosmopolitan norms, but… a unity forged by the appropriation of land (*Landnahme*) and its demarcation from the enemy" [Lewis 2020, p. 140]. "In Schmitt's argument, both cosmopolitan ideas of global governance and Westphalian concepts of state sovereignty are destined to be replaced by a new spatiality, a multipolar world of regions dominated by hegemonic great powers" [Lewis 2020, p. 163].

The *nomos* of the earth comes to be directly linked to the acts of will. The conqueror *merits* what he had conquered. The tiller of the ground *merits* the land because he tills it. Cain, the first "tiller of the ground", thought that he *merits* a certain response from God and saw himself in contrast with his brother Abel because he thought in the competitive terms that are appropriate to the *nomos* of the earth. Paul critiques any notion of meritocracy: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). In the Christian context, the acceptance of one's createdness is precisely this renunciation of thinking one's possession of certain things is justified by one's own effort. For Williams, "to see oneself as self-made, is to be just that – a thing constructed, literally a fiction" [MacKinlay 2019, p. 40].

Characteristically, Schmitt is at a loss in dealing with those aspects of the environment that are hard to appropriate and control. Take the sea. For Schmitt, there can be no spatial order on the sea, no land appropriation or land division. This maritime insensitiveness to the land to a fundamentally distinct understanding of order, to the "universalism of the Anglo-Saxon sea-based hegemony that transcends space, is foreign to the land [*land-fremd*], and is therefore limitless" [Schmitt 1995, p. 320]. By dividing human civilizations into that of the sea and that of the land, Schmitt has again put his political theology at odds with Christianity, this time not just on the "wrong side" of Christian theology, i.e. heresy, but altogether outside its confines, i.e. Paganism. Many of

the first Christians were fishermen, people who deal with the sea, not the earth. The distinctive secret sign of the early Christians was the fish (Greek *ichthys*). The distinctive ethical stance of Christianity had a pronounced universalist and anti-geopolitical bent. What does it mean that early Christians refused to worship the deities of the imperial cult? It means that they disregarded, disrespected, and eventually discarded the balance between the geopolitical powers of the cities and provinces of the Roman Empire which paraded as the cults of local gods under one universal cult of the divine emperor of Rome.

§5. *Katechon*. As a revisionist Hegelian, Schmitt envisions history not as the progression from despotism to freedom, as enshrined in juridic and ethical norms, but as a pursuit of the "golden mean" of political sovereignty, which for him is attained by the nation-state that straddles the balance between a city that is too tiny to safeguard its sovereignty and an empire that is too big to maintain its sovereignty. Schmitt secularises the term *katechon* from 2 Thessalonians 2:6-7 to describe the sheer exercise of sovereignty that respects and sustains the balance of power, thus preventing them from the mutually assured destruction and the world from its end. He writes in his Glossarium: "I believe in the *katechon*; for me he is the sole possibility for a Christian to understand history and find it meaningful" [Meier 1998, p. 22]. For Schmitt, "the restraining function of the *katechon* stabilizes the existing terrain of the political as 'all there is' and its disappearance is only thinkable as the self-destruction of humanity" [Prozorov 2012, p. 489]. An alternative reading of the *katechon* was elaborated by Giorgio Agamben, who claimed that the *katechon* is the Antichrist, "a device for the preservation of illegitimate power, justified as the 'lesser evil' of authoritarian order to prevent the 'greater evil' of chaos" [Lewis 2020, p. 196]. "Agamben's messianic approach", writes Prozorov, "insists on the removal of the *katechon* as the condition of possibility of life beyond the familiar coordinates of the political, defined by the logic of sovereignty" [Prozorov 2012, p. 489]. According to Lewis, "These two interpretations of katechontic order represent two fundamental

paradigms of political thought in contemporary Russia (and indeed more widely): either the legitimation of Putinist Russia as an authoritarian order, which acts as a conservative bulwark against global chaos; or an interpretation of Russia's domestic authoritarianism and aggressive foreign policy as threatening both domestic peace and international order." [Lewis 2019, p. 196]. A theme that unites Schmitt with his contemporary Ivan Ilyin, another representative of Hegelian Right whose quotes find the most warm welcome in Putin's speeches, is a kind of "realism" that hypostatises evil, that treats evil as substantial. W. H. Auden notoriously portrayed Luther as a man "With conscience cocked to listen for the thunder". Katechontic thinking can be thought of as a conscience cocked to listen for evil. The argument that evil should be resisted by force legitimises evil because it legitimises its methods. Ilyin's dictum of "resistance to evil by force", substantiated in his treatise with an eponymous title, risks becoming the *modus operandi* wherein only evil is acknowledged as real, while all attempts to re-see the ostensibly evil thigns in the new light are discarded as dangerous naïveté. Schmitt and Ilyin share a fundamental distaste for an "artificial" amelioration of human relations, treaties, norms, legal protocols, bureaucratic procedures, economic contracts, and the idea of progress per se – for them, all of these fail to do justice to the violence essence of *homo sapiens*. Their is a realism that recognises as real only war and death, everywhere else it sees only as simulacra.

When it comes to the "realism" of Putin's elite, it appears that their own experience of scarcity and violence locks them into an outlook where the world that stands beyond the brute struggle of wills is not fully *real*. Subsequently, the usual targets of their contempt are the people who did not taste the same misery (or behave as if they did not taste it). To ensure that they taste it, the "realists" are willing to turn the world writ large into a place where everyone shall be forced to at last face the "realist reality" and forsake all pretentious principles. You will recall that Schmitt's notion of sovereignty comes down to the capacity to decide without hindrance. However, precisely this exercise of the *libero arbitrio* is the domain of the greatest distance from natural development, because it tends

to ingore the extant laws, agreements, and intellectual traditions, which are the prerequisites of social progress. The "narrower" this zone of arbitrary discretion, the "narrower" this zone is made by agreements, normative acts, representation of different groups, precedents, debates, etc., the better for society – for in such a society language attains sovereignty; not the will of a particular person who happens to be in power. There is only one alternative to this – the exercise of the will as a revolt against all expectations – agreements, obligations, common sense, duties, laws, norms, orders, conventions, ultimately, revolt against reality as such. Decisions, free choices, are central to Schmitt because they transgress relations, contracts, and laws that underwrite contractual relations. In a word, Schmitt advocates for the priority of the "will" over "language", over the "word" that people give to each other. The true human sovereignty is impossible unless the "will" is able to declare an exception from the fabric of human rationality. In this manner, freedom of choice turns into freedom from rational choice, from expected response – into freedom from sanity.

It is said that the nearer we are to a situation where unilateral decision is necessary the worse representative democracy performs. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the nearer we are to such a situation the nearer we are to war. And the irony is that war is created by human decisions. Therefore a "strong leader" who performs badly in the public square of the argumentative democracy can artificially create the conditions of war to create an artificial demand for his leadership. "Let us be realists", hints this leader, "since the world is a violent place, only my violence can protect you from the world". What he does not add is that it is he who is artificially turning the world into a "violent place" as he speaks. This is an instance of a "self-fulfilling prophecy". Instead of looking through the war to some profit which Putin's regime can achieve we have to see that it sees the war as an end itself, as the future by choosing which Putin has made his regime seem indispensable.

1.3.2. Vladimir Nabokov (1899-1977). The Art of Political Representation.

Schmitt claimed to derive what he called his "pessimistic anthropology" from the Catholic doctrine. He secularised the concept of Original Sin and Augustine's *libido dominandi*, casting the sinful lust for domination as the defining trait of the human race and warning that the denial of this view is naïve, utopian, and unorthodox. Contra this assertion, I posit that it is not Schmitt but Shalamov – the person whom only a madman can accuse of naïveté or utopianism – who has a correct take on the orthodox view of human nature. In the GULAG, Shalamov was taught a few lessons in anthropology which he would later stress repeatedly, even compulsively. For Schmitt, to be human is to be political, and to be political is to have enemies whom one can dominate. Shalamov's key takeaway from the camps was the opposite view, namely that, once our relation to others turns into the imposition of will, the irrational and silent coercion, we no longer live as *humans*. In *Sukhim paikom*, Shalamov asserts that "The worst in the camp – is the imposition of one's (or someone else's) will on another man" ["худшее в лагере – это навязывание своей (или чьей-то чужой) воли другому человеку"] [Shalamov 1998, p. 34; *my trans*.]. Shalamov saw *Blatar* "grammar of life" as the life that turns this *libido dominandi* into law, turns the domination of the strong over the weak into their sacred right.

But Shalamov also pointed to an alternative form of life, linked to a certain kind of spiritual practice. Shalamov saw poetry as the antidote to the *blatar* anti-language. In poetry, we are ordered by the music of language, its rhymes and rhythms, we are not conscious of how we remember the next line, we just follow the beauty. Hence, we can see poetry as a practice of surrender to language. Poetry is *memorable*, its source is the generativity of language; hence to recite it is to organise one's life around one's life in language, around one's "name". And since our "names" is our political identity, poetry is not disconnected from politics, it is one of the ways of keeping touch with the historical

trajectory of the community. In the final analysis, what does human survival and wellbeing hinge on if not on the task of coordination? And what is coordination if not the inventing of the language that illuminates various elements of our life as partaking in a common project? And what is poetry if not that which allows language to develop? Poetry "purifies the language of the tribe" from the clichès and catchphrases that are no longer in touch with reality. To say that politics is poetry is to say that the etymological link between poetry and *poiesis* (ποίησις), Ancient Greek for "creation", is not arbitrary. And if it is not arbitrary, then, from the theological point of view, the political process of "building the city with words" is just a version of God's "poetry".

Poetry allows us to "regain our names" and remain *persons* even when we are in the death-camp. Shalamov kept a link with the higher "forms of life" because he remembered poems by heart. What is more, poetry preserved Shalamov's link with life writ large. At some point in Kolyma, Shalamov organised "poetic evenings". A local doctor Lesnyak, impressed by Shalamov's taste and memory, became convinced that he has to save this "member of intelligentsia" by championing his cause to obtain the position of a paramedic (*feldsher*) in the hospital – the intercession that prevented the inmate's sure death in the gold mines [Lesnyak 1990]. Poetry, a common circle of communication with people afar in space and time, saved Shalamov's life.

Among the poets recited by Shalamov was Vladislav Khodasevich, perhaps the most underrated poet of the Russian Silver Age. Khodasevich was a close friend of Vladimir Nabokov, who even depicted him in his novel *The Gift* as Mr. Koncheev. So far I have focused on the Russian writers whose work can provide an alternative to contemporary Schmittism. My biggest concern was to flesh out a tradition whose central trait is the veneration of language. Potebnja, Shpet, Bulgakov, Mandelshtam, Losev, even Stalin, provided a number of qualifications and caveats, all see language as sovereign. Yet without Nabokov, whose literary corpus and life's conduct testify to the possibility of transgressing zero-sum-game of geopolitical realism, this lineage is incomplete.

Admittedly, a legitimate question is, why at all trace the intellectual lineage that has been asphyxiated in the course of recent Russian history, culminating in the outbreak of violence in Ukraine? The reason is that, against all odds, it seems that it is only Ukrainians who, in spite of terror visited upon them by their neighbour, instead of taking revenge, in the spirit of generosity, can present Russians with a democratic alternative that is not imposed from elsewhere but springs from the very mainstream of their own religious and philosophical tradition. In short, the task is to represent Russia to itself better than Russians themselves can.

In any case, whereas Shalamov bore witness to the view of human nature that stipulates the centrality of solidarity and treats coercion as unnatural, as a mere privation of the good, from the direst conditions of human life, the scarcity of death camps, Nabokov draws his readers into the world where language is supremely sovereign. Nabokov is often regarded as unconcerned with politics. Fortunately, this perception was convincingly contested by Dragunoiu's in her *Poetics of Liberalism* [Dragunoiu 2011].

Writing in the 1930s' Germany, Nabokov diagnoses fascism as a reduction of politics to the "earthly", the biological, and thus provides a critique of Schmitt's geopolitical realism. For Nabokov, fascism is ignited by the delight in one's bestiality, the delight that can be fully enjoyed only when everyone else is exposed as the same earthly creature behind the facade of effete charm. In his short story *Tyrants Destroyed*, Nabokov depicts the quintessential tyrant as a ruler of a state with an "agricultural anthem", an enthusiast of all things farming. In *The Gift*, Nabokov describes one acolyte of geopolitical realism reminiscent of Schmitt's as "vulgar" because his discourse sharpens the focus on competition for the immediately available, clichéd goods and makes it harder to imagine the yet unknown goods that can be attained through the legislative transformation of our contest into collaboration. By imprisoning our attention to the cliché, this geopolitical outlook "imprisons" us within the inability to go past the competition of wills for scarce resources.

Nabokov was peculiarly capable of thinking beyond these limits, of the attention to the material world that unchains its communicative potential. In terms of artistic practice, Nabokov believed that its task is to endorse indeterminacy, to endure the urge to categorise things into neat niches, to facilitate the dialogue between seemingly contradictory realities – even though they may now and then challenge the artist. It is the task of giving time and floor for the other to be other. Nabokov's own art might provide a glimpse of the "forgiveness of sins" as a *practice* of escaping from Schmitt's macabre view of politics. For Nabokov, language has a redeeming quality. The central task of a writer or a poet is to "elevate" the world, even its evil components, to the level in which it can be reconciled with everything else, re-membered into the fabric of rational converse, *faced* and *thought*. Nabokov's *Lolita* is a striking illustration of the healing and liberating effect of representation, a book where he manages to put into words perhaps the most un-discussable sexual attraction, paedophilia, so as to wrestle with it without the compromise of objectivity – in faith that the sheer act of putting it into words enacts its own kind of change, is itself a remedy. In *Lolita*, Nabokov captures evil through language, in whose light it is de-monstrated, de-substantiated, and de-realised, so as to narrate the story of the traumas and choices that made the sinner who he is, a story that fleshes out what is redeemable in the sinner, that brings a represented person to peace, into the moment where he hears "the melody of children at play…", and is thus set free from his "diabolical" view of Lolita only in terms of his own passion and catches a glimpse of the objective essence of his sin: he "knew that the hopelessly poignant thing was not Lolita's absence from [his] side, but the absence of her voice from that concord". It stands to reason that, by writing this book Nabokov wrestled with and overcame his own passion. Thus, in this kind of artistic practice, both the artist and the "topic" are cured by language. I contend that the nature of politics is similar. A politician will be able to produce "speech acts" that present persons and communities in the light of possible solidarity with everything else only if she herself is transformed in the process of doing so. Therefore,

politicians may benefit from wrestling with Nabokov's artistic concept of "triadic" representation where both the representing artist and the represented phenomena remain subjects and yet also submit to the "third" subject which is the inexhaustibility of language, the source from which both are created anew.

1.3.3. Rowan Williams (1950). Substitution and Deification.

§1. Scarcity and Excess as Objects of Faith. An alternative reading of Hegel, paved by Russians Gustav Shpet, Sergii Bulgakov, Aleksei Losev, and Brits Gillian Rose and Rowan Williams, is to see the dialectic as central and linguistic. In fact, Alexander Kojève has already turned causal relation upside down – even the will-to-power is explained in the light of the desire for communion, for we want power because we desire to be desired, because our power will make people desire to talk with us. Hence, instead of seeing communication as a deceptive veneer behind which the real desire for empowerment lurks, we can see empowerment itself as but a way to enter into communication. In the following discussion, I contrapose Schmitt's framework to that of Rowan Williams.

According to McKinlay, Williams' Hegelianism "works well in the absence of a need to make enforceable decisions but less well when decisions on strongly contested questions cannot be avoided." [McKinlay 2019, pp. 1-2]. McKinlay writes that "The views Williams expressed in the course of the long debate on women in the English episcopate were in harmony with his theology of conflict and difference. But it was difficult to square them with a pressing need to *decide*, to make a decision that Williams himself wished to have made. [...] Williams attempted to accommodate all sides of the dispute and to make no side the "loser" when evidently that was not possible. This begins to show a difficulty in his approach, particularly when one is faced with a binary decision: either women bishops were to be allowed or they were not. Rather than a "broken middle", perhaps on some occasions there can be no middle at all. But when? In some conflicts, one side may simply be wrong and the other right. In other cases, it may be clear to all that neither side

is unilaterally right, yet that a decision of some kind is unavoidable" [McKinlay 2019, p. 180]. This latter case is when, in contrast to Williams, Schmitt's approach is at its finest. One may equipoise the two in a dictum that has a place for Schmitt's decisionism: "Decide when you must, think when you can". However, there is a sense in which Schmitt's reading does less then justice to Hegel. Although the freedom of volition is indispensable, the developmental logic of Hegel's overall project ought to remind us time and again that the "will" is but an instrument, not a sovereign – that it has to be put under a "schoolmaster" (παιδαγωγὸς), be it law or spiritual authority (Galatians 3:24). Decision and determination are important. The affirmation of decision as an intelligible action of the human will is a prerequisite for history having the "human face" so that one can relate to "fate" as if to a person. For Schmitt, however, this is where the problem is solved, whereas, in reality, this is where we come to raise a problem that is no less relevant – the problem of the education of the will, the reformation of our decisions. Hence, Schmitt's affirmation of decisionism turns into the affirmation of *unintelligible* action. Schmitt's decisionism severs the ties between education and politics because it reduces the communicative tie between the representative and the represented to blood ties. Latin *decidere*, "to decide, determine," comes from the root *caedere*, "to cut". What is cut off in Schmitt's political theology is the relationship of responsiveness and responsibility where the people prevent their government from acting "at will", from making decisions in their "name" without seeking their consent and counsel, decisions that are not approved by them or unintelligible to them but only acclaimed retroactively. Schmitt, on the other hand, "completely neglects the distinction between intelligent and stupid decisions" [Holmes 1996, p. 47]. For him, the sheer sovereignty of decision-making, sheer decisiveness, is the end-in-itself whereas the quality of decisions is secondary. Schmitt's own biography provides the choicest example. ""At least a decision", wrote Schmitt in his diary on 30 January 1933. The occasion was Hitler's nomination as chancellor" [Minca and Rowan 2015, p. 274]. One can argue that Schmitt's "impoverished" concept of representation

explains his indifference toward the particular "forms of life" which politics enables.

Schmitt's belongs to a tradition that pays little attention to the classical distinction between liberty and licence. Schmitt's emphasis on decisionism leads him to carve out a legal sanctuary for the free exercise of will. His aim is to extend the "state of exception" wherein the will of the sovereign is free from juridic and normative conceptions of right. I think that this "state of exception" is not far from what Paul calls the freedom from righteousness: "When you were slaves of sin, you were free in regard to righteousness" (Romans 6:20). Schmitt's "state of exception" is the space where "matters are settled with gas and with bomb" [Auden, *Danse Macabre*], where we reach peace simply by allowing the strong to triumph. Thus, there is a link between Schmitt's sanction for the sovereignty of "will" and the regnant balance of power. Schmitt's endeavour to stop the time and freeze the present status quo subordinates reality to relations of dominance, while rejecting the prophetic witness and education as dangerous illusions. To cite Paul again, Schmitt seems to forget that there is any wisdom beyond the "wisdom of this age, and of the rulers of this age" (1 Corinthians 2:6), that "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (1 Cor 3:18).

The decisiveness is indeed important. Yet, for Williams, the decision that matters most is our decision of what to attend to. In his Enthronement sermon, Williams argued that the Church "will do both its prophetic and its pastoral work effectively only if it is concerned first with gratitude and joy" [Williams 2003]. The "realist" presumption that life is a zero-sum struggle locks people into defensiveness that makes them disinterested in learning. In contrast to this, what makes orthodoxy orthodox is openness to learning. Orthodoxy is necessarily transformative because it is continually drawn out of its contentedness with its present terms by the object of its desire, God. Because it desires God, the uncontainable and inexhaustible, it simply desires to continue desiring, to desire without end. Therefore, the orthodox sensibility is one that understands that learning is never over. If it stops learning, it means that it desires something it already knows and

possesses, and this in turn means that it desires something other than God. The halt in learning denotes that it came to love itself and not God. Finally, the key difference between the two frameworks so far discussed, the "orthodox" and the "unorthodox" theories of politics, is their object of faith – in the latter case, it is scarcity, in the former, excess, in the latter, territorial possessions, in the former, God.

Saint Augustine derived a political theory from this framework. For him, *civitas dei* is a city that loves and desires God, whereas *civitas terrena*, a pagan and idolatrous city "whose own strength is its god", is a city whose love is turned onto itself and, therefore, whose desires are passionate in the classical sense of irrationality. Elsewhere, I hypothesise that orthodoxy presumes a universal infinite learning curve where the "lesson" is God. The Pauline-Thomist-Hegelian vision of education is a vision of deification (*theosis*) – the attunement of our conduct to the "pure act" of God by entering relations with God wherein the will is purified from arbitrariness by being led (Lat. *ducere*) by thinking and loving, the two forms of being-in-the-other (Greek *perichoresis*). This "pure act", the act of entering others and being entered by others, is the very act that allows to grow (a conclusion we may draw from the "Dunbar's number" research is that the lack of such representation, of "keeping others in mind" and "being mindful of others" diminishes our mind, literally makes our brains smaller).

§2. Language and God. Williams' 2014 book *The Edge of Words*, based on his 2013 Gifford Lectures on natural theology, a discipline that, as Encyclopedia Britannica puts it, aims to "establish religious truths [mainly existence of God] by rational argument and without reliance upon alleged revelations", is concerned with language. So far I have discussed language as that which constitutes humanity. If human species, the "shadow" (*tselem*) of God, is defined by its linguistic faculty, what does it say about God who casts the shadow? Rowan Williams is the theologian who has arguably came the closest to drawing a comprehensive analogy between God and language that is "impossible to

possess" ("*la langue n'appartient pas*", as Jacques Derrida quipped): "…language cannot describe or contain the conditions of its own possibility – and that this incapacity is precisely the source of its energy, its movement, its capacity for correction, innovation and imagination. Language behaves as if it were always 'in the wake' of meaning, rather than owning and controlling it" [Williams 2014, pp. 172-173].

As one of the apostles has put it, "no man can tame the tongue" (James 3:8). No matter what we do, language always ends up as a subject in relation to us. It is this subjectivity that constitutes the "third" party to representation that saves representative and represented from a "dyadic" zero-sum-struggle. This is the difference that is repeatedly emphasiseed by Williams – the "difference between representing and imitating or substituting" [Williams 2014, pp. 196-197]. What is unique about language is that it represents without loss. Williams discusses the representative activity of the word by referring to Hegel's concept of representation (*Vorstellung*): "the act of representing, so far from being a flight, as we might say, from substance to substitute, is an act which simultaneously recognizes the other, the 'object', as thoroughly bound into the life of the subject, and recognizes the self, the 'subject', as invested in the object – so that conventional categories of inner and outer, mind and matter, are suspended and transformed ('sublated', in the usual idiom of English versions of Hegel)"; in other words, "representation *performs* what it refers to: it enacts the mutual investment of subject and object" [Williams 2014, p. 194].

"*Vorstellung* is a moment in the self's recognition of itself as already materially situated, already 'spoken to' (receiving intelligible form into itself). Representing is performing or enacting a form of being in a new mode" [Williams 2014, p. 195]. It is here that Hegel stands within what Losev curiously described as the mystical tradition of *imiaslavie* that sees the world as essentially a network of communication, whose "protagonists" are words (*logoi*). It is these "words" that act as the "third" subject in the "triadic" representation. Likewise, in scholasticism, e.g. in Thomas Aquinas' theory of

knowing, the "object of understanding lives again in us as the active product of the mind – the *verbum,* the inner word, that is the fruit of the encounter between mind and object… the life of one reality in another…" [Williams 2001, p. 262]. It is because of this that we can say that "Language is a self-differentiation, a letting what is other live in me without either the other or myself losing something" [Williams 2001, p. 262].

Upon our arrival at this conclusion that language is the quintessential "interpenetration" or "being-in-the-other", the parallels with the orthodox teaching on God become clear. It stands to reason that it is this representative power of language to overcome all kinds of zero-sum-games which is affirmed by the theologians of the Great Œcumenical Councils. When the represented becomes present in the representative, nothing of either is lost or compromised, instead, as the formula of Chalcedon teaches us, in this concrete instantiation, *hypostasis,* both become actual. From this it can be inferred that the representative does not necessarily diminish when she represents the represented, instead, it is precisely when she becomes the place where the other is present that she becomes fully and uniquely herself. Representational relations are the relations where there is no competition in the sense that – the more I live *for others,* the more *I* live, the more intense and fulfilled my life becomes. "I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly" (John 10:10). It is a "shame" to live only one life when one live "in glory", when one can live many lives in others and live many lives of others in oneself: "And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the LORD, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another. For this comes from the LORD who is the Spirit." (2 Corinthians 3:18, ESV).

The work of the Spirit is simply this: drawing everybody into the Trinitarian interpenetration. The Father begets the Son, presents what is identical and other at once. Everything else is a matter of re-presentation of this original presentation, a matter of Spirit. The Son is re-presented back to the Father yet in concert with the whole of creation, the great variety of responses the Father – that is to say, by the power of the Holy Spirit

whose face is the myriad faces of the perfected creatures: "The Spirit has no human face, although every human face on which the grace of the Spirit has been bestowed – above all that of her who is 'full of grace', makes it manifest" [Bulgakov 1946, p. 264:]. "He substitutes Himself, so to speak, for ourselves," writes Lossky [Lossky p. 172]. The Spirit is manifest "in deified persons: for the multitude of the saints will be His image." [Lossky 1976, p. 173]. As Williams eloquently paraphrases it, "The face of the Holy Spirit is the faces of all the saints." [Williams 2008a, p. 41]. If this is the work of the Spirit, then any talk about spiritual exercises that does not mention entering relations of mutuality with concrete neighbours is nonsense.

§3. Substitution and Deificaiton: From Exchange of Names to Exchange of Sins. In terms of representation, the difference Christ makes is the difference between the first book of the Bible, in which humans "began to call on the name of the LORD" (Genesis 4:26) and the last, where human names are said to be "written in the book of the Lamb" (Revelation 21:27). The same practice of name-hallowing extends to encompass all creation: in the Torah, humans bear the Name of the Father, in the Gospels, Christ bears the name of humans, in the Spirit of Christ, humans bear the names of one another.

The emphasis on the "name" is not accidental. To address another by the "name" is to approach another as *active* and *communicative*, as a *person* who can affect, change, and steer us. Otherwise, if we focus on something besides the "name", we risk reducing another to a possessor of properties, to a rival "will" that has to be resisted and subdued. The difference between the two is the difference between love and war – life-in-one-another and struggle for space, mutual indwelling and mutual exclusion.

In the Book of Kings, God promises "to cause His name to dwell" in the Temple (*leshakken shemo sham*) (1 Kings 9:3; 11:36; 14:21; 2 Kings 21:4). Hence, the key task of a king is to build an edifice that can house God' Name. When Solomon builds the Temple, God accepts it as "a house for my name" (*bayit lishmi*) (Kings 8:17-20, 44). The phrase "to

put one's name" came into the Bible from the Akkadian context where it denoted the glorification of a king by installing a monument with the inscription of his name [Richter 2014]. Yet since Jewish Temple glorified not king's but God's Name, they were able to abstract praise beyond addiction to power: "Some *trust* in chariots, and some in horses; But we will remember the name of the Lᴏʀᴅ our God" (Psalm 20:7). In the rest of Psalm 20, God's Name is portrayed as an active agent of salvation: "May the name of the God of Jacob defend you" (20:1); "We will rejoice in your salvation, And in the name of our God we will set up *our* banners!" (20:5).

The next step was to bestow this love back on human beings. This bestowal is glimpsed in Isaiah 53, where we read a prophecy that God himself shall become a saviour-king and a "temple" for the people: "He himself bore our sicknesses, and he carried our pains" (Isaiah 53:4). "he was pierced because of our rebellion, crushed because of our iniquities; punishment for our peace was on him, and we are healed by his wounds" (Isaiah 53:5). He died as a "guilt offering" in the place of sinners (53:10). "He was numbered with the transgressors, And He bore the sin of many, And made intercession for the transgressors" (Isaiah 53:12).

Christians hailed Jesus as the saviour-king of Isaiah's prophecy. As reads the Anamnesis of the Great Anaphora of St. Basil's Liturgy, "He gave himself as a ransom to Death by which we were held captive, sold into slavery under sin" [e.d. Vaporis n.d.]. But how can it be that the action of a single person has a salvific effect on people far away? How can one particular death enact salvation for people across distance and time?

Paul effectively invents Christian theology to give his answer to this question – the represented partake in the life of their representative through faith in his name. As reads the incipit of John's Gospel: "to those who believe in His name [πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ] he gave the right to become children of God" (John 1:12). Faith in the name of Christ represents the faithful as righteous, incorporates into righteousness, even adopts to divinity. Common to various Christian communities from the first and second centuries CE

was a sense that Jesus and Jehovah share in the "Divine Name" (after all, *Yehoshua* means "Jehovah saves"). Relevant scholarship reads this as betokening high Christology antecedent to the high Christology of Nicaea (confession of Christ's con-substantiality with God) [Fossum 1985, Hurtado 1998, Gieschen 2003]. In Charles Gieschen's rendition of Jarl Fossum, "long before the Nicene Creed confessed the Son to be of "one substance with the Father", some first-century Jews were confessing the full identification of the Son with the Father on the basis of the Divine Name they shared" [Gieschen 2003, p. 158]. The usage of what is called the "Name Theology" is almost invariably related to soteriology, i.e. the science of salvation [Harris 2013, p. 275]. "In Rome," writes Harris, "knowledge [of the Name] was necessary for, and led to the possibility of salvation. In Syria, possession of the Name was in direct correspondence with salvation, and so was guarded to one degree or another. In Alexandria, the knowledge itself virtually amounted to salvation, and so was only possible for the elect." [Harris 2013, p. 281]. Referencing 1 Enoch, Harris concludes that "the Name elicits responses of acknowledgement, which save, and responses of denial, which condemn" [Harris 2013, p. 280].

Paul's Romans 3 is considered to be the key text on vicarious atonement. In it, he offers the precise formula of what came to be defined as the penal substitution: "the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God set forth as a propitiation by His blood, through faith, to demonstrate His righteousness, because in His forbearance God had passed over the sins that were previously committed" (Romans 3:25). Paul heralds the reality of the effect of a representative's action on the life of the represented. In Adam, humanity is represented as sinful; in Christ, as righteous: "as by one offense *sentence came* on all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of One the free gift *came* to all men to justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of One shall many be made righteous" (Romans 5:19).

Christ is set forth to answer *personally* for what humanity has become as a *political* whole; as a result, humanity as a political whole is declared righteous but the task of

individual humans is to respond to this declaration *personally*, to "particularise" salvation [Hovorun 2023]. And how does one particularise it? Simply by being Christian, by living in the Name of Christ. Through bearing his Name, people become consciously and personally related to certain historical changes caused by the life it refers to. People declare themselves as Christ-ians and respond to the response this Name arouses in the world so that the logic of Christ's life reverberates and becomes intelligible "in the midst of them." (Matthew 18:20).

Thus, it is the "exchange of names" that unites Christ and the faithful. In the exchange of names, by the power of metonymy, our sins came to be associated with Christ and Christ's righteousness with us. Paul refers to this exchange when he prays "that the name of our Lord Jesus Christ may be glorified in you, and you in him…" (2 Thessalonians 1:12).

But the paradox is that to become associated with the Name of Jesus was seen to be far from "glorious". In the New Testament, the Name of Jesus carries both glory and infamy. Christ took the name of humanity upon himself and was condemned for it. Christians took the disreputable name of Jesus upon themselves and were also condemned but somehow interpreted this condemnation as glory. Christians came to believe that to share in the infamy of Jesus is to be glorified. In his first letter, Peter reassures the faithful that the very reproach they suffer for the name of Christ somehow glorifies both them and Christ: "If you are reproached for the name of Christ, happy *are you*, for the Spirit of glory and of God rests upon you: on their part he is blasphemed, but on your part he is glorified" (1 Peter 4:14). The reason for this belief is that, in this reproach, even in death, the disciples came closest to stand in the place of Christ, to witness (*martyria*) and to enact Christ's life through their own bodies – and thus to partake in the glory of the Resurrection, to be "translated into a life that ageth not" [Matins, *The Evlogitaria for the Reposed*, p. 83]. This exchange of infamy, the infamy of humans for which Christ is punished and the infamy of Christ for which martyrs are punished is the very nucleus of

glorification – for their martyrdom is the logical continuation of Christ's life in the other, the liturgical act of Christ's Mystical Body.

But Paul also argues that the disciples have to practice Christ's vicarious action among themselves: "Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ." (Galatians 6:2). And this law, this "yoke" of Christ is easy (Matthew 28:30) because another's burden is lighter; and another's burden is lighter because for us it is not entangled in her history of failure and trauma, let alone the fact that a thing I hate to do may be another's choicest pastime.

This bequeathal seems to include the exchange of sins. Sölle renders Hegel's rendition of Paul's view that redemption cannot be obtained through Law but only through faith in Christ in the following way: under Law, every man answers for his own sins, but under the Law of the Spirit, we answer for each other's sins [Sölle 1967, p. 103]. Dietrich Bonhoeffer captured this vision in his concept of *Stellvertretung*, variously translated as "deputyship", "vicarious suffering", or "representative action". "Bonhoeffer distinguishes himself from Luther and from his Protestant contemporaries, including Holl and Barth, in his belief that voluntary suffering by the Christian disciple can function vicariously for others" [Randall 2018, p. 252]. Jesus Christ is the New Covenant between God and humans because he is the pure model of the representative. Jesus is punished by death for the sin he did not commit – the sin he voluntarily took upon himself for the sake of the sinners. Christ is the sinless who represents the sinful – thus he establishes the precedent and paradigm of atonement: "...He is the Mediator of the new covenant, by means of death…" (Hebrews 9:15). As Bonhoeffer writes about Christ in *Ethics*: "All that human beings were supposed to live, do, and suffer was fulfilled in him. In this real vicarious representative action, in which his human existence consists, he is the responsible human being par excellence. Since he is life, all of life through him is destined to be vicarious representative action." [Bonhoeffer 1995, pp. 258-259]. This is a kind of "democratisation" of the Old Covenant responsibility of the kings to "Speak up for those

who cannot speak for themselves..." (Proverbs 31:8-9), made obligatory as the model for all human relationships, as the essence of operation of every community, every parish church.

Infamy, pain and sin can turn into glory only through being *exchanged*. And the exchange of all these things is dependent on the exchange of "names", for to bring these burdens to the level of exchange is to elevate them to the level of communication, for communication is exchange par excellence, *communicatio idiomatum* ("exchange of properties"), and the key that ignites this exchange is the exchange of names because names is precisely that part of us that which part of us that already exists in language and therefore in others. Moreover, to hallow the "names" we have exchanged is precisely to exchange all these properties – to ease pain, pay debts, and expiate sins of another. To "hallow" the name means simply to respond to the convocation of the name I have received, say, to pay the debts that are associated with that name. To hallow another's name is to bear her infamy, suffer her pain, answer for her sins. Through hallowing the name I bring the "inner form" of other's name into the light of public exchange, I answer for everything that is associated with this name, correctly or erroneously – burdens, debts, criticisms, accusations, rumours, curses, notoriety, infamy, even sin. To hallow another's name is to turn the entirety of one's life into a credible "response" to the convocation of another's name. Thus, hallowing the name is the opposite of taking the name "in vain" (Exodus 20:7), in which case we are neither affected by nor answer to it but use it as a mere instrument.

Thus we can see that there is no contradiction between Western "juridic" penal substitution and Eastern "spiritual" deification. There is no deification that does not have the shape of substitution. *Theosis* simply means growing into a kind of person who is more and more willing to die as "ransom for all" [Ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων] (1 Timothy 2:6). Consequently, when we read of God's plan to "recapitulate" [ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι, "sum up"] all things in Christ" (Ephesians 1:10), we can read it as pertaining to recapitulating all

things in these divine relations of substitution.

Moreover, Gustav Aulén's *Christus Victor* theory of atonement that emphasises the inauguration of the kingdom should not be read as at odds with either of the two, for people's liberation from death has to do precisely with living under the new law of Christ's Spirit, a "law like love", as Auden has put it, under which persons can receive new life in those who "hallow" their names. There is a logic to the order of the propositions in the Lord's Prayer of Matthew 6:9-11: (1) "Hallowed be Your name", (2) "Your kingdom come", (3) "Your will be done". The coming of the kingdom is dependent and subsequent on the hallowing of the name. If the name is hallowed, the kingdom comes. The "will" is mentioned last because "kingdom" logically stems from the "name", not from the "will", for it is never arbitrary, it never breaks its subordination to relations of representation. Moreover, this practice of vicarious atonement becomes the model for the exercise of all political authority: "whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant… just as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many." (Matthew 20:26, 28).

I contend that modern representative democracy is an heir to the biblical discipline of "name-hallowing" because it treats the "name" as the main token and target of political representation, it is ministered "in the name" of the people, which means that people's public *personae* as subjects of speech are taken to be the relevant level of politics, and this in turn implies that the government and the people are connected not through manipulative imitation but through public deliberation. Analogously to how a king of the Jews was supposed to build a temple for Jehovah's Name, a modern politician is supposed to build a "verbal temple" for the "name" of her constituents. Analogously to Christ, a modern politician is supposed to *become* a "temple" for the "name" of her constituents.

A politician should not think that she will be able to build or become a perfect representation of the "people" themselves, of the "inner form" of people's name; for that would eliminate the space and need for communication and education, for whenever a

representative copies something below people's "name", i.e. people's "properties", she discards the communicative agency of the represented, their life as subjects of speech and growth, and instead turns them in a "still life" image, into something dead – which is precisely why Jews despised idols and Plato despised mimetic art – for them, representation is necessarily dialectical. On the other hand, if a politician succeeds at acting in people's "name", then she builds and becomes a "temple" where people's presence is sighted – to the extent that people recognise themselves in the legislation that shapes their common life.

§4. Politics and Purity. If politics at its core is like this, why do people abstain from it? If another burden is lighter, why do we refuse to ease each other's pain, to enter the fabric of mutual aid? Ultimately, the answer has to do with purity. For many of us, to make oneself vulnerable and indebted to the aid of another not only demands a degree of humility and courage which we often lack but also appears to compromise our purity because of becoming implicated and complicit in the perpetuation of an unjust world. However, in contrast to the default common sense of our individualist intuition, the normative Christian view on purity sees participation in this compromised network as the essential prerequisite of becoming pure. One must not forget that the cause of Jesus' infamy was his transgression of the common standards of purity, his practice of commensality, "table-fellowship" with toll-collectors, pagans, and other disreputable characters. What is more, Jesus was even reported to descend to hell to mingle with the hell types.

In essence, Christians understood Christ's purity as inseparable from his act of taking all sins of the human race upon himself. Paul's paradoxical implication from this is that for humans be pure is to be washed in the blood of our innocent victim: "being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him" (Romans 5:9). To be pure is to acknowledge that we are stained. W. H. Auden's singular genius was to clarify

the *political* implications of this view. In his poem "Vespers" from the *Horae Canonicae* sequence, Auden describes the democratic city as one built on a "cement" of innocent blood. Auden narrates "a rendez-vous between two accomplices" – the Arcadian protagonist, "I" (i.e. Auden himself) and his "Utopian" antagonist, "he",

> " ... who cannot resist meeting
>
> to remind the other… of that half of their secret which he would most like to forget
>
> forcing us both, for a fraction of a second, to remember our victim (but for him I
>
> could forget the blood, but for me he could forget the innocence)
>
> on whose immolation (call him Abel, Remus, whom you will, it is one Sin Offering)
>
> arcadias, utopias, our dear old bag of a democracy, are alike founded:
>
> For without a cement of blood (it must be human, it must be innocent) no secular
>
> wall will safely stand." [Auden 2009, pp. 236-237].

As in the Pauline framework, the condition of purity is wrestling with impurity. Auden denies any sanctuary wherein one can be sequestered from sin. On the contrary, the "bonds of imperfection", to borrow O'Donovan's helpful coinage, is the very glue that, provided a sufficient degree of ecclesial humility, keeps the Church together [O'Donovan 2004]. As claims Williams, "*any* ideology, radical or conservative, which would reserve for itself some exemption from our concrete complicity in socio-political sin becomes a strictly Christological error" [Williams 2018, p. 206].

In other words, there is no purity apart from exchange of sins. When we enter into relations of representation, I come to suffer responsibility for the sin of my representative and my representative comes to suffer responsibility for mine. We cannot endure the sentence our sins deserve on our own – we are in need of one another to be redeemed. Consequently, we can think of Christ's "innocence" in more dynamically incarnational terms, as an ethical stance of making oneself utterly available to respond for the sins of others – to suffer for them. In this framing, Christ does not come into history as an

"unblemished outsider" who as it were bestows grace from the faraway region of innocence, rather, his innocence is the continuous decision to stand in the very place from which humans always strive to escape – the decision to stand accused and thus to conform his will to the will of the Father, which is nothing but the will to establish solidarity with what is other. To be more precise, this is not even a decision, for Christ does not have a choice – he simply realises his solidarity with the people in virtue of the human name they share. To say that Jesus' life is coextensive with the *actus purus* ("pure act") is simply to say that he is free to see the other in non-rivalrous terms; for Jesus, to "choose" something else than this means to become something else than Jesus – to estrange his name from his face, and hence to become a slave to sin. From this perspective, the doctrinal insistence on the humanity of Christ is the *sine qua non* of thinking about Christ's life as life in the name of others – humanity is represented in Jesus as in peace with itself in a way that perfects and purifies it from sin, that is, from all the ways in which it refuses to face the consequences of its action, refuses to stand corrected by language, to be ordered by the Word. For Christ, there is no chasm between his life for others and his life for himself, for, in thinking and in language, a person is none other than his or her life reflected in others, none other than a person in love.

It is impossible to make sense of Atonement without taking the idea of vicarious suffering seriously. "Sin is healed by solidarity, by identification. Its power is shattered by the act of God in Christ; that act creates the community of Christ's body, in which we live, ultimately, only through each other" [Williams 2007, pp. 31-32]. The ultimate sin that is thus defeated is the inability to live in one another – what is defeated is the sin as "a climate of thinking and behaviour in which we have become incapable of relating to God or each other except in fear, rivalry, and suspicion." [Williams and Chittister 2010, p. 54]. We cannot atone for our sins on our own, we need Jesus to take our sins onto himself. Baptism, the cleansing of sins, "works" because, when sinless Jesus insisted that John baptises him, he was not cleansed from sin, for he did not have any, but was "stained" with

the sin that is ours; but it this very action of taking the sin of others that paradoxically constitutes his sinlessness. As Paul says, Christ is "put to death for our trespasses and raised for our justification" (Romans 4:25). In the Pauline framework, one is atoned only through another – only the one who suffers the sins that are not his can redeem those whose sins these are. To be cleansed, one must be stained. Or, as wrote T. S. Eliot, "In order to possess what you do not possess / You must go by the way of dispossession" [East Coker, p. 188].

Among the Catholics, the thinker who thought of representation as central to the whole entrreprise of Christian religion is Hans Urs von Balthasar. In a paper written for Communio in the last year of his life, Balthasar contended that "The one word that most centrally characterises the existence of Jesus Christ is representation (*Stellvertretung*)" [Balthasar 1988]. As Jacob Lett writes in his admirable exposition of Balthasar's theology of representation, "Representation is grounded in the generative activity of the triune processions, inherent to created being, depicted in the Christ-creation metaphysic, universalised in Christ's dramatic action for humanity, and rendered essential to the thematic activity of the *commune sanctorum*" [Lett 2023].

When Jesus bids farewell to the disciples in the Gospel of John, he says, "As the Father has sent Me, I also send you… He breathed on them, and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit"" (John 20:21-22). Just as Christ is the deputy of the Father, likewise the Christians are ordered to be the deputies of Christ – deputies whose task is nothing less than to be "all in all", to be "spiritual" in this technical sense of omnipresent co-inherence, participation the public work (*leitourgia*) of the Spirit, "Who art everywhere present and fillest all things," as reads the Usual Beginning – which is simply the Father's act of gathering "together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth" (Ephesians 1:10), of raising Christ "far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to

the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all" (Ephesians 1:21-23 KJV).

§5. Political Representation, Spiritual Exercise. Rowan Williams' reading of Hegel is rooted in his encounter with philosopher Gillian Rose. One of the central concepts of her groundbreaking study *Hegel Contra Sociology* is the "broken middle" [Rose 1981]. Rebekah Howes refers to the "broken middle" as a space between our understanding of a thing and how a thing negates our understanding through signalling to us "what it actually is" [Howes 2017]. "That space, between our own thinking and what may be reality, is a place of learning. The truth lies as much in the experience of thinking and negotiation as in any solution to apparent conflict." [McKinlay 2019, p. 47]. In terms of our discussion, the "broken middle" is where the "third" of representation strikes and transforms us. For Williams, our premature escape from this "broken middle" is the technical definition tragedy. For him, tragedy has a political import because it teaches us to keep watch of how we misconstruct our identities and thus misrecognise our own interests. "In the inability of its protagonists to know themselves fully, tragedy shows us the weakness in our self-knowledge and invites us to think and to question our own self-representations" [McKinlay 2019, p. 38]. Williams repeatedly returns to Stanley Cavell's words that "tragedy is particularly about what we know but do not acknowledge" [MacKinlay 2019, p. 36]. As Williams paraphrases Cavell, the tragedy of Othello was not the lack of knoweldge but that "he could not yield to what he knew". Our problem so often is that we do not let what we know to act upon us. Tragedy may help us because it pushes us not just to know, but to reflect on what we know.

And at this point we can see how all of this is connected to politics. Politics is an essentially *linguistic* approach to the building of the common world. When we practice politics, we do not act from the position of dividing and possessing what is already there – shall that be the case, the right thing shall be to fight, not talk. Rather, in politics, we act

from the place of faith that we can tap into the unexpected excess if we attend and attune ourselves to the creative act of God in the world, to all things as "words" in relation to the "word of God": "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which are visible" (Hebrews 11:3). The Greek for "word of God" in this passage is ῥήματι θεοῦ, where *rhema*, "word, phrase, verb", is a word from which "rhetoric" is derived. Hence, politics can be seen as participation in the "divine rhetoric", and the process of human civilization is simply human natural way of participating in divine creation, where civilization has little to do with technological process and everything with the Platonic "construction of city with words" – the construction of "city that has foundation, the city whose architect (τεχνίτης) and builder (δημιουργὸς) is God" (Hebrews 11:10).

We can see this linguistic nation-building in the Jewish history, which is distinguished by being miraculously geography-defying. Instead of being constrained by the logistics of geopolitical competition, the Jews were repeatedly delivered from being consumed by the "great powers" by their faith in the God of the Book. "By faith" they were breaking the laws of nature: "By faith they passed through the Red Sea as by dry land, whereas the Egyptians, attempting to do so, were drowned" (Hebrews 11:29). Now faith is that whose object is a-priori invisible, intangible, and distant, something abstract or something in the future, something promised. Ultimately, for Jews, the object of faith is the Name of God and the Word of God, Jehovah and the Promised Kingdom.

In Christianity, acting in the Name of God, "imiaslavic" representation, is "democratised". The central claim of John's Gospel is Christ is the Word of God. In terms of the discussion we have been following, this means that, in Christ, we are "saved" in all our otherness, invited into increasingly communicative life of the Church, called to become persons who live *in*, *for*, and *from* each other. In Christ, our presence is not "watered down". W. H. Auden connects this representative capacity of Christ to his act of taking the place of an absolute outcast, a non-person. Auden muses: "just what

appearances he saves by suffering in a public place a death reserved for slaves" [Auden 2009, p. 248]. Several of the Psalms speak of God as the "salvation of countenance", e.g. "God is the salvation of my face" (Psalm 42:11, 43:5). Proper political representation "saves the appearances" of the represented. Notoriously, many a politician does not readily evoke in our minds an image of the aforementioned "site of selflessness" that can be home for many. However, I contend that one is a politician only to the extent that one embodies this pure divine act.

To see how our presence can be watered down, we may attend to social media. In the foregoing discussion, I mentioned that new "forms of life" enter our lives in the guise of new "language-games". The way we live is shaped by the way we speak, which in turn is shaped by the media of communication prevalent in our public square. The order of abstraction to which our communication belongs – whether we are able to represent reality in sentences, stories, abstract ideas, or systems of ideas – "attunes" us to the "frequencies" of corresponding forms of life. A functional society is one which is able to discuss the challenges it faces on the level of abstraction that does justice to them. What level of abstraction does our public square favour? What order of difficulty can it entertain? It stands to reason that the contemporary shortening of our attention span of due to the new forms of social media that cater short fragments of communication (clips) to easily distractible audiences works to the detriment of our capacity to entertain the level of public political discourse that could do justice to the difficulty of the problems we face. If this is so, these problems will remain un-represented in our policy-making and thus will stay unaddressed and unresolved. And, since the key task of any society is the task of its own coordination, the lack of public discourse that does justice to the complexity of the state as a whole renders us incapable of formulating the vision of the shared interest and establishing solidarity between various groups whose interests seem incompatible, seems to pose a serious problem. Voegelin described this process "in which human beings form themselves into a society for action […] the articulation of a society" [Voegelin 1952, p.

37]. If the public discourse that shapes electoral outcomes leads to the divergence of the elites and the *intelligentsia* who are able to think society in its totality, then society loses its ability to reflect, to speak to itself; and, as I have indicated earlier – this is precisely what tragedy is. If the elite cannot articulate the shared interest and make it intelligible to the people, society finds itself in the deadlock of misrecognition whereby its members see their good as attainable only at another's expense.

The importance of *intelligentsia* can be missed if we forget that representation is a two-way process, a politician must represent not only a people to a state but also a state to a people. Consider an anti-populist paroxysm in Eric Voegelin's *New Science of Politics*: "A democratic government is not supposed to bow to the "will of the people" but to put down the danger by force…" [Voegelin 1952, p. 144]. But what sanctions this exercise of force? Eric Voegelin spoke about the so-called "transcendental" representation, betokening a Platonic sense that rulers ought to be representatives of certain ideas and virtues, they have to contemplate the "Good" which cannot be *thought* unless thought *abstractly* [Prokopenko 2020]. For Voegelin, a representative truly represents the society if he somehow represents the power that keeps this society afloat: "the ruler himself represents the society because he represents the transcendent power which maintains cosmic order…" [Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, p. 54]. Voegelin expedites Fortesque to portray relations between the king and the realm: "the king is in his realm what the pope is in the church, a *servus servorum Dei*; and as a consequence, "all that the king does ought to be referred to his kingdom"– [this is] the most concentrated formulation of the problem of representation" [Voegelin 1952, p. 45]. Voegelin argued that philosophers, scientists, artists, can represent "truths" beyond the immediate comprehension of the public. In Vatter's rendition of Voegelin, "[t]he political body is 'mystical' because it cannot be articulated in the absence of reference to this dimension of Platonic 'ideas'". [Vatter 2020, p. 79]. In my estimation, this "transcendental" representation is disabled in our present condition, which can be aptly captured by the term "spiritual paedocracy" (*duhovnaia*

pedokratia), presciently coined by Segii Bulgakov in his 1909 *Vekhi* article. For him, the Modern intuition that, in the end, the children are right, steers society towards adopting simplified, and hence, false notions of the shared interests that hold it together – therefore it leads to "childish" conceptions of solidarity, based on the visceral imagery of "blood and soil". Rowan Williams advocates the cultivation of difficult and abstract discourse precisely because it is the only means to transcend misrecognition, a premature presumption that the contradictions between our interests and overall differences between us are unnegotiable and unresolvable. In fact, we do not yet know what our real interest is. We have not yet learned to frame reality in a way that lets us fathom all the gifts it has on offer, let alone cooperate so as to receive all of them. A society mindful of this inexhaustibility goes past the false zero-sum "realism" and re-sees elements of its environment as having increasingly more to "say" within increasingly intricate, attentive, and articulate exchange. This mindfulness is often facilitated by higher education that widens our minds so as to afford us to think thoughts that do justice to the strangeness of reality. Expansion of vocabulary and refinement of verbal acumen in and of itself is of great help since language is the key realm of our engagement with and attunement to otherness. In the interview with Olga Sedakova, Williams described "language as something that both brings us into the heart of what is strange and also slows down our response to what we think we know" [Williams 2023e]. The various disciplines within the umbrella term of "liberal arts" teach us to, as it were, relax our grip on reality, loosen our "mastery" and embrace "mystery", weirdness, uncertainty, and contradiction. to suspend judgement so as to allow the strange "to speak for itself" in hope that it will take an intelligible form – because the increased abstraction of communication had accustomed us to except and attend to the realities that take time to actualise. Liberal arts teach us to see excess where others see scarcity. Consequently, at the collective level, it ingraces our individual acts with a common tact that turns us into a body politic that is attuned to the higher order of creative, productive, and ethical action – a body politic that is more "in

touch" with the excess wherefrom all things spring. Additionally, this "good faith" is exactly what the Great Œcumenical Councils develop into doctrine (and the endorsement of *imiaslavie*, or condemnation of *onomatoclasm* as heresy, appears to be the next step in this development). Thus, when all is said and done, religion, academia, art, all contribute to the cultivation of a politically literate culture whose communicants tend to see otherness not as a threat but as an occasion for learning.

Conclusions to Part I.

Besides statecraft, representation has a rich history of deployment in various fields of human action – art, religion, commerce, jurisprudence. There is no shortage of studies that track the varied routes of cross-pollination between representation in politics and representation elsewhere. Yet there are no studies of representation as a general anthropological phenomenon. To raise the question of representation in the field of anthropology is to inquire into the overall significance of representation in human life.

In this study, I turn the usual relation between human goals and representation outside-in. Instead of treating representation simply as one of the peripheral tools expedited to meet various goals, I treat it as the central practice from which our goals stem, as the practice which precedes and determines all of our goals. Moreover, I treat representation as the practice that is constitutive of our humanity, that makes humans human. The rationale behind this claim is that the faculty that gives rise and shape to the human race is language. If humanity is constituted by language, the way language operates tells us something about the form of personal and political life that actualises the fullness of humanity. And since, as I join Gustav Shpet, Sergii Bulgakov, and Rowan Williams in arguing, representation is the defining trait of language, political representation is simply the way in which language governs human relations, a process of rational coordination between people who are not currently present. In short, through representation, we develop into increasingly rational and hence distinctively *human* life, we come to be ordered by

language, come to live not just as "creatures" of language but as creatures "by whom it lives" [Auden 2009, p 90].

Representation is how language develops. The "word" becomes a place where the represented reality attains a new, mediated life, a new "body". Human persons develop in the same way – through making friends, through falling in love, we exchange "names" and thus receive a new "place" (Greek χώρα) in one another. By this exchange of names, we enter into the state of interpenetration, mutual indwelling, being-in-the-other – the state of most intense and natural growth. Christian theology denotes this state through the Greek term *perichoresis* (περιχώρησις). First, Gregory of Nazianzen developed Christology wherein Christ is understood as the locus of περιχώρησις between divine and human natures. Later, in *De fide orthodoxa*, John of Damascus wrote that three Persons of the Trinity "have their being in each other [*kai ten en allelais perichoresin*]" [John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.8, PG 94.829A.]. Later, in Maximos the Confessor, the concept of περιχώρησις received its mature articulation. The process of representation is thus the very process by which language creates humanity – because it is the protocols of representation that provide the time and distance wherein creatures can grow through a series of "resurrections" in new contexts and bodies. As we learn to speak and act on each other's behalf, we are given a chance to be re-materisalied in multifoliate mediums and milieus. To be human is to partake in the culture of literacy that enables to see ourselves, one another, and all things, beyond immediate presence and even death, to communicate and coordinate across distance and time. If humanity is God's "shadow" (Hebrew *tselem*) cast upon creation, i.e. that part of creation that bears a more direct "mark", a more analogical relation to the Creator, this "mark" is language. Like God who creates that which is other to God and yet in some way becomes present in it by also creating humans as God's "shadow", so does our language imbues us with the ability to represent reality by genuinely other means, by symbols and sounds that bear no immediate resemblence to the represented phenomena, yet somehow make it present to the interlocutors.

This study is called "theological anthropology" because this variant of anthropology that sees the act of representation as central to both human and divine natures is enabled by Christology. As Dorothee Sölle puts it, "Anthropology and Christology are related as question and answer" [Sölle, p. 103]. What makes Jesus of Nazareth God, the one through whom the world is made and saved? Jesus is God due to being a "representative", a "mediator", or a "medium" of communication between divinity and humanity – he represents divinity to humanity and humanity to divinity, he establishes an identity between different realities without compromising their difference. This means that this very act of *representing* is the act of *hypostatising* the other, the act of making the other present and real, the very act of God. In this theological framework, representation is not an epiphenomenon or an instrument applied to attain certain aims, it is not an act that merely transmits what already exists, rather, it is the act that creates from nothing, the act that is uniquely operative in humans and singularly central in Christ, the person that acts like a "word" acts – as a signifier whose centre of life is in the other, who exists ex-centrically – "for their sakes I sanctify Myself" (John 17:19). Therefore, it is Christology that enables the aforementioned "rich" anthropology of representation. To see how it happened one has to attend to the history of religion as the history of what Hegel called *Vorstellung* (customarily rendered as "representation"), the history of representing the ultimate reality through the entirety of communal and personal life, the history that consummates in the representation of representation itself, in the "self-consciousness of God" in Christ who understood that "perichoretic" representation is not a merely a vehicle for some otherworldly reality but the very *esse* of God.

Equipped with this theological anthropology, we find ourselves in the position to judge whether a given political regime succeeds or fails in enabling the fulfillment of our humanity – the life of growth through a series of "resurrections" in the new contexts, the life of establishing solidarity despite distance and difference. Political representation "refracts" us in the talks, reports, pamphlets, books, parliamentary debates, and public

hearings, where we are "performed" in new "keys" and thus transformed. Political representation can be painful because not all of our definitions of our interest and its relation to the shared interest "pass through it" to be implemented as policies – they are repeatedly represented to be repeatedly questioned, scrutinised, and sometimes to be discarded as irrational or immoral. To entrust oneself to representation is to drop one's defences and surrender oneself – to use Gillian Rose's term – to the "broken middle", the enfiliade of representations that puts our original presumptions and self-images to death. But since the protocols of representation prevent us from the premature cessation of thought, from arbitrary conclusions, they also become the space where we are educated to articulate our desires as genuinely *political* interests – since they are formulated in awareness of our interdependence with others and thus of the need to negotiate and coordinate with the interests of others, they become open to judgment, open to be "read"; we are "verbalised" into intelligible public claims of what the achievement of the public good requires at this particular stage.

The fact that our initial definition of our interest can often be lost in the "broken middle" of representation, with a consequence that we do not recognise the state policy that came on the other side of it as something we had a say in, should not be understood as negative because it is the very precondition for learning what our real interest is. And, as we go through this process of increasingly abstract articulation of what constitutes our interest – we come closer to recognising that our ultimate interest is nothing but this learning process itself, the process of solidarisation, of recognising oneself in the other, of discovering identity despite ever greater difference. We recognise that political representation is our ultimate interest, not the instrument to get our message across, to satisfy our true pre-existing desires, but the process by which we are educated to *desire better*, the activity that constitutes the ultimate fun of human race.

Thus, the rites and routines of democratic representation afford time and distance to "have life in abundance". Applied to politics, this view implies that, instead of expecting

our representatives to speak, dress, act, and be like us, we are to let them exercise judgment that sometimes runs contrary to our immediate will and opinion. To use Oder's distinction, we need representation to be "metaphorical" instead of "synecdochal", in the sense that metaphor represents what is other and synecdoche represents what is identical. If the mediation as the time and distance necessary for learning disappears, the communication between the government and the people become reduced to what Hegel calls *Darstellung* – a process that is less than representation because the representative is not changed by what she represents and therefore does not go past the relation of domination wherein she depicts, describes, even "parodies" and at best "resembles" certain realities but does not empty herself to become a χώρα ("place") where they receive a new "life", a new "body". This impoverishment of representation prevents language from building the common life of humans because it prevents humans from entering into relations of περιχώρησις. In contrast to this, representative democracy makes language sovereign by turning representation into the law of the land, by making authority coextensive with representative claim, by requiring rulers to be the representative of their constituent at the risk of not being re-elected. Yet what is crucial is that, in a successful democracy, this representation has little to do with the mirroring of people's "will" and everything with hallowing people's "name", i.e. people's life as subjects of speech and growth. Hence, democracy necessitates political representation that is a creative tension between thought and love, knowing the other as identical, knowing the other's "name", and loving the other as other, as "unnamable"; discipline that preserves the representative power of the "name" to make the named present by allowing the named to proceed into its farthest otherness and thus to become a true creature of language. On this reading, a politician's task is to aid people's growth into the "name" in which she acts – into the order of words from which everything is made and made new.

PART II.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF

THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.

2.1. Representation as Means: Before the Common Era.

2.1.1. "Satrapal" Representation: Hittites, Phoenicia, Carthage, Persia.

At the dawn of history, kings used representation neither for legitimation of their reign nor for refinement of their agenda – they used it as a mere instrument for getting their message across, for getting their orders executed at a distance – a "chain of representation" was but a "chain of command". That representation was deemed successful in the course of which nothing was altered, added, or lost from the initial input prompted by the ruler. Representation was seen as a sorry tool to be used when a preferable direct expression and imposition of will was impossible. In these instances, representation allowed the ruler to extend his command beyond his immediate spatio-temporal locale. Joseph Costanzo lists three causes that necessitated representation in ancient times: "Multiple cares", "number of men", and "distance" or, as he puts it, the "ambassadorial tasks". [Costanzo 1954, p. 135].

We can see the Hittite Empire, Phoenicia, and Carthage, as the first historical entities wherein these causes coalesced. Binetti calls the Hittite Empire a "(proto)-representationalist state" [Binetti 2017, p. 13] with the two "roots of representation": "division of power" and "openness towards power-sharing across economic, ethnic and other demographic groups" [Binetti 2017, p. 15]. In the case of Phoenicia, Binetti sees the "roots of representation" in the stratification of classes and the increase in literacy. Carthage, the polity founded by the aristocratic refugees from Phoenicia, preserved some of the Phoenician (proto)-representative principles and exerted a notable influence on the political institutions of Rome. This is why Binetti ventures that

"a direct line can be traced between our institutions through the Roman Republic back to the Hittite Empire" [Binetti 2017, p. 4].

G. W. F. Hegel describes Persia in the following manner: "In Persia, the government, though joining all in a central unity, is but a combination of peoples – leaving each of them free. Thereby a stop is put to that barbarism and ferocity with which the nations had been wont to carry on their destructive feuds, and which the Book of Kings and the Book of Samuel sufficiently attest. The lamentations of the Prophets and their imprecations upon the state of things before the conquest, show the misery, wickedness and disorder that prevailed among them, and the happiness which Cyrus diffused over the region of Anterior Asia." [Hegel 1837/1991, pp. 206-207].

Even in its earliest days, the Persian empire was never a strict empire in the way Babylon, Assyria, and Media were, "but more of a multi-ethnic, federalized where each satrapy or province, had at least some autonomy in internal affairs" [Binetti 2017, pp. 40-41]. "Persia's (proto)-representationalist system allowed it relative internal tranquillity while Babylonian autocratic rulership allowed Persia to meddle in the internal politics of Babylonia and even attract interest groups to its side, thus causing Babylonia to be ripe for the slaughter by Persian armies" [Binetti 2017, p. 41].

What made Persia unique was its tolerance toward the continuities of autonomy of the subordinated nations, constituted by the worship of a common god, and them having "recourse" to the imperial state apparatus through the figure of the satrap, who was appointed to oversee the region by the emperor [Binetti, 43]. However, it is clear that we cannot say that the satrap represented the interests of his subjects, since, even though he might be said to have been symbolically representing the power of his respective province, ultimately the satrap derived his authority from representing the power of the Emperor who has appointed him.

2.1.2. "Synecdochal" Representation: Greece.

In her magisterial 1967's *The Concept of Representation*, Hanna Pitkin indicates that ancient Greeks "had nothing whatever to do with representation, an idea for which their language had no word" [1967, p. 241]. The scholarship in the wake of Pitkin largely accepted her indictment [Saward 2006, 2010, Landemore 2020]. On the whole, this verdict is commensurate with the earlier consensus, voiced in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract*. Greeks did not use representation even in jurisprudence. In Athens, for example, the litigants did not hire lawyers to represent them in disputes. In the courts, they represented themselves. The only help they could use is to hire a speechwriter [Newman 2022]. However, there are strings of scholars who helpfully qualify the prevalent judgement.

Tenney Frank's 1919 intervention *Representative Government in Ancient Polities* contributed valuable nuances to the debate. Granted, says Frank, in retrospect, the primary assemblies of Ancient Greece "clung to its right of ultimate decision… because men are men and trust themselves rather than delegates" [Frank, p. 540]. However, Frank offered three examples of what might be compared to representative governance in the modern sense: the Boeotian League, the Hellenic Confederation, and the Aetolian League. For example, in the Boetian Leage (with a power centre in Thebes) there is no trace of the general assembly. Instead, the decisions of the senate were "apparently final and did not have to be referred back to the local senates for ratification" [ibid]. It seems, Frank avers, that the "senators were the responsible representatives and not merely instructed delegates" [ibid]. The reason why the representation-averse Greeks were able to operate under this model is threefold: distance, numbers, and time. Distance between the cities and time it would take for every citizen to participate in decision-making. One wonders, however, were these leagues not simply erring on the opposite side of the Ancient Greek malaise of direct democracy, that is, was this arrangement not simply aristocratic? Taking

into account the agricultural, indeed "arcadian" economic model of these states, it stands to reason that these senates were comprised of wealthy landowners who were indifferent to securing the approval of the citizenry.

Another scholarly lineage pays close attention to the distinction between different kinds of representative offices. Daniela Cammack follows Ober's proposal to define the regnant practice of proto-representation in ancient Greek polities as "synecdochical" [Ober 1989]. All in all, "synecdochical representation lay at the heart of ancient Greek democracy." [ibid, p. 575]. The term "synecdochical" originates from Ankersmit's differentiation between "metaphorical" and "synecdochical" representation. In Modern democracies, representatives are not "interchangeable" with the represented, therefore "metaphorical". In Ancient Greek polities, the "ambassadors, generals, orators and volunteer public prosecutors were all metaphorical representatives" [Cammack 2021, p. 574], while the "democratic councillors, judges and assembly-goers were all synecdochical representatives" [ibid, p. 575].

The synecdochical representatives "fit in" the body politic so that they cannot be distinguished from its other members. Their homogeneity with the people writ large is guaranteed by the fact that they are elected by "casting lots". And "since it was assumed that the interests of synecdochical representatives and those they represented could not diverge, synecdochical representatives were not held accountable [*aneuthunos*]" [ibid, p. 575].

A metaphorical representative "stands out" from the body politic as a distinguished member with distinctive skills and expertise. "Since it was assumed that the interests of metaphorical representatives and those they represented might well diverge, all metaphorical representatives were subject to routine accountability measures (*hypeuthunos*; from *euthuna*, meaning "audit"). If deemed acting on their own selfish interest, they would face impeachment (*eisangelia*)" [ibid, 575].

Since metaphorical representation without immediate audit opens the distance and

difference between representatives and represented, it necessitates the cultivation of virtues that subordinate one's life to abstractions – justice, fidelity, solidarity, good faith, frank speech – that allow one to see relationship not as a means but as an end and therefore to act in the abstract shared interest regardless of either the proximity of the concrete others who share it of how one's concrete private interest is thereby affected.

Moreover, metaphorical representation without audit would have emancipated political discourse from the requirement of winning and securing the immediate acclamation of the people and would have given the people time to reflect and see through the rhetoric of the demagogues. In its absence, Ancient Greek democracy was at the mercy of the Sophist orators who were weaponizing people's passions through the skill of eloquence so as to impose their will on the people regardless of the correspondence of what they say to the truth and the public good.

Another way in which the Ancient Greek representation falls short of its Modern counterpart is that representation could only be conceived as pertaining to the polity as a whole, not to the fractions that have distinct interests (let alone the minorities). Ober argued in *Demopolis* that "the Athenian demos (as the whole of the citizen body) was imagined as present in the persons of those citizens who chose to attend a given assembly. So the demos was conceptually represented, pars pro toto, by a fragment of the citizenry" [Ober 2017]. Even though "political representation was thus a feature of ancient no less than modern democracy…", says Cammack, "ancient Greek democrats avoided what may be called subdivisional representation: the special responsibility of political representatives to advance the interests of the subdivision of the community from or by which they had been selected, as distinct from the interests of the community as a whole… In other words, they did not have personal constituents or constituencies. Those concepts are a modern invention" [Cammack 2021, pp. 573-574].

By and large, the limitation of political representation in Ancient Greece is that the representatives in the councils were merely delegates who were ordered to carry out the

instructions of the primary assembly. Therefore, when, instead of the prevalent direct democracy, we encounter instances of political representation, what we encounter is only the delegate model of representation in which the representative is not an independent actor – that is, he cannot exceed the narrow instructions of the assembly which had delegated him.

Frank's assessment of the Greek attitude to representation is worth citing again: "men are men and trust themselves rather than delegates" [Frank, p. 540]. It appears that the lack of "good faith" (*bona fides*) precluded the Greeks from developing the systems of representation in which the representatives could be trusted to make judgments at odds with popular opinion: they had either a totally "synecdochal" consonance between the interests of the representative and the represented so that he received a "you do you" licence under which he could act in whatever way he deemed right as long as he was "one of their own"; or a totally "metaphorical" dissonance between the interests of the representative and the represented so that he could not be trusted to do anything beyond the narrow instructions mandated by the primary *ecclesia*. Hence, what was precluded is a kind of middle ground between the two, "resonance". The idea that a person can "stand out" and at the same time "stand for" the represented seems to have been absent from the Greek mind. Whenever genuine representation took place it was probably seen as an unwelcome compromise with the infeasibility of direct participation (μετοχή).

Overall, in Ancient Greece there was a sort of zero-sum-game between the independence of the representatives and the represented – consequently, the independence of the representatives quickly deteriorated into aristocracy indifferent to the interest of the people and the independence of the represented deteriorated into immediate democracy that, in the absence of the time and space for the cultivation of competent elite and complex argument, was repeatedly kidnapped by the populists who instrumentalised the impressionable passionarity of the assemblies. No matter on which side the polity erred, the end result was dysfunctional.

2.1.3. "Metaphorical" Representation: Rome.

§. Cicero (106 - 43 BCE). The English word "representation" comes from the Latin *repræsentatio*. Yet the usage of the term in the Ancient Rome had little to do with the legal concept familiar to us. In classical Latin, the prefix *-re* augments immediacy ("to present something immediately") or intensity ("to intensify the presence of something"). The verb [*repræsentare*] as a rule refers to a "self-inflicted" action. First and foremost, to making *oneself* present in court in answer to a summons; In Ulpian's *Digest*, we read that a person can "represent oneself", *se repræsentet*. Second, to making present of an abstraction, for example, a virtue, *effingere et repræsentare virtutes alicuius*, "the embodiment of courage in a human face…" [Pitkin 1967, p. 3]. Third, to performing an action immediately [Hofmann 1974, 38ff. and 148; Pitkin 1989, p. 133; Rausch 1977, p. 78; Podlech 1984, p. 509]. The noun [*repræsentatio*] primarily indicates payment in ready money, the direct payment of a trust, or bringing something before the mind.

The usage of *repræsentatio* in Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia* has to do with photorealistic depiction. Parrhasius won the artistic contest against Zeuxis because, while Zeuxis' painting of the grapes was able to "fool the birds", Parrhasius' painting of the curtain managed to fool the rival artist: "The contemporaries and rivals of Zeuxis were Timanthes, Androcydes, Eupompus, and Parrhasius. This last, it is said, entered into a pictorial contest with Zeuxis, who represented some grapes, painted so naturally that the birds flew towards the spot where the picture was exhibited. Parrhasius, on the other hand, exhibited a curtain, drawn with such singular truthfulness, that Zeuxis, elated with the judgment which had been passed upon his work by the birds, haughtily demanded that the curtain should be drawn aside to let the picture be seen. Upon finding his mistake, with a great degree of ingenuous candour he admitted that he had been surpassed, for that whereas he himself had only deceived the birds, Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist." [Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia 35.29* (or *35.36* in other editions)].

Yet the "richer" concept of representation also existed in Rome, albeit under different names. "In Roman law", for instance, "someone's representative in a lawsuit was variously called his *actor*, *cognitor*, *procurator*, *tutor* or *curator*, though never his *repræsentor*" [Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 7]. As Justinian's *Institutes* put it, "one may take proceedings in one's own name or in that of another. In the name of another, as a procurator, tutor or curator;" [Justinian's Institutes 4.10]; "*cognitor* and *procurator ad litem* to mean someone who represents another in court… In both cases the principal drops out of the law suit and the cognitor or procurator takes his place." [Watson 2006, p. 15]. To sum up, "The Romans knew well the twin concepts of representation and representatives in law suits and in the relationships between father and son [*filius familias*], and owner and slave. But for these concepts they did not use the terms *repæsentare* or any cognate. [Watson 2006, p. 18].

"In classical Latin the term *repræsentatio* was applied in a range of different settings, from economics and law to aesthetics and theology, but never in politics" [Messarra 2020, p. 3]. "In Roman political thought, the term that came closest to capturing what would later be thought of as a relationship of representation between different agents was drawn not from law but from the world of the theatre, and in particular the practice of mask-wearing. The language employed to describe this practice was that of the *persona*" [Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 7].

Cicero deployed the word *persona* to speak about politics as well as jurisprudence. In *De oratore*, he claimed that "a lawyer must not only conjure up an image of the person whom they were representing, but that they also had to imagine themselves in the *personae* of the judge and of the opposition to know all sides of the case" [Messarra 2020, p. 4] In *De officiis*, Cicero describes the magistrate as an official who "bears the person of the city" [*se gerere personam civitatis*]. "This means that the magistrate, like an actor in the theatre, assumes a different character to act and speak in the name of the civitas" [Messarra 2020, p. 4]. "One outstanding difference here, as opposed to the *De oratore*, is

that Cicero transfigures an abstract legal association into a person… Although one should not imagine that Cicero is anticipating the medieval development of corporation theory, by which the *civitas* is said to be a *universitas*, which can then be understood to be a *persona ficta*, it appears that he is saying that the magistrate assumes the *persona civitatis* in a legalistic sense as its guardian" [Messarra 2020, p. 5]. Cicero's ingenuity was to envision collective action not as arbitrary feat of fate but as intelligible moves that are supposed to be conducted by an agent who *personifies* people's collective life, "bears the public person" (*gerit personam publicam*). In the absence of democratic negotiation, the metaphor of mask-wearing allowed Cicero to set clear moral standard for the judgment of the conduct of public officials.

§. *Tribunus plebis*. Republic. Binetti claims that the tradition that blossomed in Roman republicanism is a precursor to the Modern representative democracy: "We as modern Westerners descend primarily though not exclusively from a Republican tradition that is more directly relevant to the Punico-Phoenician tradition of Tyre and Carthage than the Greek system of politics with its dual obsession of oligarchal rule and democracy" [Binetti, p. 47].

Binetti proposes a negative and a positive definitions of republican governance in Rome. Negative is the prohibition of "arbitrariness" and "absoluteness" in executive power. Positive is the importance of the "rule of law" and the involvement of the people in the administration of law, be it in a tribal or in a centuriate assembly. According to Mansbridge, "The Roman Republic itself in the classic period of 264 to 133 BCE had a complex structure of limited direct democracy, with only two arguably representative elements. In one, the 'centuriate' assembly, the whole citizenry elected high magistrates, such as the two consuls, according to a system that gave more heavily weighted votes to the wealthiest citizens. In the other, the 'tribal' assembly, the common people (possibly excluding patrician citizens) elected, through

a somewhat more majoritarian process, the ten 'tribunes of the plebeians'" [Mansbridge 2020, p. 21]. It is this institution of the tribunes that had transformed Roman Republic into something that was unavailable to Ancient Greeks.

The Roman Republic started as an oligarchy with a strict caste system. A series of "strikes" by the people or plebs (times when the army "left Rome and camped on a nearby hill") convinced the patricians to renounce their monopoly on power thus extending political rights to the common people: "one of the two chief executives, or consuls, had to be a plebeian at one point", while the plebeian tribunes… had real executive and legislative power as representatives as well" [Binetti, pp. 50-51].

It is in concession to these plebeian revolts that Roman republicanism obtained its advantageous trait of giving room to the people, especially to the "power of the tribe", the army, to be politically represented not only through acclamation but also through articulation. One can argue that the success of Rome stemmed from its ability to let its own power "speak", to incorporate its legions as the interlocutors in the political discourse.

Tribunus plebis was the first office of the Roman state open to the blebeians – and only to the plebeians. The tribunes had a right to convene the *concilium plebis* (the plebeian assembly) to legislate on matters affecting the plebeians alone (*plebiscita*) and, since 471 BC, to be elected by them. The tribunes also had the *Ius intercessionis*, the right to intercede on behalf of the plebeians and veto the decisions of the magistrates that were unfavourable for the plebeians. The tribunes like Gaius and Tiberius Gracchus were reported to genuinely champion the interest of the people.

It is worth noting that the patricians who grafted *Lex Duodecim Tabularum* in 449 BC to grant the Plebeian revolutionaries their demand of "equal right before law" insisted that this principle affects only the private law, not the public. Thus the struggle of the plebs against the aristocrats in effect led to the bifurcation of Roman

law into a comparatively "humane" private law which recognises the dignity and trustworthiness of all citizens and a "less humane" public law which treats the public square as the space of domination. "To the end of the empire, public law gave precedence to wealth and power," says McGuckin [McGuckin 2012, p. 40]. On the whole, a conclusion suggests itself that the eminence of Rome was downstream of its internal cooperation based on the art of interdependence – the sense that fellow compatriots can be trusted because they can enter into contractual relations wherein they are *identical to their word*. This sense of solidarity was sustained by the Roman private law – and if we are to search for the sprouts of the trustee representation prior to Mediaeval Christendom, it is here that we find them.

In broadest terms, the Roman "warriors" and "workers", the second and the third "estates" of Plato's ideal polity, were effectively granted a tribune to voice their concerns, articulate their will, and thus become present in the governance, sharing it with the "first estate" of the patrician aristocracy – a possibility not envisioned in Plato's *Republic* nut intimated in Aristotle's *Politics*. Thus, around 150 BC, building upon Aristotle's conception that a healthy *politeia* has to combine the democratic and aristocratic elements, Polybius "had distilled a theory of separation of powers from the practice of a Roman Republic that had sedimented class conflict into the institutions of government itself. He had reasoned that because kingships naturally degenerate into tyranny, aristocracies into oligarchy, and democracies into mob-rule, the best constitution would preserve liberty by mixing elements of each, 'the force of each being neutralized by that of the others'. Each branch could then 'be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them with contempt' and 'any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked… by the others'" [Polybius c. 150 BC / 2011, pp. 345-346] [Mansbridge 2020, p. 26].

Although the republican institutes in Rome were gradually asphyxiated, a

number of inventive Roman jurists managed to orchestrate something akin to representative governance in a number of conquered Greek territories – Thessaly, Achaea, and Macedonia. Whereas "in most of the Greek states the senate was merely a counselling body which shaped the ordinances that were to be submitted to the deciding vote of the sovereign primary assembly of all qualified citizens", in Macedonia, writes Livy, "the senate was formed to preserve the state from the mistakes of popular rule" [*ne improbum vulgus libertatem ad licentiam traheret*] (xlv. 18) [Frank 1919, p. 548]. The ideas of Flamininus and Paulus, the architects of representative structures in the conquered provinces, bore fruit in the institute of the provincial *concilia* composed of the delegates sent by various local communities to annual meetings held at the provincial capitals that mostly concerned themselves with religious matters. Yet in the Late Empire, writes Frank, "these councils often discussed temporal matters as well, and their recommendations to the emperors had no small influence upon the policies of the government." Frank concludes his study of political representation in the Antiquity by saying that "the councils of the church adopted the machinery of these pagan *concilia*, and it is not improbable that such church councils first suggested the machinery that finally developed into the parliaments of modern states." [Frank 1919, p. 549]. This might be the thread of representative governance that the Church inherits from Roman statecraft and passes on to the secular West.

§. *Divi filius*. Octavian Augustus (63 BC - AD 14). The gradual process by which emperors curbed the power of the senate, the central repulican institution, is connected to the accumulation by the emperors of all sorts of titles that were associated with prestige and authority. For the purposes of our study, it is profitable to trace a history of relationship between the two Roman titles that denoted divinity and representation – *divi filius* and *tribunis plebis*.

Paradoxically, the title of the "tribune of the people" played a pivotal role in the process of "imperialisation" – it was used by the emperors as a pretext to circumvent and devitalise the republic. The emperors had gradually usurped the power of the tribunes. At first, in 48 BC, the senate bestowed the "tribunical power" on the dictator Gaius Julius Caesar, even though he was a patrician and thus ineligible to hold the office of the tribune. In 42 BC, the senate deified Julius Caesar posthumously. Octavian Augustus, an adoptive son of Julius Caesar, was nauseated by his adoptive father's death at the hands of the senatorial conspirators. "The latter was assassinated for being too openly monarchical, so his adoptive son formulated his position of sole rule over a long trajectory in which he accumulated various honours and powers step-by-step. Important in this process was that he did not seem to acquire these powers actively (to avoid appearing monarchical) but that they were bestowed upon him by existing (Republican) institutions" [Hekster 2019, p. 12]. In 23 BC, the senate bestowed on Augustus the lifetime tenure of the commander-in-chief, tribune, and censor. One of the titles adopted by Augustus was *divi filius*, the "Son of God", a term which at first was meant to convey that the new emperor does not want to actively divinise himself – a part of his strategy of avoiding the fate of his father – but eventually became the cornerstone of the imperial cult. Obviously, the term would have an immense impact on the language and self-presentation of the Early Church [Peppard 2011].

In strict juridic terms, it was the *tribunicia potestas*, the right of speaking on behalf of the "people" which emperors received from the senate upon claiming the throne, that gave them their exceptional authority. By virtue of *tribunicia potestas*, the emperor had "personal inviolability, could veto measures freely, summon the organs of government, and propose decrees and legislation. He numbered the years of his power by it, thus exploiting to the full the old democratic tradition of the champion of the plebs" [Britannica, *tribune*]. A disturbing twist of Roman history is that the very institution that made Roman Republic stand out as the unique beacon of democratic representation among the rest of ancient

polities was subsequently used as a pretext to do away with the power of the senate as the core institute of republicanism. The claim to represent the "will" of the people as a whole was used to legitimise the autocratic rule of the divine emperor.

What made emperor emperor? Octavian Augustus was hailed as the representative of God and representative of people, *divi filius* and *tribunus plebis*. These were his most formidable claims to power – divinity and representation. In terms of our discussion, the crucial question is what is the connection between these titles? Unfortunately, Octavian was a god who just happened to also be a great representative and a great representative who just happened to also be a god. These titles were not mutually conditioning, they were simply accumulated by the most powerful player in the political game. This lack of logical link between divinity and representation, between representation of God and representation of people, only allowed for the replication of typical Pagan arrangement where the power itself is deified and representation is merely collateral, and therefore not for real representative democracy but only for the plebiscitary democracy which is equivalent to dictatorship because, in the absence of recognition of the worthwhileness of rites and protocols of mediation between the power and the people, i.e. of the senate, the ruler simply claims to speak *in the name* of the people yet does not speak *with* the people, thereby precluding them from actually being meaningfully present in the "name" in which he speaks and acts, thereby turning them into politically illiterate plebeians who have a vague "will" but lack a "name", a real presence in the order of language from which the political authority legislates their collective life; i.e. they do not have a say in the making of laws by which they live.

2.2. Representation as End: The Common Era.

2.2.1. Jesus of Nazareth (c. 4 BC - AD 30).

The political figure of the "tribune", a person interceding in the Senate for the plebeians who are seen as incapable of speaking for themselves, is the closest Roman approximation to our concept of representation. To my knowledge, the title of the "tribune" is not used in the Christian prayer life. Since the Greeks witnessed mostly the militaristic side of Roman life and not the republican one, the concept of tribunes for them brought no image of political representative to their mind, but instead that of the commanders of thousands of soldiers, from Greek χιλίαρχος, a portmanteau of χίλιοι (*khílioi*, "thousand") and ἄρχω (*árkhō*, "to rule"). Consequently, in the New Testament, the word "tribune" lacks political flair. For example, Claudius Lysias, a head of the Roman garrison ("cohort"), is called "the tribune", *chiliarch*, in Acts 21-24.

Ernst Bloch uses the language of the "tribune" to speak of Christ's Ascension: "The Son of Man not only broke through the myth of the Son of God, but also through that of the throne "at the right hand of the Father": now a Tribune of the people sits upon that throne, and so revokes it. For all his celestial dignity after the Ascension, Christ is still, even for Paul, the man Adam – indeed Paul is explicit: "The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven" (1 Corinthians 15:47). And his human character stays with him there: that of a *Tribunus plebis* from first to last" [Bloch 1972, p. 180].

"The celestial palace," writes Bloch, "the seat of disinterested unchanging power, has finally been incorporated by us by being taken over for the use of the peoples of the earth with Jesus leading the way as our Tribune." [Brown 2016]. I think that this reading is not without basis. By the time of Jesus, the political power of the tribune was usurped by the Emperor – it was he who was supposed to represent the people, the multitute of Rome against the senatorial aristocracy, the "many" against the "few". Early Christians'

opposition to the Imperial cult can be interpreted as an opposition to the idea that it is men like Augustus who are the true representative of the "many" non-persons of the empire, and that it is precisely the one who was rendered non-person, the crucified, who is the true representative, the one who truly acts "for us".

The term "gospel" itself lies at the heart of the Christian political subversion. In the time of the Early Church, it was commonly accepted that *divi filius* was the Emperor Augustus and that it was his birth which were to be hailed as *evangelia*: "Virgil's prophecy of a divine and royal child in the Fourth Eclogue was widely known, and applied to Augustus: the golden-age of Saturn, the Saturnalia, are coming back–and it is this that is here called gospel. In this sense, too, an altar-stone at Priene in Asia Minor honors the birth of Augustus quite literally as the beginning of "evangelia" for the world. In this way the word penetrated into Palestine" [Bloch 1972, p. 131].

This transformation of the object of *evangelia* symbolises the final act in the Christian subversion of the tormented Jewish history of confusing messiaship with kingship. The rule of the ancient world is that the king tends to be recognised as divine. It appears that the Christian story hails the one farthest away from earthly power – indeed a loser by its standard, but not from the peculiar Jewish understanding of the divine power – as king.

Divi filius was one of the many titles adopted by Augustus. It pertained not to representation of people but to representation of God. With this in mind, the refusal of Christians to bend the knee to the imperial cult begins to make more sense. Augustus' representation of God and representation of people were not logically connected, let alone mutually enabling. With Jesus, Octavian's contemporary, the dynamic was reversed. Jesus was recognised as God's Son precisely because he was a representative of the people – his story was a coherent continuation, a "follow up" to the story recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures. Jesus is *Rex Iudæorum* not due to his power and prowess in establishing his rule over Judaea but because of his representative work. Christians recognise that "Christ

is a recognisable typological recapitulation of all that God has done for Israel" [Coleman 2022, p. 147], that Christ's life is the act in continuity with the act that ignites and directs the history recorded in the Scriptures, that is, with the God who hears and answers the cries of the oppressed (Exodus 3:7-9), who creates and liberates the Jewish nation, who elects "a people for his name" (Acts 15:14).

2.2.2. Tertullian (155 - 220 CE). *Personae* and *Repræsentatio*.

As Vieira and Runciman indicate, "in neither its legal nor its more aesthetic uses" was the Roman concept of *repræsentatio* "connected up with the idea of 'acting for' another person, nor with the notion of 'playing a role'. It was only with the birth of Christianity, and its theological controversies, that the word took on a broader meaning, one that could cover the relationship between entities that did not necessarily resemble each other but were nevertheless capable of taking one another's part. It was here, in Christian thought, that the language of representation came to overlap with the idea of the *persona*, paving the way for a novel understanding of the term: a relationship between 'persons' able to stand in for one another by dint of the bond between them, rather than simply because of a likeness that they happened to share." [Vieira & Runciman 2008, pp. 8-9].

Augustine adopts Cicero's usage of *personae* but does not connect it with the idiom of *repræsentatio*. In passage of *De civitate Dei*, he describes Samuel's mother Hannah as "bearing the person of the Church [*personam gerens ecclesiae*]" [Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XVII. 4.] because "she 'personated' the ecclesial body through her words thanking God for Samuel's birth (1 Samuel 2:1–10), and thus prefigured its formation" [Messarra 2020, p. 5]. Thus, Augustine interprets Hannah's verbal act of thanksgiving as a true representation (and prefiguration) of the eucharistic practice of the Christian Church.

Augustine also wrote that Saul "'figuratively bore the person of the people of Israel [*Populi ergo Israel personam figurate gerebat homo iste*]'" [Augustine, *De civitate Dei,*

XVII. 7.], thus implying that "the represented is culpable for the sins of its representative" [Messarra 2020, p. 6]. "Although Saul sinned, Augustine holds that the punishment redounds to Israel because the 'kingdom and people' is 'embodied in the person of Saul, who represented them [*sub persona Saulis, illius regni et populi figuram gerentis*]'" [Messarra 2020, p. 6]. The people of the *respublica* are culprits in the crimes of the king because they entrusted him with authority.

The work of connecting the concepts of *persona* and *repræsentatio* was conducted by Tertullian. Tertullian is the first scholar who used *repræsentare* and *repræsentator* to convey modern senses of "to represent" and "representative" [Watson 2006, p. 18]. Overall, "Tertullian is credited to with 982 new word formations" [Watson 2006, p. 17]. Among his coinages is the word *Trinitas*, which Tertullian described in terms of the relationship of *repræsentatio* between three *personæ*. It is generally acknowledged that the Tertullian's Christian Latin has provided the grammar for the development of what we now know as Western civilization. Tertullian's divinization of the *personæ,* the term that originally pertained to performance of roles, theatrical acting, mask-wearing, and, philosophically speaking, can help us understand how that part of us that is in concrete relationships with others came to be understood as our "more valuable part", Lat. *pars valencior*, so that, in mediaeval proctorial representation, "[i]t was imagied that [the representatives who bore the public *persona* of the community] constituted the substance of the community" [Göhring 2011, p. 41].

Tertullian writes that Christians celebrate *repræsentatio* of all Christians by the councils: "Moreover, the Greeks hold in fixed places councils from all the churches in which are treated some higher matters in common and this representation (*repræsentatio*) of all [of] the Christian name is celebrated with great veneration." ["Agentur præterea per Gracias illa certis in locis concilia ex universis ecclesiis, per qua et altiora quaque in commune tractantur, et ipsa repræsentatio totius nominis Christiani magna veneratione celebratur"] [*De Ieiunio* 13.6, in Quinti Septimi Corpus Christianorum, series latina 2, in

Florentis Tertulliani, II, Turnhout 1954, 1272.] Also, Tertullian speaks of the Son as a *repræsentor* of the Father: "Therefore he made manifest the conjunction of two persons so that the Father would not be longed for, as if he werevisible in sight, and that the Son would be regarded as the representative of the Father. And nonetheless this also is interpreted in this way that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father" ["manifestam fecit duarum personarum coniunctionem ne Pater seorsum quasi visibilis in conspectu desideraretur et ut Filius repræsentator Patris haberetur. Etnihilominus h o quoque interpretatus est quomodo Pater esset in Filio et Filius in Patre."] [Praxean 24.7, in Corpus Christianorum 2, 1195]. Lastly, Tertullian says that Jesus *repræsentat* his body with the bread of the Eucharist: "panem, quo ipsum corpus suum repræsentat." [ibid]. In all of these cases, the difference between the representative and the represented was not an impasse for representation.

Hofmann and Pitkin argue that the meaning of the term representation was further widened during the Medieval debates on the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The celebration of Eucharist was seen as representing a past event to which it bears no pictorial similarity [Hofmann 1974: 65ff., Pitkin 1989: 133ff]. But the "real expansion" of the language of representation, claims Pitkin, "begins in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, when the Pope and the cardinals are often said to represent the persons of Christ and the Apostles…" [Pitkin 1967, p. 241].

2.2.3. Deprivatizations of *Repraesentatio*. "Scholastic Politican Ontology Where Representation Takes Centre Stage".

§. The "Good Faith" (*bona fides*). In the previous chapter, I have suggested Rome's triumphs are intimately linked to the sense of solidarity between Roman citizens. As stated by Corrias, "the basic idea underlying solidarity is usually traced back to Roman law: the obligatio in solidum denoted a form of joint liability for a financial debt where 'each person was individually responsible for the liability of the group; i.e. everybody was liable

in solidum (= for the whole)'" [Corrias 2021, p. 130]. These relations of solidarity were underpinned by the cultivation of the virtue called "good faith", *bona fides*, a widely recognised concept in the Roman jurisprudential practice, denoting trust between the parties to the contract, their recognition of each other's public *persona* as authentic, credible, and reliable. *Fides*, the personification of the virtue of fidelity, was one of the original deities in the Roman pantheon. The cultivation of *bona fides* is the cultivation of the "good faith" that the publicly stated intent is the most relevant dimension in relations between persons. To engage with another in "good faith" is to trust that the public *persona* she presents is authentic, to assume that the identity my partner discloses to me *is the very place from which she will act* and that therefore it makes up for the sufficient information I need to know to conduct transactions with her. Since she does not hide a malevolent agenda "beneath the surface" of public utterance, since she "keeps her word", the obligations to which she became a signee shall be fulfilled in due time. To use terminology developed thus far, to approach a person in "good faith" is tha trust the she is identical to her "word", that, in the most fundamental terms, the "name" she introduces herself by corresponds to the sequence of sounds that arise in the minds of her close ones when they see her "face". Therefore, since the virtue of the "good faith" allows the relations between persons to be the "ground" from which their identities stem, it is the virtue that is coterminous with the civilizational progress as the development of coordination and cooperation [Kropotkin 1902]. The Christian concept of faith is often assumed to stand at odds with this principle of the reliability of the parties of contractual relations and instead to denote a kind of blind adherence to a set of propositions. However, the Greek term Πίστις of the New Testament is identical to the Roman notion of *Fides*, in the sense that it also signifies the virtue of trust.

My hypothesis in this section is that Christians "deprivatised" the *bona fides*, unchaining it from linkage to private contractual relations between actors of economy and extending it to the political relations between rulers and people. To flesh out the ontology

that underpins this transformation, we must attend to the development of the Christian dotrine. I suggest that the trajectory of the Great Œcumenical Councils can be seen as the steps toward cultivation of "good faith" with regard to reality writ large. By formulating new dogmas, new "creeds", the orthodox theologians invented the new vocabulary and grammar that opened doors to the whole new worlds to live in, the worlds where things that appeared to be mutually exclusive turn out to be able to mutually indwelling. The Councils consistently refused to make a premature choice (αἵρεσις, *hairesis*) between seemingly contradictory claims, thereby enabling a wider and richer approach to reality, a parallax view from seemingly incompatible perspectives. Conciliar theologians articulated the "orthodox" doctrine of representation that is remarkably "rich" in the sense that it asserted that representation of God, of the ultimate power, is the opposite of a zero-sum-game. If there is no zero-sum competition between God and human nature (1st, 325, Arianism), between God and human mind (2th, 381, Apollinarism), between God and human will (6th, 680-681, Monothelitism), between God and human artworks (God's representations in the icons) (7th, 787, Iconoclasm), if God, that which is ultimately significant and praiseworthy, can be represented by "human means" without either the diminution of the divinity or the amputation of certain facets of humanity, if the finite can "host" the infinite on its own terms, then what we encounter at the heart of reality is not a struggle for scarce space but something like solidarization across ever greater distance and difference. For instance, Chryssavagis described the "essence" of the Chalcedonian dogma as the "reconciliation (or at-one-ment) of what is aberrantly estranged and fractured" [Chryssavgis 2023].

This credal framework is coterminous with the cultivation of *bona fides* because it teaches us to discern, imagine, or simply expect the excess beyond the current scarcity, to recognise this very scarcity as "pregnant" with potential excess. If taken seriously, it disarms us before "the in-breaking of what is inexhaustible" [Williams 2008a, p. 16]. It is supposed to teach us to treasure not what is already there, "treasures on earth, where moths

and vermin destroy", but what is not yet there, the Spirit as "the treasury of every good and bestower of life". If the goods seems scarce, it means that we have put our heart somewhere lower than heaven. If concentrate on something that is already and tangibly there, most paradigmatically on the possession of land, I am bound to presume that my relation to the other can proceed only on rivalrous terms, that my profit is proportional to her loss. On the other hand, if I have faith that our communication is the very process that creates *ex nihilo*, then can I be disarmed to approach another in "good faith" – with an open face in the sense that our "names" and all our "words" that which we exchange when we become acquainted are identical to who we are, that our "name" and our "face" are one.

Prior to Christianity, the principle of *bona fides* was limited to personal relations between Roman citizens who possessed *dignitas*. Hence the possibility of representation was limited to the private sphere where certain agents were trusted to represent principals or corporations. The dual intervention of Christianity is the stipulation all humans *can* represent and that all rulers *must* represent. First, Christians imbued the concept of "fidelity" with the significance that it has in the Hebrew Scriptures, where God is attested to be precisely the agent who is trustworthy and credible par excellence, who is *identical to his Name* because he *keeps his Word*. Second, Christians as if it were "democratised" this divine attribute of fidelity by affirming that the historical person called Jesus of Nazareth *is the very Word to whom the God of the Scriptures is identical*. And since Jesus is unequivocally human, this means that human beings are capable of acting solely for the other's sake in a way that is analogous to the act of God. Hence, if we return to our discussion of the Roman terms, what was thus "democratised" is the sense of *dignitas*. (It is important to remember that Roman law treated the non-persons such as slaves as people who emphatically *could not be trusted* and *could speak truth only under torture*, to which for this reason they were systematically subjected). Vatter reads an episode in the *Divine Comedy* when Virgil says to Dante, "I crown and mitre you over yourself" as expressing

the ushering in of the *sæculum*, the timeframe that makes the lifespan of a human person salient and significant. Vatter contends that "Dante's crowning at the hands of Virgil symbolizes the passage from a Roman, aristocratic sense of *dignitas* as 'noble bearing' (symbolized by Virgil) to a modern, democratic sense of dignity that belongs to every individual human being in virtue of their humanity (symbolized by the mitred Dante)" [Vatter 2020, p. 178]. Thus the two "initiations" into citizenship form of succession of co-citizenship with Adam (Rome of Virgil) and co-citizenship Christ (Rome of Beatrice). For him to be initiated as a co-citizen of Christ is accept Beatrice's call to "...be everlastingly with me/A burgher of that Rome whence/Christ is Roman". Or, as reads alternative translation, "...and citizen shalt be, forever with me,/Of that true Rome, wherein Christ dwells a Roman" [*Purg*. XXXII, 100ff]. The defining character of human dignity into which Dante is initiated is love. For Dante, there is an identity between his love with Beatrice and the love that constitutes Christendom. As Charles Williams had put it, "Beatrice and Dante in a sense co-inhere" [Fiddes 2021]. Paying close attention to Dante's *in-* prefixes (the life of the blessed virgin "in-heavens" her – *inciela* [*Paradise* 3.97]; each seraph "in-Gods" himself – *india* [*Paradise* 4.28]; joy is "in-poured" – *infonda* [*Paradise* 8.86]), Williams emphasised the state of "being-in" that he found both in Paul's "in Christ" and in Dante's "me in thee-ing" and "thee in me-ing" as the foundation of Christian love.

The cultic praise (from Lat. *pretium* "price" and *pretiare*, "to prize", "to value") of what we would now call the work of a "trustee representative" could not leave the systems of Roman life untouched. In Christian body politic, both in the ecclesial and secular domains, there was no excuse for the leaders not to relate to the people in the same way Christ does, not to be vicars of Christ in this sense of acting as institutionalised servants, i.e. representatives who bear personal responsibility for people's collective life. In this manner, relations in "good faith", fidelity, and solidarity, between contracting parties in the Roman private law were deprivatised to become the principle of relation between the ruler and the people. In 1085, Monk Manegold of Lautenbach would develop what may be

called "the first preserved social contract theory" [Mansbridge 2020, p. 22]. Manegold envisioned the authority of the king as derived from the link of faith between him and the people: "is it not clear that he deservedly falls from the dignity entrusted to him and that the people stand free from his Lordship and subjection, when he has been evidently the first to break the compact for whose sake he was appointed? Nor can anyone justly and rationally accuse them of faithlessness, since it is quite evident that he first broke faith" [Lautenbach 1085/1954, p. 164].

§. The Three Clauses. My hypothesis in this section is that the Christian doctrinal and practical cultivation of the "good faith" in the prospect of solidarity between inconceivably *distant* and *different* entities – rooted in the worship the person who represents God to humanity and humanity to God – allowed the mediaeval legal scholars to "deprivatise" the clauses that had to do with the consent and representation within corporations from the Roman private law by reinterpreting them as the principal pillars of political legitimation. In this study of political representation, I follow Boucoyannis (2015) and Stasavage (2016) proposal to look beyond parliaments to the practices on which they were based – proctorial representation, consent, and corporations, stemming from Roman private law, thus at last acknowledging what the medieval historian has long attested [Post 1964, pp. 61-63; Monahan 1987, pp. 111-126, O'Callaghan 1989, pp. 14-15; Oakley 2012, p. 155].

According to Jørgen Møller, "Roman public law had nothing to say about representation and consent; both notions were found in Roman private law" [Møller 2018, p. 1077]. Møller argues that the mediaeval catholic legal scholars managed to resuscitate the clauses that had to do with representation from the nondescript corners of the Roman private law and reinvented them as pillars of a robust framework for the exercise and legitimation of political authority [2017, 2018, 2019].

The deprivatisation of the clauses of Roman private law that had to do with

representation became possible thanks to this Medieval culture of commentary – the jurists were adding layer upon layer of interpretation and elaboration, inventively taking certain clauses out of their original narrow context and "testing" them on all sorts of theoretical questions and practical challenges, including the political conflicts of the hour. This process of deprivatisation was conducted by the Medieval jurists who developed an intricate system of commentaries to the legal codes and then a system of commentaries to these commentaries with an increased forensic attention to detail and abstract speculative conjectures. The first generation were known as the "glossators" and the second the "postglossators" or "commentators".

Tierney narrates the sequence of deprivatisation in the following order: "The typical process that occurred was the assimilation of a text of Roman private law into church law, its adaptation and transmutation there to a principle of constitutional law, and then its reabsorption into the sphere of secular government in this new form" through the varied "areas of interaction" between the ecclesial and secular spheres [Tierney 1982, p. 25, p. 13]. At first, the principles of representation were used in the operation of the various Christian communities (*universitas*), then they became the basis of the constitutional theory of the Catholic Church, and eventually they were were transmitted to the secular governments.

Mansbridge, Møller, Vieira, Runciman and other scholars stress the deprivatisation of the "consentual" and "fiduciary" clauses from Roman private law. First, the principle *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur*, according to which "a received understanding or contract could not be changed without the consent of the contracting parties because 'that which touches all should be decided by all'". Second, the principle of *plena potestas*, according to which "a principal could give an agent 'full powers'", the right of a plenipotentiary to make decisions that are binding for those he represents [Mansbridge 2020, p. 21]. The dictum *quod omnes tangit* was taken from a "remote corner of Roman private law that dealt with co-guardianship or co-tutorship" [Møller 2018, p. 1077] and the

dictum *plena potestas* hailed from clause in the corporate law that stipulated that "a private corporation could appoint an agent who could negotiate on its behalf with full powers". [Møller 2019]. The third component is the law of corporations themselves, the juridic language around the idea that there can be "bodies" that unite many individuals. I schematise these principles in the following order: i. The authority of the constitutive power (*quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur*); ii. the authority of the constituted power (*plena potestas* or *plenituda potestatis*); iii. the authority of the constitution (*corpus mysticum*), the principle of corporeal solidarity that sustains the paradox of simultaneous identity and independence of the "body" and the "head", the represented-constituent power and the representative-constituted power.

§1. *Quod Omnes Tangit*: Constituent Power. *Quod omnes tangit* secures the freedom of the members of the community not to have their life legistated by an arbitrary will, freedom to have a say in the making of laws by which they live. Found in the Justinian code of 531, *quod omnes tangit*, "began as a technicality of Roman contract law, referring to the consultation of those affected by a contract or a will…" [Grzymala-Busse 2022, p. 161]. Interest in the principle developed in canonical circles in the eleventh century in connection to the election of bishops, and by the mid-twelfth century Bernard of Clairvaux wrote of "an ancient rule" that everyone affected by an episcopal election should participate in it [Monahan 1987, p. 99]. The canon lawyers reinvented the principle, taking it from private contract law and applying it in politics: "a matter that 'touched' a whole community could be approved by a representative assembly acting on behalf of all" [Tierney 1982, p. 25]. "By 1200, this clause was referred to in the ecclesial councils, at the Fourth Lateran council in 1215, and at subsequent ones". [Grzymala-Busse 2022, p. 161].

§2. *Plena Potestas*: Constituted Power. Whereas the "*Quod omnes* demanded that the affected parties be consulted, the principle of proctorial representation made that consultation feasible" [Grzymala-Busse 2022, p. 163]. According to Møller and

Stavnskær, procuration, or representation by proxy, was based on the Roman private law principle that a "corporation (*universitas*) could organize itself as a judicial personality and appoint a proctor (*procurator*) with full power (*plena potestas*) as an agent." [Møller 2018, p. 1077]. Grzymala-Busse writes that, "originally, a procurator was an agent who could act on behalf of another in contracts or lawsuits, a legal substitute who attended court and handled the case… Just as with *Quod omnes*, canon lawyers refashioned the notion of proctorship: an individual proxy could now act on behalf of a group and represent that community in councils or assemblies…" [Grzymala-Busse 2022, p. 163].

Plena potestas secures the freedom of the representative to exercise her own judgment, unchained from the immediate will of the constituency. At first, the *plena potestas* clause was used to legitimise the Pope's authority. Then, the "twelfth-century canonists stepped in and translated *plena potestas* from a doctrine of papal power to a concept of representation. They likened *plena potestas* to the binding power of attorneys. They then elaborated it as an irrevocable power of representatives acting on behalf of a group, which was then obliged by the acts of the representatives even if it did not grant full consent to them ahead of time [Post 1943, p. 211; Tierney 1982, p. 24; Monahan 1987, p. 123].

According to Costanzo, "The legists and decretalists of the thirteenth century found in the *Digest* and the Justinian *Code* premises and precedents for vicarious responsible agency. This rested directly upon authorization, *plena potestas agendi,* and the commission, *mandatum*, which enabled the proctor to act as if the principal or his constituent himself were present and, unless otherwise restricted by the necessity of referendum or by special limited trust, to act in all eventualities in the capacity of a steward in transactions with a legal import." [Costanzo 1954, p. 139]. The coexistence of *mandatum* and *plena potestas agendi* seems to be a contradiction, yet precisely this conjunction meant that the "representative agent could attend to all business of his *dominus* relieved of any restriction and act as if the principal were present in person…", so

that "the resultant consequences bind the principal as effectively as if he had acted directly" [Costanzo 1954, p. 139]. Thus, contends Grzymala-Busse, "centuries before Burke, representatives were empowered to act as trustees rather than delegates" [Grzymala-Busse 2022, p. 164].

§3. *Corpus Mysticum*: Constitutional Power (the "corporatist mediation" between the constituent and constituted powers). According to Watson, "The metaphor which enables an understanding of medieval and the origins of modern representation is that of corpus." [Watson 2006, p. 35]. Without the assertion of the reality of the communities (*universitas*) as political bodies, either the leader or the people may become victims of illusion of self-sufficiency. *Corpus* can be seen as the "juridic equation" between *quod omnia tangit* and *plena potestas*, the "constitution" that sustains freedom of both the represented and the representative, freedom which produces difference between the two and thus obliges them to talk to and learn from each other.

In Roman juridic thinking, *corpus* is found both in private and public law, albeit these two traditions of its usage are disjointed. In the private law, the corporations were understood as contractual relations between citizens with a shared interest. The corporation was treated as a fictional person who could "sign contracts, own property, and negotiate with other corporations" [Edelstein 2021, p. 152]. In the political thinking, the metaphor of the "body politic" was used to emphasise the unity and inner peace of the republic, *corpus rei publicae*, the empire, *corpus imperii*, and later the Christendom, *unitas corporis Christi*. We can read Cicero as eloquently bridging these traditions in his definition of the republic as a people who share "consensus with regard to the law and the communion of interest" [*multitudo juris consensus et utilitatis communione fociata*] [*De re publica*].

The pivotal innovation in corporatist thinking came with the Christian Church which understood itself as a *corpus mysticum* ("mystical body"), constituted by representation. To notice the novelty of the Christian conception of the *corpus mysticum*, we must attend

to St. Augustine's critique of Cicero's definition of the republic and the Roman Republic writ large as insufficiently republican. For Augustine, since the Roman understanding of the shared interest, *utilitatis*, amounted to mere imperial expansionism, i.e. conquest and pillage, the whole Roman concept of the interior peace, *Pax Romana*, is a result of the subordination of the vices and the passions to the supreme vice of pride, lust for glory, which, in accord with the wider Greco-Roman culture, Cicero understands as the key rationale for the engagement in politics and exercise of authority. Thus the interior peace is sustained by the methodical expansion of violence over the outer reaches of *Pax Romana*. In short, Augustine retorts that the Roman Republic never fashions true solidarity between its citizens because its identity is negative – Rome is made one in virtue of sharing one enemy.

Against this conception, Augustine develops the concept of the republic as constituted by the relations of love (*caritas*) analogous to those within the private domain of the family – the move Hann Arendt castigates in her *Conditio Humana* [1958/2013]. Augustine reuses a metaphor from 1 Corinthians 12:27 that speaks of the Church as a body where Christ is "head" and Christians are "limbs" to devise a constitutional theory where the thing that the citizens of the republic share at the most essential level is not just a interest, let alone a shared enemy, but the object of reciprocated love – the "head" of the polity.

By deprivatizing domestic love Augustine concurs with the trend of deprivatisation we have been tracking throughout this chapter. As a consequence, the unique level of trust in Roman relations of corporate and cordial solidarity from the sphere of economic and domestic relations were turned into a principle of public politics. For this to happen, the communion between the people and the ruler had to be "hypostatised" as an independent representable unit, which is exactly what is afforded by the image of the "mystical body" as the concert between Christ and Christians.

At this point we can clearly see a process whereby the Trinity casts a shadow on the

plane of secular politics: this hypostatisation of the concert between Christ and Christians which the Apostles began to label as the Church, the "Community of the Holy Spirit": "κοινωνια του αγιου πνευματος" (2 Corinthians 13:14), or "τις κοινωνια πνευματος" (Philippians 2:1), is analogous to hypostatisation of the "love" between the Father and the Son as an equally-divine Person. Bernard of Clairvaux describes the Spirit as a sign of corporeal solidarity between the Father and the Son, their kiss: "The Father is he who kisses, the Son he who is kissed, then it cannot be wrong to see in the kiss the Holy Spirit, for he is the imperturbable peace of the Father and the Son, their unshakable bond, their undivided love, their indivisible unity". [Bernard of Clairvaux, *8th Sermon on the Song of Songs*]. In short, the way the Spirit signifies the solidarity between the Father and the Son is analogous to the way in which the Spirit establishes the solidarity between Christians and Christ – the act of the Spirit is the continuous "re-constitution" of the Church through the performance of mutual advocacy, intercession, and representation, made visible in the Divine Liturgy. Thus construed Church stimulated mediaeval jurists to envisage all kinds of communities as constituted through representation.

§. *Personae Repraesentatae*. Procrotial Representation. Gregory VII (1015-1085), Innocent III (1161-1216), Innocent IV (1195-1254). A pivotal event in the transition from the arbitrary to representative government is the "Gregorian Reform" (1050–80), named after the Pope Gregory VII (1015-1085), born Hildebrand of Sovana, that triggered what Harold J. Berman termed the "Papal Revolution of 1075-1122" [Berman 1983, pp. 15-19]. According to Vatter, it was a legal revolution that "turned the Church into the first exemplar of the modern nation-state in which, as Jürgen Habermas likes to emphasize, all legitimate rule must be carried forward in and through the medium of law." [Vatter 2020, p. 182]. The central contestation played out over the right to invest Bishops, the so-called "investiture controversy" (*Investiturstreit*). It began in 1076 as the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and German Emperor Henry IV and ended in 1122 with the Concordat of

Worms. Prior to the Concordat of 1122, the ecclesial and secular authorities in the West overlapped much like in the *Rex-Sacerdos* model habitual to the Byzantium; in its aftermath, although the bishops had to swear an oath of fealty to the monarch, their selection, including the selection of the Bishop of Rome, the Pope, was left to the church. Berman argued that, in virtue of separating Church from Empire, and simultaneously developing its code of law, the Papal Revolution "effectively separated law from might (kingship), and thus allowed for the creation of a 'rule of law' separated from the power of the sovereign" [Berman 1983, p. 427].

After the Concordat, the conflict between the Church and the lay rulers was channelled into the realm of law. Both sides educated and employed erudite jurists to help with litigation and development of constitutionalist doctrines that could adjudicate their respective claims to jurisdiction and investiture. According to Møller, "the Gregorian Reforms initiated a flood of litigation into the ecclesiastical system in general and the papal court in Rome in particular. Both representation and consent were originally judicial concepts that were developed in the twelfth century to handle this torrent of litigation into ecclesiastical courts of law" [Møller 2018, p. 1077].

By the year 1200, to ensure meaningful participation of various communities in these judicial proceedings, the church legists started to deploy the key clauses of representation to design a legal framework where the members of a corporation – a town, cathedral chapter, shire, guild, universitiy, mendicant order – could exercise their right of *quod omnes tangit*, the right to have a say in decisions that affect them, by appointing a proctor endowed with *plena potestas*, full power to act on their behalf, and sending him to a council or assembly, whose decisions were binding for the group [Møller 2018]. Thus, a regular cathedral chapter was framed as a moral or corporate entitiy whose prelate, the bishop, came to be treated as the "representative" of the group, its proctor. [Vieira & Runciman 2008, pp. 10-11]. Once this "reciprocal surrender of sovereignty" was turned into a juridic principle, the Ignatian ideal of relations between the bishop and the people as

relations of spiritual representation or recapitulation became the law of the land. Centuries later, Schmemann will lament the fact that unilateral or emanationist form of relations between the bishops and the people in the Orthodox Church distort the spirit of the canons, according to which the bishop derives his authority from the communities he represents: "In the Synod of bishops properly understood, all Churches are truly *represented* in the person of their bishops; and, in the early tradition, a bishop without a Church, i.e. without the reality of his episcopacy, is not a member of the Synod. The Synod of bishops is the "higher power" because it speaks and acts *in* and *for* the Church and takes from the real, living Church the *truth* of its decisions." [Schmemann 1964a, p. 81].

In my estimation, originally, the constitutional relation of a corporate *persona* to its members was not fixed as a legal compact but was sustained by the imagery, doctrine, and liturgy of the Church. Since the Church was seen as *corpus mysticum*, the "mystical body" of Christ, many other communities came to be seen as "bodies" whose relationships with "heads" were thought on an analogy to relation between Christ and Christians. It was left for the compilers of the glossas to develop the formulate the precise "juridic fictions" of the nascent constitutionalism. Drawing on the legacy of Roman law and combining it with Christian ideas, the legists developed the concept of *corpus* as a legal fiction which would unite a multitude of real persons into a *universitas* [Dohrn-van Rossum 1978: 541; Hofmann 1974: 126ff.]. "The *universitas* model allowed the exercise of highest authority by a rector, who was above the individual members, but not above the *universitas* itself, as he was the corporation's agent" [Grzymala-Busse 2023, p. 166]. "Due to the important impact that the medieval church had on the development of legal theories, corporations came to be the most eminent organisational feature of social and political communities in Europe at that time. The Holy Roman Empire, states, towns, local communities, functional groups such as the estates and guilds, were all framed as corporations. Although many other terms were used synonymously – a corporation could also be named collegium, universitas, societas, communitas, congregatio, consortium – canonists still preferred

corpus as legal expression because it emphasised the unity of the corporation…" [Göhring 2011, p. 36]. The language of the "body" emphasised the unity of the corporation and allowed it to be imagined as a "unit", representable by its "head".

The second legal fiction was developed by the glossators who began to refer to various corporations as "persons by representation", *personae fictae* and *personae repraesentatae* [Buckland 1921, p. 176]. "[A]pplied in order to make corporations function like a personification of collective life", the concept of *persona repraesentata* enabled corporations "to act on their own account" [Göhring 2011, p. 36]. In the writings of the Pope Innocent IV, we find a clear instance of defining *universitates* as "juridic persons" who represent a certain community by *fictio iuris*. "These juridic persons are therefore *personae representatae*, because when they become representatives of a group of persons, they represent that group as a distinct legal entity" [Mulieri 2018, p. 82 - *my translation*].

"The late medieval urban world was a system of corporations" [Rossi 2018, p. 57]. As a rule, Roman and even mediaeval jurists treated offices as a "series of powers vested in a person, not as a different person" [Rossi 2018, p. 57]. Not so with the corporations. The "head" of a corporations was understood to bear the "person" and act in the "name" of the community he represents.

Baldus de Ubaldis, a towering figure among mediaeval Postglossators, is reported to be responsible for the "distinction between person and office" for the individual offices: Baldus "applied to civil law some principles elaborated in canon law, especially by the great pope-lawyer Innocent IV; In retrospect," claims Rossi, "we could perhaps even say that what Innocent began, Baldus brought to conclusion." [Rossi 2018, p. 58].

The process by which the ecclesial and secular groups were coming to be conceptualised as corporations in the Roman law sense allowed for a more robust participation in œcumenical councils, organised by the Church, since it could now be attended by the representatives who carried the "juridic persons" of their communities "inside" them. The first genuine use of political representation at a council, based on

Roman law, appears to have occurred when Pope Innocent III (p. 1198-1216) called proctors from six cities in the Papal States to his curia in 1200 with full powers [Post 1964, pp. 108-109; Tierney 1982, p. 24.]. Fifteen years later, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 has "put the representative principle into operation on a scale with a prestige which made it known throughout the whole of western Europe" [Costanzo 1954, p. 143]. This meant that the clauses of representation were used to account for the functioning of the general Church Councils, for how they could make decisions that bind everyone, including the People, because everyone has a say in them. As Harold J. Berman writes in his "magisterial *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition,* church councils such as Innocent's Fourth Lateran of 1215 and the Council of Bourges in 1225 were thus the first medieval parliaments." [Berman 1983, quoted in Møller 2019]. As a response to the fact that this practice of proctorial representation (i.e. corporations sending representatives with full powers to the ecclesiastical court) developed to impact the highest level of ecclesial decision-making, the "12th- and 13th-century theologians" started "to construe the Christian community, and hence the Catholic Church, as a corporation (*universitas*)" [Møller 2018, p. 1077].

To rethink the Church itself along the lines of corporatist representation, the loose metaphor of *corpus mysticum* had to be elaborated into the constitutional theory that could define the relation between the "head" and the "body" of the Church in lucid legal terms. The so-called conciliarist movement started to argue that the councils which by the thirteenth-century included not only bishops but also representatives of cathedral chapters, religious orders, and secular princes, were the true *une image fidele* of Christendom in virtue of being more *representative* of the variety of Christians than the Pope [Pitkin 1967, p. 251]. In the process of these arguments, writes Møller, "conciliarists… formulated the first systematic theory about representative government." [Møller 2019].

"Once this leap from legal delegation to constitutional principle had been made, the practices of representation and consent spread like wildfire across the Latin West. This was

possible because Catholic Europe was in many ways a borderless society around 1200, and because the primitive lay administrations of the day were mainly staffed by churchmen, who had a monopoly on education… The use of clergy in lay government facilitated the spread of administrative and political models developed within the church." [Møller 2019].

Costanzo singles out the Dominican Order as a particularly germane proliferator of representative democracy across the continent and especially on the British Isles. "Consequent to the arrival of the Dominican Friars in England in 1221, a gradual expansion of representation in the English provincial synod develops till it ultimately comprises the proctors of diocesan clergy". [Costanzo 1954, p. 146]. Recently, Stavnskær-Doucette noted and examined in detail the role of the Dominican Order in proliferating the model of representative governance across Europe [Doucette 2021]. As writes Costanzo, "it is not till after the arrival of Dominicans in England in 1221, that representation of the lower diocesan clergy are included in the provincial synods and this we are persuaded to be a consequence of the practice and influence of the Black Friars" [Costanzo 1954, p. 301].

Gaines Post [1934, 1943a, 1943b, 1946, 1948, 1964], Georges de Lagarde [1937, 1948], and Brian Tierney [1955] noted the principal role of the canonistic doctrine of representation in the overall history of medieval representative institutions. "It may be," suggested Tierny, "that in this refinement of the proctorial concept is to be found an important link between the earlier medieval concept of representation as mere personification and the later idea, growing ever more explicit in the fourteenth century, that a true representative needed an actual delegation of authority from his community" [Tierney 1955, p. 125-126].

2.3. The Development of Trinitarian Constitutionalism.

2.3.1. Sovereignty as Product of Representation: *Vices reipublicae subeant*. Vitoria (1483-1546).

By the twelfth century, there was a consensus that it was the adhering to the principle of consent and counsel that distinguished the just king from the tyrant: "the twelfth century already held firmly to the doctrine that the just ruler ruled for the good of his people, the tyrant according to his own will" [Harriss 1975, p. 23]. In 1250, Francis Accursius, the Guelph author of the "great" or "ordinary" *glossa* to the *Codex Iustiniani* and the "books of fiefs", devised a juridical substantiation of the representative monarchy. He portrayed the power (*imperio*) as something that is "transferred from the people to the prince" (Lat. *imperio transferendo de popolo ad principe*), implying that the people as such already have the "constitutive power" before it is received by the prince. For Kantorowicz, the overall trajectory of Mediaeval constitutionalism consisted in developing the concept of the "two bodies" of the King – a clear demarcation line between the person of the king and the person of the state prevented the "fusion" of the ruler and the office, since power was understood as *bestowed* upon the king, not *possessed by* him. Thus, whereas for the Roman jurist Ulpian (170-223) the power is inseparable from the person in power – for example, *consul* becomes *potestos*, his person is "fused" with power, – for the Christians, on the other hand, the power is alienable, it is merely exercised by a human person to whom it is *delegated* and from whom it can be taken away. This allowed to prevent the confusion between human persons and power inherent to their office. For the mediaevals, the power that the prince receives is solely the power to judge and legislate – and only insofar as verdicts and laws are informed by counsel and consent. A constitutional king, to use Bogdanor's famed formula, is "a sovereign who reigns but does not rule" [Bogdanor 1996].

Nevertheless, at this point we still fall short of the declaration that sovereignty is not

a *thing* that is already possessed either by people or ruler. The last step we have to make before we reach genuinely Trinitarian constitutional theory is to declare that sovereignty is but a *product* of the activity of representation. To see how this step is made, we have to attend to the creative refinement of Cicero's idiom conducted by the Scholastic thinkers. Messarra observes that "Cicero's language of representation is persistently at work in scholastic writing, from Augustine and Aquinas to Suárez and Bellarmine…" [Messarra 2020]. For example, "In the *Prima secundae*, when discussing the legal force of custom, Aquinas says that a prince holds the power and authority to legislate insofar as he 'bears the person of the multitude [*gerit personam multitudinis*]'." [Messarra 2020, p. 7]. However, adds Messarra, "*gerere personam* was not the only means to convey the idea of representation in medieval scholastic political thought; Aquinas, Cajetan, and Almain enlarged this vocabulary to include *vicem gerens* and *repræsentatio*" [Messarra 2020, p. 9].

Messara singles out Vitoria, "who famously revamped the theology *curriculum* at Salamanca by substituting Lombard's *Sententiae* for Aquinas's *Summa*," as playing a decisive role in "the emergence of the formation of a distinctive political ontology in the second scholastic, a development that is the climactic result of this *longue durée* of scholastic refashioning of Cicero's terminology from the *De officiis*". [Messarra 2020, p. 3] Ciceronian terms that originally "defined the moral duties of the magistrate in classical republican political ideology become, by the early sixteenth century, the central devices in a Christian monarchical theory of politics by which the existence of the *respublica* – the locus of political life – is grounded in its representation" [Messarra 2020, p. 3].

Vitoria's intervention was to portray vicarious action not as a vehicle but as a source of sovereignty. In describing how rulers "assume vicariously the position of the commonwealth and undertake the care of the public good" [*vices reipublicae subeant et publici boni curam gerant*], Vitoria is careful to avoid talking of *potestas civilis* as something that is already substantial and is merely "carried" by the representative; instead, Vitoria's *potestas civilis* is latent unless and until it is represented by the person of the ruler

[Vitoria 1933, p. 53].

For Vitoria, "*Potestas civilis* is naturally vested in the whole respublica to prevent the destruction of the association, but the *multitudo* itself cannot exercise this power, and must necessarily entrust it to rulers who exercise it on behalf of the commonwealth (*vices reipublicae subeant*), if politics is to happen at all. Vitoria's maneuvers effectively upended the scholastic commonplace, evident as early as Aquinas and as late as Cajetan, that the *multitudo* can exist as an autonomous and independent body capable of governing itself without a representative." [Messarra 2020, p. 14]. "What we appear to be seeing in 1528 – well over a century before Thomas Hobbes predicated the origins of the 'state' on the institution of a 'representative', whose role was to 'beareth the Person of the people' – are a series of profound concerns in scholastic writing about the necessity of representation in order to secure the existence of the political community. That is to say, in a corpus of writings generally assumed to be basically Aristotelian in its assumptions about the natural existence of the political community, there is clear evidence of the formation of a distinctive scholastic political ontology where representation takes centre stage." [Messarra 2020, p. 14].

2.3.2. Representation as Contract. Hobbes (1688-1679), Rousseau (1712-1778), Sieyès (1748-1836).

Let us connect the two trajectories of "deprivatisation" discussed so far. Deprivatisation of the *bona fides* allowed the public square and its "communicants", *personae* (or language and that part of humans that partakes in language, i.e. "names") to be seen as the most authentic level of reality and hence as the relevant level of political action – thereby precluding all the claims to power that are not presented through the medium of public rational discourse. Deprivatisation of the three representational clauses from the Roman private law allowed the communities to be conceptualised as unified bodies *in virtue of being represented as one person by one person of their representative.*

Taken together, these deprivatisations allowed the public square to become the centre of negotiation between *personae repraesentatae* who acted in behalf of various corporations that comprised mediaeval society.

Once this practice was established, Christendom was on its way to conceptualising not just the Church or the society but the secular state itself as such a *persona repraesentata*, a product of representation of the people. This conceptualisation was conducted within the rich Scholastic tradition and drawn to a conclusion by Francisco de Vitoria. However, in the Northern regions of Europe where the secular authorities accepted the "torch" of not just the theory but the practice of representative governance (in the guise of parliamentarism) from the ecclesial conciliarism which was defeated in the infamous debacle of the Basel-Florence-Ferrara Œcunemical Councils, it took a while to come to terms with the secularisation of Trinitarian constitutional theory.

Meanwhile, in the seventeenth century, the discourse around representative democracy naturally incorporates the biblical idiom of acting "in the name" of someone. As early as 1676, this figure of speech was expedited by the merchant adventurer Nathaniel Bacon in his "Declaration in the Name of the People" to mobilise the masses for his rebellion against the colonial elites of Virginia. The idea that a representative acts in the name of the people without resembling the people became integral to representative democracy. Thus, for Edmund Burke, it was crucial to assert that the representative is not a mere delegate who carries out the instructions of the constituent assembly but a "trustee" who is entrusted to exercise his or her own judgment. The distance and difference that thus appears between the represented and the representative naturally necessitate both learning, willingness to take another's perspective, and a high standard of morality, willingness to act for another's sake.

Back in the seventeenth century, the conjunction between sovereignty and representation "is accomplished in exemplary manner in the work of Hobbes, in the form of a doctrine of "sovereign representation"" [Kervagan 2000, p. 234]. Hobbes secularised

and politicised the doctrine of the Trinity. In the Trinity, the Father "generates" or "begets" the Son. Translated into the terms of Hobbes' constitutional theory, the "Father" is the many individuals who convene to sign an irrevocable and unalterable contract in which they vow to transfer all their "natural freedom" to the Sovereign. Individuals "reduce all their wills… unto one will"; "appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person"; "This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-wealth, in latine Civitas. This is the Generation of the great Leviathan…" [Hobbes 1991: 120, XVII]. Prior to the contract, the individuals were sovereign but the state of natural freedom they inhabited meant that they were permanently at war with one another, thus, they were not a "people", a truly *political* body, because they were not represented as one "commonwealth" by a "common person". After the contract, the individuals become a "people" but transfer all their sovereignty to the Representative. Since the contract is signed among contracting individuals but not with the Sovereign, the Sovereign is not bound by the contract – only the contracting parties are bound by it to obey the Sovereign. Since the Sovereign is not a signee of the contract, in the wake of the transference, the nascent "people" do not have any say in what the Sovereign is to do. This is why Hobbes' view of representation is often described as "absorptive" or purely "formal". For Hobbes, "the sovereign represents in the very special sense that he brings into being or constitutes the represented, exactly as, in the act of speech, meaning does not exist prior to its expression." [Kervagan 2000, p. 234]. "For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude." [Hobbes 1991: 114, XVI]. As we can see, Hobbes' politicisation of the New Covenant bestows absolute sovereignty on the "Son" who is generated through representation. Instead of a community of communities, the state is thus envisioned as a contract between the atomised individuals and the absolute sovereign.

Alarmed by the absolutism beckoned by the Hobbesean account of representation,

Rousseau, inverts the Hobbes' sovereign representation and devises its exact contrary, the doctrine of representative sovereignty, where the "Father" (a people) refuses to transfer sovereignty to the "Son" (a representative) because of the distrust in the possibility of undistorted representation. In *Contrat Social*, Rousseau distinguishes between sovereignty and government to emphasise that sovereignty cannot be constituted by delegation, cannot have representatives who carry *plenitudo potestatis*, for "the sovereign may only be represented by himself" [Rousseau 1964, p. 368]. But this total sovereignty of the "people" is hardly preferable to the ancient divinization of the ruler. In both instances, what is foregrounded is the unchecked "will", something that is not open to stand corrected and be taught. Unfortunately, when it comes to political representation, the simple "revolution" of the usual status-quo is insufficient. The state of affairs where the represented unilaterally dictate their representative what to do merely turns the "chain of command" upside down but fails to turn it into a genuine "chain of representation" whose actors articulate and refine the initial input – opinions, grievances, prejudices, sentiments, in short, the illiterate "will" of the people.

What both Hobbes and Rousseau failed to do was to stipulate the simultaneous freedom of both the people and the government. Without affirming that on either ends of representational equation stand free subjects, and without the boundaries and distance that ensure their independence, there remains only the direct confrontation between their "wills". Thus, both Hobbes and Rousseau remained within the confines of seeing constitutional relation as a zero-sum-game. The only way to go past this conundrum is the dialectic, the discipline of not choosing, of endorsing the incessant contradiction between the sovereignty of represented and representatives powers as the only thing that opens either to learning and growth.

Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, the theoretical architect of the French Revolution, attempted to do just that, i.e. to equilibrate the sovereignty of the represented and representatives. In *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat?*, Sieyès presumed that there should not be

zero-sum-game between the represented and representatives if the latter is constituted legitimately. To stress that the two are interdependent, Sieyès invented the language of "constituent" and "constituted" powers, *pouvoir constituant* and *pouvoirs constitués*, thus preparing conceptual ground for both for the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of the government. Sieyès' main concept is that of *la nation*: "Qu'est-ce que la volonté d'une nation? C'est le résultat des volontés individuelles, comme la nation est l'assemblage des individus". [Sieyès 1985, p. 179]. Sieyès claimed that the legitimately constituted representatives "take the place of the nation itself" [Sieyès 1988, p. 136]. For Sieyes, "the body of representatives, to whom the legislative power or the exercise of the common will is entrusted, exists only in the manner that the nation has willed to give it." ["le corps des représentants, à qui est confié le pouvoir législatif ou l'exercice de la volonté commune, n'existe qu'avec la manière d'être que la nation a voulu lui donner"] [Sieyès 1985, p. 160]. Consequently, Sieyès endeavoured to devise the impeccably legitimate juridic equation between the *pouvoir constituant* and the *pouvoir constitués*.

The outcome of Sieyès' work in the 1789-1791 is the theory of national sovereignty and constitutional representation in the Constitution of 1791. There, he formulated the "modern relation between citizenship, sovereignty and representation" [Gohring 2011, p. 53]: "(1). Sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible. It appertains to the nation; no section of the people nor any individual may assume the exercise thereof. (2). The nation, from which alone all powers emanate, may exercise such powers only by delegation. The French Constitution is representative" [*Constitution française du 3 septembre 1791*, Title 3, Articles 1-2].

According to Kervégan, "Sieyès literally reverses the Hobbesian doctrine of representative sovereignty in holding that a nation's delegation of its sovereign power to a corps of extraordinary representatives does not entail either its diminishment or devolution. On the contrary: it is *only* by virtue of the mediation of representation that a diffuse national will is carried to expression and becomes authentically sovereign, since

"the object or end of the representative assembly . . . may not deviate from that of the nation itself, if it can at once unify and endow."" [Kervagan 2000, p. 235].

Let us recap the key milestones. Hobbes portrayed the constitutional equation is a characteristically Modern way, where all sovereignty was bestowed on the "generated" power of the Son. Rousseau retorted that popular sovereignty is inaliable. Sieyès balanced the two by stipulating that, although people as a whole do indeed possess sovereignty, there are "not able to exercise this themselves, and must be represented by the very act by which they are constituted" [Kervagan 2000, p. 235]. However, Sieyès aimed to do so by devising a flawless constitutional arrangement that would do total justice to the "general will" and thus capture it once and for all. In doing so, Sieyès aimed to minimise mediation, to make it as momentous as possible. For this he was vehemently criticised by Edmund Burke, who on one occasion ridiculed Sieyès' meticulous efforts to offer a final solution to the problem of the popular by writing a perfect constitution: "Abbé Sieyes has whole nests of pigeon-holes full of constitutions ready made, ticketed, sorted, and numbered; suited to every season and every fancy; some with the top of the pattern at the bottom, and some with the bottom at the top; some plain, some flowered" [Burke 1796/1803].

2.3.3. Corporatism and *Corpus Christi*. State as Community of Communities in G. W. F. Hegel (1777-1831).

I suggest that G. W. F. Hegel was the first to systematise the political implications of the orthodox dictum that mediation is not a means but an end, of which the central is that the duration of representation is worthwhile because it is the very process which "hypostatises" both the represented and the representative, both the constituent and the constituted powers. It was a part of Hegel's magisterial project of going past Modern ontology and developing essentially Meta-modern ontology which reintroduces Trinitarian ontology in the new garb. By doing this, Hegel offered an intellectual framework that provides a sustainable foundation for the representative democracy where sovereignty is

usurped neither by the wealthy nor by the powerful but is preserved for the public reason, language, or *Geist* (German for "Mind" or "Spirit"). Hegel gestures toward the sovereignty of language by offering a constitutional theory whose operation can be figuratively likened to a liturgical circumambulation of the "empty throne" (Greek ἑτοιμασία), "prepared" for God who alone is sovereign. This circumambulation is the dialectics which must know no cessation because it must never be reduced to one of its "moments" or "elements". As soon as it is thus reduced, sovereignty comes to be contracted in a given individual or a group who come to think of sovereignty as their property. Instead, the rule of secular politics is that none of its participants can be a proprietor of sovereignty because none can be construed as divine or sacred – all must be subordinated to the unending communication of properties, the continuous exchange of views and standpoints. As stated Sofia Näsström, "the unprecedented nature of modern representative democracy [is that] the locus of power becomes linked to an empty place, by which is meant that who has power and therefore counts as the appropriate incarnation of the people now turns into the very question of democracy'" [Näsström 2014, p. 3].

Kervégan claims that "in what concerns democracy, the Hegelian treatment of the question of representation seeks in some way to overcome the alternative on which modern thinking about the State is based: either representative sovereignty or sovereign representation." [Kervégan 2000, p. 236]. On the one hand, says Yeomans, Hegel did not share Rousseau's and "our own contemporary pious illusion that direct participatory democracy is a real possibility against which our extant forms of political life ought to be measured." [Yeomans 2017, p. 480]. On the other, in contrast to Hobbes and Sieyès, Hegel claimed that the constituent and constituted powers should be connected not by a one-off contract but by a "chain of representation", i.e. that the constitutional relation between the two should not take the form of a unilateral delegation of sovereignty but instead should be conceptualised as an ever unfinished business of communication across the free intermediate institutions that make up the State. For Hegel, "the authentic vocation of

political representation is to form a people politically that would, by itself, be politically amorphous. In other terms, without the "articulation" accorded it by representation, the people lacks that "rationality" which confers on it a significance for politics and the State" [Kervégan 2000, p. 239]. The affirmation that both parties to constitutional relation are sovereign entities underwrites the prospect of their reciprocal education which allows the governance to function like a learning process.

"If Hegel criticizes so harshly the usual justification of political representation (the "people" must be able to express its desires and defend its interests), that is because he rejects the thesis according to which the people by nature knows what it wants… But if the people does not know spontaneously what it wishes, that is because it is not *immediately* what it is: *a* people. Only representation, which gives body and voice to the "amorphous mass" that is the multitude, permits the people *to be* politically, to overcome in a universal mode its contradictory diversity and particularity." [Kervégan 2000, p. 242]. In a sense, Hegel concurs with T. S. Eliot's famed enfilade against immediacy in the *Four Quartets*:

> "...be still, and wait without hope
> For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without love,
> For love would be love of the wrong thing; there is yet faith
> But the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting" [*East Coker*, p. 188].

But what is the proper medium of such representation? Hegel takes it to be irrational that people who participate in already existing communal and professionaö relations have to be thrown asunder into atomised individuals who vote in general elections. Hegel thought that "stability and legitimacy cannot be found in individual opinion – neither each on their own nor in aggregate – but only in those circles of practical engagement that have already developed the outlines of common norms and the axes of dispute concerning them. These outlines and axes are the concreteness of the norms that provide the content of political debate." [Yeomans 2017, p. 479]. Therefore, Hegel was interested in reinventing

the mediaeval framework of the corporations, the intermediary "gatekeeping" institutions.

As wrote Hegel, "In our modern states, the citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the state; but it is necessary to provide ethical man with a universal activity in addition to his private end. This universal, which the modern state does not always offer him, can be found in the corporation. We saw earlier that, in providing for himself, the individual in society is also acting for others. But this unconscious necessity is not enough; only in the corporation does it become a knowing and thinking ethical life." [*Philosophy of Right* §255Z]. Accordingly, Hegel's ideal of representative mediation is described either as "corporatist" [Sata 2010] or "syndicalist" [Harris 2011, pp. 467–522]. Hegel was able to reappropriate this mediaeval vision of the state as a community of corporations because his Meta-modern theory of recognition allowed him to think about corporations in terms of group personhood [Hirvonen 2017]. Hegel defines a corporation as any community recognised by a state. But the corporations that matter most are the professional organisations such as labour unions, charities, guilds, hospitals, schools and universities, theatres, museums, etc. Also, there are the "gatekeeping" institutions that are not represented as distinct interest groups because they function as impartial agents of arbitrage and brokerage and hence require high professional standards and cultivation of virtues to perform their duties properly – e.g. the courts or the media that stir the discussion and serve as ethical authorities. For Hegel, writes Kervégan, "political integration of social diversity cannot succeed unless it takes account of, or more exactly bases itself on, the real divisions of civil society, themselves institutionalized thanks to the "corporations."" There are two reasons why corporations are the point of departure for genuine politics: first, they are the loci where the "interests" of the people are made lucid; second, they are the loci where the people receive their "names". First, corporations stand in relations of concrete productive interpenetration with the rest of civil society and government, which means that they operate on the level where the rational interests of the citizens are visible. If the medium of representation is a corporation, then it is possible to

articulate the interests of concrete productive groups that comprise the state. And since "interest", coming from Latin *inter* and *esse,* is the concretisation of people's "inter-being", their interdependence with the rest of society, we can say that, through corporatist mediation, people are represented neither as the mythical "public will" of the multitude nor as the equally mythical "private" individuals but as "communicants" in actual relations of production and mutual aid, as people in the lives of other people, in the "glory" of "hypostatic" interrelatedness. Second, corporations can offer a vision of an examined and hence worthwhile life, of the virtues, values, and views that can become the basis of moral judgment in the public square. Because of this, corporatist representation vindicates the tradition of representation whose medium is the "name", since the corporate groups are precisely that milieu where humans are recognised and celebrated as worthy of admiration and emulation, where their names are "made great" (Genesis 12:2).

In short, On Hegel's account, humans must be represented not as "mass of individuals" [*PR*, §303A] but as people in "glory", in active life of subjects of production and learning, as participants in concrete relations with one another and simply as people *in* one another, that is, as people in the communities whose members pass a shared judgment on the conduct, virtues, and character traits that constitute human finesse, share the standard of the fine performance, and share the role models. In the words of Yeomans, Hegel's "estates schema is nothing less than a precondition for robust individual agency as such. The estates (and, within them, the corporations) represent the circles of practical engagement in which this body of practical knowledge can be developed, honed, diversified, and transmitted. The exemplars of these estates – whether patron saints, stock characters in artistic representations, or just locally recognized successes – provide visible schemas for this practical knowledge that enable both emulation and debate." [Yeomans 2017, p. 474]. It is only as members of these autonomous communities that humans can offer valid perspectives and claim legitimate interests in the political exchange. In this regard, I contend that Hegel's ideal of corporatist representation where the representatives

must kenotically condescend to share in the life of their respective communities concurs with the tradition of ecclesial synodality where believers are represented neither as abstract "individuals" nor as an abstract general "will" but precisely as "communicants" in concrete relations of transformative communication, as persons in parishes, where their presence is witnessed and harnessed by a visiting bishop who can "recapitulate" local communities at the oecumenical councils precisely because he comes to "taste and see" their local gifts and problems.

For St. Ignatius of Antioch, the eucharistic constitution of a local community is coterminous with the presence of the bishop ("overseer") in the same way in which the constitution of the Catholic Church is coterminous with the presence of Christ – for it is them who make the Eucharist possible. In simpler terms, the Bishop enables the local communion in the same way in which Christ enables Communion writ large: "Let no man do anything connected with the Church without the bishop. Let that be deemed a proper Eucharist, which is [administered] either by the bishop, or by one to whom he has entrusted it. Wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the multitude [of the people] also be; even as, wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church [Καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία]" [*Letter to the Smyrnaeans* 8, Roberts and Donaldson (*trans*.)].

From this it can be inferred that, from the beginning, the corporate unity of the Christian Church was thought in terms of representation. The Church is the resurrected body of Christ – Christ's life in a new medium. On this assessment, the historical uniqueness of the Church is that it is the first corporation which *exists as representation*. It is Christ's resurrected life in the bodies of the people and the new life of the people in the resurrected body of Christ. To this it shall be added that the continuity of Christian action within and outside of the Church is the continuity of witness. That is, any given action in the worlds of activism, charity, politics, etc., can be labelled "Christian" only insofar as it bears witness to the Christian God; and this it does only insofar as this action is but a "spillover" of the same joy that is attested to in the liturgy, of the same act that holds the

liturgy and the whole Church together – the Eucharist. The eucharistic exchange is the central constitutive act of the Church and the literal illustration of the principle of its unity. Therefore, the continuity of Christian action in the ecclesial and secular domains is the continuity of the Eucharist. At this point we are ready to understand why democracy which is genuinely centred on the practice of corporatist representation can be a secular theatre of witness to the divine liturgy which is centred on the act of the Eucharist. That governance bears witness to the "kingdom of heaven", that governance is "liturgical" or "theocratic", whose style and end gesture to the Eucharist as the act of the ultimate, corporeal representation – giving one's body to another and taking another's body inside oneself. Such governance itself works eucharistically (as acting in another's "name" and "interest") and also works to legislate the Eucharist as the law of the land – so that the grammar of "interpenetration" and "co-inherence", "presence-in-one-another", becomes the grammar of all relations – "so that God may be all in all" (1 Corinthians 15:28).

Conclusions to Part II.

Provocatively, I speculate that Plato would have embraced modern representative democracy. His magnum opus *Republic* is concerned with the task of building a city where justice is not equated with power, not reduced to that which is expedient to those who happen to be stronger [*Republic* 338c2–3]. Plato's disregard for Athenian democracy stemmed from this conviction that the power of the majority does not have a purchase on legitimacy, let alone justice. Hence, For Plato, it was crucial to not identify justice with the will of the majority because the insufficiently articulated popular will is by definition unable to resist the populism of the demagogues.

As a matter of fact, our representative democracy does not cater to the majority opinion. Instead, it safeguards the rights of the minorities and affords the pluralistic public square where the minorities are allowed to raise difficult questions through a limited amount of representatives – hence affording a scale (peace and pace) of discussion where

it is possible to exercise collective moral judgment, and thus to articulate a nuanced picture of the common good. The quality of discussion and the quality of representatives are mutually-conditioning. If the discussion is conducted in "good faith" in the sense that every person is open to stand corrected, the minorities see that they have to send representatives who will be able to engage in it.

The crucial caveat is that minorities must be organised not on a descriptive basis (the immediate visceral solidarity of, say, race, or some semi-arbitrary self-identification), but as communities of shared conviction, craft, and character, then there will be a sense that their representatives should be not merely delegates who convey strict instructions but trustees who further the agency of their community through interaction with other communities. One such community is the Church. The mission of the Church in this regard is to "a community in which the good of each is inseparable from the good of all" [Williams 1994, p. 7], "a community whose transparency – and transforming or liberating effectiveness – is to be found in its penitence rather than its self-defence" [Williams 2011, Divine Presence], in short, to proclaim a non-zero-sum vision of society by performance of a life in which the procuring and securing of its space, power, and wealth, are not the end-in-itself because – and it is at once a disturbing yet reassuring paradox – the nature of Christianity is such that the more successful the Church becomes at securing its own territory, the less credible it becomes. The Church comes to be most fully itself when it fails to secure its place in the world, when it is, say, driven under the earth as the "catacomb church" in the Soviet Union.

Rowan Williams calls this vision "procedural secularism". What does it mean to live in a world where God is the one to whom belongs all "glory", "majesty", "dominion", "authority", and "might"? (1 Peter 5:11; Jude 25; Revelation 1:6; Revelation 5:13). I offer two implications, one negative and one positive. Negative: the state cannot expropriate these predicates for itself. Positive: the state has to become an instrument of the divine power, has to become disciplined, transformed, and used by it – not in order to reach some

distant state of utopia or arcadia by any means necessary but, on the contrary, in order to bear witness to the divine by the very style of its exercise, to testify to something of the gratuity, gratefulness, and grace of the divine "transfer of power" that is absolutely "self-forgetful" because it is conducted among the Persons who know that they will "find" themselves in each other (as a lover knows that she will always be present in her beloved's thoughts and dreams). The constitutive power's bestowal is gratuitous, the constituted power's reception is grateful, the repercussion of their relation is grace. In the Liturgy, we join this exchange from the place of grateful receptivity, the Eucharist – Christ breaks the bread, again and again, to gratuitously re-constitute the Church as a community *in which* he is and a community which is *in him* – so as to, being ingraced with the Spirit, to return as one to the Father as "breath" returns to its "source" [Ecclesiastes 12:7].

Practice of philosophy is a prerequisite of sane governance precisely because it allows language to be sovereign. Recall Plato's claim that "those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead" (Phaedo 64a3-4), that "true philosophers practice dying" [ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι] (Phaedo 67e). Parties to a genuinely philosophical discussion must not defend their viewpoints by all means necessary, instead their task is to be willing to "stand corrected", to "let go" of beliefs and identities that are revealed as untrue, not so as to have the foreign will or view imposed on them but so as to allow the logic of language to take *all* the interlocutors to a weird place wherein they never expected to end up. Hegel claimed that "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well" [Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Preface, §17]. In philosophical discussions, the truth is not passive, it "strikes" and "wounds" us. This "dying" can be seen as "conforming of the knowing subject to what truth is at that moment 'doing'" [Williams 2013b, p. 276]. Seen in this light, the representatives who are merely instructed delegates are not true philosophers – they are the lobbyists who come to Parliament with their minds already and prematurely made up. In the time of Plato, Sophists construed wisdom as something they

possessed, as their mastery of manipulative rhetorical techniques. But the canon of Western thought from Plato to Maximus to Aquinas to to Hegel identifies the truth with that which disrupts and disturbs the neat operations of our thinking. This is why representatives ought to act not simply *in behalf* but *in the name* of the people – for, in the latter case, they are entrusted not just to follow the pre-ordained instructions with regard to the interest of the people as people themselves define it, but with people's life in language, with their "name", so that a door is left open for the rethinking of what is people's "best interest" really.

Before concluding, let us examine the contours of Hegel's "Trinitarian constitutionalism". The constitu*ent* power is legitimate only insofar as it constitutes the constitut*ed* power, because this act of constitut*ion* is itself the power that constitutes and unites the former and the latter – and only together do these powers comprise the constitut*ive* power which alone is sovereign, that is, the State. Hegel calls this the "idealism of sovereignty" [*Philosophy of Right* §278]. The constituency has to entrust its power and identity to the constituted power – just like "the Father gives all that he has and is to the Son" [Williams 2008a, p. 22]. Neither the represented nor the representative is sovereign, neither can simply "do its own will"; they have to continue their relationship, continue their life in each other, which is what constitutes the "will of the Father" – which Jesus does, "having loved His own who were in the world, He loved them to the end" (John 13:1), and predicts Peter to fail at doing, "the rooster shall not crow till you have denied Me three times" (John 13:38).

Historically, this constitutional framework has a Paschal form. The development of these powers is the sequence of the revelation – in Passover, the "constituent power" is liberated as a political body, nation of Israel, and united with its Sovereign (Christ) through the (obscure) mediation of the Law; in Crucifixion, the Sovereign, the "constituted" power for which Israel as the "divine constituency" was created, is revealed as a disconcerting glory of the crucified king, *Rex Iudaeorum*; lastly, in the Pentecost, the "constitution"

between the "constituent" and the "constituted" powers, between the "body" that is Israel and the "head" that is Christ – is revealed as the Church, the Community of the Holy Spirit, whose mediation does not obscure the "constituted" power of Christ but makes it abundantly clear. Think the difference between the "darkness" of Sinai (γνόφος), the unbearable light of Tabor (φῶς), and the miraculous intelligibility and translatability bestowed by the "tongues as of fire" (γλῶσαι ὡσεὶ πυρός) which landed on the disciples at the Pentecost. In both "dispensations", the covenant community re-members and re-constitutes itself by re-enacting the constitutional act of eating the Paschal Lamb, be it the unleavened bread of the Jewish Passover or the gifts of the Eucharist. The Spirit is the clarification of the fact that the people who left Egypt were destined to come under the headship of the crucified. The Church, the community of the Spirit, is the community of people who came to terms with this fact. Hence, as wrote Bulgakov, "The recreation of a genuinely corporate humanity" [Williams 2008a, p. 28], "the gift of communion, of *koinonia*, is the first gift of Pentecost. It is also the supreme goal which Christ himself has set for the whole human race within the Church" [Bulgakov 1927, p. 306.].

It stands to reason that the community constituted in this manner naturally lends itself to the synodal style of administration. A bishop is enabled to speak in the "name" of the local churches because he kenotically partakes in the "inner form" of their name, i.e. the "substance" of their life. According to St. Ignatius, a bishop as it were collects the presence of the parochial churches by sharing in their problems and becoming a "communicant" of their gifts, because, thanks to "tasting" the lives of these communities, a bishop is enabled to represent them substantively at the wider councils. After Pope Innocent III, the relation between the represented community and the prelate is juridically articulated into a relation between corporations and proctors who "bear the person" of the collective life they represent. The conciliarists aimed to transform the Church writ large into the corporation of corporations, into a conversation between *personae repraesentatae* who stood for various communities, but were defeated at the Florence-Ferrara council.

After the defeat of ecclesial conciliarism, the "torch" of synodality was adopted by the secular authorities and thinkers, who launched the process of the secularisation and politicization of the ecclesial synodality that springs from the perichoretic representation articulated in the "trinitarian", "christological", and "pneumatological" dogmas of the Church.

I suggest that Hegel's philosophical system is the definitive realisation of this project. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* can be read as containing the germs of a translation of the "Trinitarian", "Christological", and "pneumatological" dogmas into, respectively, constitutional theory of sovereignty, theory of political action as substitutionary atonement, and theory of corporatist mediation. Hegel offers a vision of the state where all human life becomes subordinated to the logic of synodality, where the "word" is sovereign – the state where all exercise of power is legitimated through "corporatist" or "syndicalist" mediation which affords an appropriate scale for the personal conversation between the citizens and the government because it represents humans as "communicants" of creative and virtuous forms of life, persons in concrete relations of speech, growth, and production, as speakers, students, and workers. For Hegel, the constitutional process that creates both the civil society and the government is the corporatist representation in quite a literal sense – the discipline of incarnational solidarisation by which the "head" and the "limbs" of the state become one "body" thanks to "tasting and seeing" each other's lives; and since authorities in this framework must share in the substance of corporate life, it empowers actual communities of conviction and profession to become the key agents of political exchange. Finally, if this is true, then we can draw a conclusion that the corporatist representation which is rooted in this kenotic communion is an organic political continuation of the Eucharist, a "spillover" of the "rational worship" (τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν) by which the Spirit constitutes Christ's Mystical Body – his Church (Romans 12:1).

PART III.
ORTHODOX ROOTS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY.

3.1. Orthodox Doctrine as it Stands in Relation to Political Representation.

3.1.1. "Perichoresis": Relations of Representation.

The New Testament usage of the verb **ἐντυγχάνω** seamlessly ties God, Church, and state together – the salvific agency of Jesus, the act of the Spirit that marks the communion of saints, and the ubiquitous model of communication between the rulers and the ruled:

1. "It is Christ Jesus, who died, yes, who was raised, who is at the right hand of God, who indeed intercedes [ἐντυγχάνει] for us" (Romans 8:34 NRSVA);
2. "[T]he Spirit intercedes [ἐντυγχάνει] for the saints according to the will of God" (Romans 8:27);
3. "Festus said, "King Agrippa, and all men present with us, you see this man about whom the whole Jewish people petitioned [ἐνέτυχον] me, both in Jerusalem and here, crying out that he ought not to live any longer" (Acts 25:24).

The rarely theologically contested intercessory role of Christ in relation to the Father is examined in 3.1. Intercessory prayer as a spiritual act that constitutes the community of the saints is examined in 3.2. The role of intercession in relations between the rulers and the ruled is examined in 3.3.

In the West, "authority *without* a representative claim referring to the people has become next to unthinkable" [van Meurs and Morozova 2019, p. 144]. I contend that this is a "learning outcome" of Christian education – doctrine, cult, and practice of the Church. The form of Christian unity, the cascade of intercession, became the form of Western statecraft.

At the end of his ministry, Christ prays "that they all may be one, as You, Father, *are*

in Me, and I in You; that they also may be one in Us… And the glory which You gave Me I have given them, that they may be one just as We are one: I in them, and You in Me; that they may be made perfect in one" (John 17:21-23). Christ does not talk about simple unity. *Pace* Rowan Wiliams, "If we take seriously the language of St John's Gospel, we cannot avoid some account of real mutuality in the divine life: each hypostasis actively constitutes the life of the others, and, since there are no contingent differentiating factors involved, each is simply itself in, for and with the others, in the timeless circulation of an overflowing eternal love and intelligence never contained in any kind of closed reciprocity" [Williams 2023, p. 11].

The Persons of the Trinity "abide in each other" and "we are all made in that image" [C. Williams 1942, pp. 194–5.]. "That manner is said to be by 'co-inherence' of the Divine Persons in each other, and it has been held that the unity of mankind consists in the analogical co-inherence of men with each other …" [C. Williams 1943, p. 92]. So wrote Charles Williams in his admirable study *The Figure of Beatrice*. His usage of the word 'coinherence' originates from Henry Newman's translation of *perichoresis*, the Greek word at first used to describe the relation between divine and human natures of Christ and later the relation between the Persons of the Trinity.

Charles Williams argued that "You have the notion of coinherence in almost all the doctrines"; the "central fact of Christendom" is that the same order exists in the spiritual and in the social realm: from the doctrine of Christ to "the basis of the social order, co-inherence was the real statement of the whole thing" [Fiddes 2021]. In *The Descent into Hell*, Williams states that substitution "...is hidden in the central mystery of Christendom which Christendom itself has never understood, nor can" [C. Williams 2010, p. 101].

Applied to everyday life, "Co-inherence is the idea that Christ's risen life inhabits believers so that they share the divine interrelationship of the Trinity and live as members of one another." [Higgins 2013]. It is the idea that "we are radically responsible for one

another's wellbeing and even salvation, and that it is even possible literally to take on the suffering or fear of others and endure it on their behalf so they are spared the pain" [Williams 2022, p. 343]. "In the deep interconnectedness of human lives that characterize the Mystical Body of Christ, believers are able to take on the experience of others as if it were their own… You may or may not then *experience* it in the same way, but what matters is that you have made yourself 'available' to carry it on behalf of others, and have lifted from those others the weight that they cannot bear." [Williams 2022, pp. 313-314].

Charles Williams singled out the "Acts of the City": exchange, substitution, and romantic love. In love, one "has a sense of loving precisely from the great web in which the object and we are both combined. There is, if only transitorily, a flicker of living within the beloved." [C. Williams 1941, p. 153]. As Gallagher points out, what Charles Williams called the "acts of the city", are mostly the prosaic acts of recognition and reverence that we pay one another: "We allow the other car to move through the intersection ahead of us", "physically assisting one another" [Gallagher 2006], the acts that bring to mind W. H. Auden's "courtesies of the city" – "politeness", "manners", "etiquette", "decorum". At a more abstract level, these are the acts of "entering into another's reality as if it were our own". The ultimate "act of the city" is self-sacrifice – "without a cement of blood… no secular wall will safely stand" [Auden 2009, p. 237].

English "interpenetration" and "co-inherence", Greek *perichoresis* and *anakephalaiosis*, Latin *circumincessio* and *mutua inhaesio*, Church Slavonic *predstatelstvo* and *zastupnitsvo*, German *Vorstellung* and *Stellvertretung*, all these terms were used at various times to render Christ's life "in the name" of the other, the life that constitutes his Church, the Mystical Body whose members live "in Christ", i.e. "in", "for", and "from" each other – bear each other's burdens, ease each other's pain, answer for each other's sins, engage in "the ardent interchange of pardon" [C. Williams 1938, p. 145]. My contention is that Tertullian's *repræsentatio* – with all its political connotations to a modern ear – is an appropriate term to speak of Christian practice in our day.

The mockers who made fun of Christ hanging on the Cross, "Others he saved, himself he could not save" (Matthew 27:42), did not err in regard to the predicament of all humans: what God shows us is that no one can save oneself, we can only save and be saved by one another. Our salvation is precisely our life in and for one another – for this is precisely what life in Christ means. As Charles Williams once phrased it, "The thread of the love of God was strong enough to save you and all the others, but not strong enough to save you alone" [Gallagher 2006]. The "web of humanity" "becomes 'in-coherent' through sin and is restored to a new 'co-inherence' of glory" [C. Williams 1949, pp. 22, 26, 30-2].

To learn the doctrine of the Trinity is to become habituated to the language of self-giving, i.e. to language in its purity, language per se, since language is simply being-in-the-other. The prevalent Patristic terms to talk of God's self-giving is περιχώρησις (rotation, interpenetration, coinherence), κένωσις (self-emptying), and ἔκστασις (being outside of oneself). God's hypostatisation of the "other" results in grades of otherness:

1. Generation.
2. Procession.
3. Creation.
4. Incarnation.

God makes the other present and is present in the other through knowing and loving. The Father thinks the other *as identical* in the Son and loves the other *as other* in the Spirit. The Father "generates" the Son as simultaneously "kin" and "other". The Father lets the Spirit "proceed" so as to be simultaneously fully God and "more other" to the Father than the Son. Yet this "othering" does not end with the Spirit. God creates the world that is even "more other" than the Spirit – to the extent of being *not God*. Thus we can discern the three acts of God in relation to the other – the Thinker, the Lover, and the Creator. Yet,

even in the creation, the Son and the Spirit work so as to make it identical to God. In the Incarnation of the Son, God becomes present in the world and, in the Resurrection by the power of the Spirit, makes the world present to Godself as other and as identical (adopted) at the same time. The act of the Spirit is the act of creation identity-in-difference. In the Spirit, those who are different from each other are united in one community of solidarity – all by being drawn into the Trinity, the community of Persons who are totally present in each other yet without diminishing distance and difference. It is the model of letting the other be other, and establishing solidarity with the other in other's farthest extent of otherness. God establishes solidarity with creation by transforming His relationship with it into 'generation', God's Incarnation in the midsts of the fallen world.

I hypothesise that the doctrine of the Tirnity can be read as the Christian blueprint of a "constitutional theory". In the Exodus, we read of the election and liberation of the Jews as the "constituency" of God. In the Gospels, we read of how this "constituency", at last, comes under the headship of the "constituted power" that was destined for it – it is "recapitulated" by Christ. In the Acts, we read how the Spirit draws the people into the community that recognises and confesses the reality that it is indeed Christ who is the "constituted power" for whom the Jewish "constituency" was created in the first place, draws the people to come to terms with the terrifying reality that the long-awaited *Rex Iudaeorum* is crucified.

3.1.2. "Hypostasis": Result of Representation.

The Greek word *hypostasis* (ὑπόστασις, "under" + "standing") refers to that what is substantial, the ultimate underlying reality. In the New Testament, *hypostasis* appears a total of 6 times. In all instances, it has to do with insisting on the reality of something. In Hebrew 1:3, the Son is said to be the exact representation of the reality of God: "The Son is the radiance of his glory and exact representation [χαρακτηρ, impress image, impersonation] of his being [υποστασεως, reality, substance]". In Hebrews 11:1,

hypostasis is translated variously as confidence or realisation: "confidence (realisation) of the things hoped for" [εστιν δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις].

The *hypostasis* is where nature is particularised, made *actual* and hence *real*. And, taking into account what we have said earlier about the interpenetration as the constituting characteristic of the three *hypostases* of the Trinity, it stands to reason that the word *hypostasis* allowed the Church to say that what is most actual and real about reality writ large is that all things are interdependent, all things stand "under" and "on" each other. Everything that *is*, everything that is *actual*, "supports" and "is supported by" something else. Everything is in need of the other. Applied to humans, it implies that to be a person is to have one's being in the other, to "suffer" and "be suffered" by others. The account of my identity that is non-hypostatic, that ignores my involvement in others and others' in me, i.e. ignores me as a communicant in *perichoresis*, is, strictly speaking, a fiction. The discourse of the "self-made" individual substitutes the concrete history of exchanges that formed the individual in question with a myth.

The idea that what is ultimately real is that which participates in relationships of mutual aid is a common theme in patristic thought. For the Church Fathers, the reality of a thing or person was defined not by its individual essence but by its relationships with other things and persons. This idea is reflected in the way they used the term "hypostasis" to describe the reality of Christ's personhood as a relationship between the divine and human natures.

The literal Latin translation of *hypostasis* is *substance*. The seminal scholar of representation Hanna Pitkin coined the term "substantive" for a kind of representative who elevates the concrete concerns and problems of her constituents to the level of policy-making. In contrast to a "descriptive" representative whose connection with the represented is based on their likeness or identity, a "substantive" representative is she who understands and bears witness to the substance of what bothers her constituents, even though she is not necessarily identical to them. Yildirim defines substantive representation

as "a form of representation in which the representative acts on behalf of the represented group regardless of any membership or resemblance to that group" [Yildirim 2021]. Under substantive representation, *distance* and *difference* between representative and represented are seen not as an obstacle but as an occasion for learning.

Hypostasis was never translated into Church Slavonic, only transliterated as *ipostas'*. A possible Russian translation of *hypostasis* is *podlezhashchee*, "under-lying", referring to the "grammatical subject". Another possible translation is *predstavitel*, or Church Slavonic *predstatel*, "one who stands before", "representative".

3.1.3. "Icon": Aesthetics of Representation.

A word that is used in the Divine Liturgy for "represent" is *eikonizontes*. The Cherubic Hymn reads, "We, who mystically represent the Cherubim" (*mystikos eikonizontes*; "portray", "are icons of") the Cherubim". In a sense, in developing the doctrine, the Councils were trying to come to terms with their own representational operation. The final achievement of the conciliar theology was the vindication of iconography. The last Oecumenical Council developed a concept of representation that walks on a knife edge between an arbitrary "idol" and a deceptive "copy", what Williams described by means of Hebrew words for "image" and "likeness" in Genesis – *tselem* and *demut*. [2012, *Idols, Images and Icons*]. *Tselem* (צלם) is derived from the parent root צל (*tsal*), a "shadow", and דמות (*demut*) stems from דם (*dam*), "blood". Jews decried visual representation because of its temptation to copy and substitute, to stop representing, to become content with the achieved likeness of God instead of continuing learning what God is like. In one word, because of idolatry, where mere "shadow" of the object substitutes the object because it resembles it. Instead, the Jews were interested in the substantial transformation, in the conversion of heart on the level of the whole community, with a kind of change they had undergone in their Exodus from Egypt. In one sense, Jews after Exodus are the same Jews as Jews before Exodus. In another sense, they are not.

They are represented anew as identical and different at once. The representation Jews were devoted to is a kind of "Paschal" representation whereby a community is re-constituted through remembering that its identity is the identity of transformative liberation, its identity is non-identity.

In a similar vein, Christian "iconic" representation is concerned not with resemblance but with the "continuity of action" [ibid]. Situated in the context of an austere prayer routine, the iconographer neither "copies" nor "substitutes" what she represents through an exercise of skill, rather, she "relates" and "responds" to it adequately, she makes its life present in a new medium, "in another kind of wood" [Auden 2009, pp. 89]. It is a "realisation", an "assurance", a "confidence" in things not seen. The fact that these three are the words that translate Greek *hypostasis* in the New Testament shows that this "iconic" representation lies at the core of the main "relations" that characterise Christian grammar – that between the divine hypostases, that between the divine and human. For the mortals, representation is not what it is like in the Trinity. Just like the experience "dies" in the "verbal icon" to "arise" in it a conventional meaning, whence it becomes intelligible to all thinking beings, so our "iconic" representation is "Paschal", it "crucifies" and "resurrects", it liberates us objects out of our context and promises to "land" us in a new one.

3.2. Orthodox Spirituality as it Stands in Relation to Political Representation.

3.2.1. Divine Liturgy as it Stands in Relation to Representation.

§. *Deësis* (δέησις). G. W. F. Hegel claimed that, by orchestrating a dialogue between diverse persons who speak for diverse interest groups, political representation allows people to confront their own ineliminable diversity on personal terms and hence permits them to be "in intimate contact with the living presence of the spirit" [Hegel 1977, p. 265]. The aim of this section is to make this claim more intelligible with the help of Christian

pneumatology. Alternatively, the aim of this section is to substantiate the claim that Christian worship has a representational nature. As a prelude, I will juxtapose the Christian practice of prayer with its Roman Pagan counterpart. *Pietas* (piety) was "a virtue in which the Romans judged themselves peerless," writes Mackey in his commendable study of Roman religion [Mackey 2022, p. 293]. According to Laing, Roman relations with gods had the following characteristics:

1.   Gods could not be trusted. Gods are whimsical, unpredictable, and betrayal-prone.

2.   Gods respond conditionally, our sacrifices oblige them to honour the *do ut des* principle – "I give so that you may give". The relationship with gods is transactional, based on *quid pro quo* ("this for that") proposals and deals rather than petitions and supplications.

3.   This leads to inequality of believers: "He who has nothing to offer tends to flatter his god with fair word" [Laing 1911, p. 182].

The 28th book of Pliny's *Naturalis Historia* reads, "There are different forms of address to the deities, one form for entreating, another form for averting their ire, and another for commendation." [Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia* 28.3.11]. "The primary *point* of a great many of Roman prayers is to prompt a divine addressee to do something…" [Mackey 2022, p. 318]. An emblematic example of Roman prayer is encapsulated in Cato the Censor's *De Agri Cultura*: "Offer a cake to Jupiter and honor him thus: "Jupiter, in offering you this cake I pray to you good prayers that you be willingly well disposed (*volens propitius*) toward me and my children, toward my house and my family, since you have been honored by this cake" [*De Agri Cultura* 134]. The character of Christian prayer is twofold:

1.   Whereas the pagan prayer addresses entities who are powerful in and of themselves, the addressees of Christian prayer are as a rule addressed not as powerful entities who will act themselves but as representatives who will "carry" petitions to the

"centre of power", the Judge.

2.   The representatives whom the Christian prayer invokes are invoked precisely and solely in virtue of their *representative* qualities, not in virtue of some other property like power or knowledge. Jesus, Mary, and the Saints are the addressees of prayers because *they stand in such a relationship* to all created life and its Source that they are made so transparent and welcoming to both that they can meaningfully *represent* them to each other, can act as χώρα that can be a "home" for both, as undistorted mediators who acquaint us with someone whom we could not approach directly.

I take it that the core distinction is the following – Pagans pray to the beings who have the power to directly satisfy their petitions; Christians pray to the beings who are in a position to represent us before the ultimate power. As Pagans, we relate to gods as to powerful entities who satisfy our interests in return for appropriate praise and offerings, as to entities who satisfy our passions if we satisfy theirs. As Christians, we relate to God as to the Judge of our interests who sets us free from irrational passion – for the saintly representatives will not present our lives to God unexamined.

Hence the hypothesis that, in virtue of shifting the focus of praise and locus of divinity from the possession of great attributes to being in relations of representation, Christians transformed the idea of legitimation – at first, they were saved from the confusion of the regnant earthly powers with divinity; later, all earthly powers were obliged to legitimate their authority after the pattern of divine representation – i.e. by claiming that they represent the people.

I suggest that just like the Greek dramas first enacted as religious rituals during the festival of Dyonisia gave rise to the secular tradition of theatre, just like the Roman practice of jurisprudence first enacted as religious rituals gave rise to the rule of law, so the practice of political representation that gave rise to Western representative democracy was first enacted in the Christian worship. As Hegel puts it, "States and Laws are nothing else than Religion manifesting itself in the relations of the actual world" [Hegel 1991, p. 436].

Unfortunately, it is difficult to talk intelligibly about straightforward instances of political-representational language in the Early Christian prayers since the practice of political representation was virtually unknown to the ancients. Nevertheless, in the next section, I try to identify the nerve that knits the entire liturgical life of the Church into a unified enterprise. I do so by examining some of the terms, mostly the titles from Marian hymnography, that can be interpreted as pertaining to various offices of representation.

Since λειτουργία is a composite of λειτος ("public") and ἔργος ("work"), where λειτος is connected to both λαός ("people") and λαϊκοί (from which stems our word "laity"), its etymology is often used to advocate for the intensified participation of the laity in the worship. However, originally it referred to the work of a philanthropic person *for* the people. Λειτουργός was someone who did public work at his own expense for the sake of the public good. This might give us a pause to ponder whether the usage of the word "liturgy" for Christian worship conveyed the sense of participation in the original λειτουργία of Jesus, his act of self-effacement for the sake of the ultimate public good, whether it could portray liturgy as the act by which the Holy Spirit "attaches" [παραθώμεθα] the disciples to the continuing "public work" of Jesus Christ.

The Christian Church is constituted through the Eucharist at the Last Supper – in Christ's act of giving his body to the disciples and the disciples' act of receiving Christ's body into themselves. By this act, the Church is constituted as the Mystical Body of which Christ is the "head" and Christians are the "members". Liturgy is the Spirit's act of re-constituting the Church as the Mystical Body. It is the celebration, remembrance, and reenactment of the original constitution. The Spirit simply connects the "head" with the "body", "interbreathes" the two into one *corpus mysticum*. In the Liturgy, all the ways of representation coalesce. God is re-presented by the priests, proceedings, gestures, readings, icons, bread, and wine.

It stands to reason that one of the keys to understanding the liturgy is revealed in the dominant part of Iconostasis, the so-called *deësis* row, which portrays an array of the saints

and angels who turn toward the centre to intercede for the faithful before their final representatives in the hour of Judgment, Mother of God and God's "Friend", Mary and John the Forerunner, who present the faithful directly to Christ the Judge.

The word *deësis* (δέησις) means "prayer" or "petition". As a rule, it consists of either three or more icons, situated in a row. The icon in the centre is the "King of Kings", "Christ in majesty". On Christ's left and right are Mary and John, angels and saints, all facing Christ in the prayer on behalf of humanity. It is said that the key dogmatic meaning of the *deësis* is the intercessory prayer. The saints are the mediators between the sinful humanity and the merciful God.

According to Baumstark, this iconographic form was shaped by the intercessory shape of the liturgy. Baumstark examines the two Troparia that follow the Benedictus on Versperos in the Greek and Coptic rites. In the Troparion in honour of the Prodrome, we read: "Βαπτιστα του Χρίστου, πάντων ημών μνήσθητι, ενα ρυσθώμεν των ανομιών ημών σοι γαρ εδόθη χάρις πρεσβεύειν υπέρ ημών" ["Baptist of Christ, be mindful of us all, that we may be delivered from our transgressions. For to you has been given the grace to intercede for us"]. This he takes to be the origin of the *deësis* "as the iconographical type of intercession" [Walter 1970, p. 182].

This theme of intercession is also found in the text, "inscribed upon the unfolded roll held by the Virgin in the Deësis (not Paraklesis) in the church of the Archangel or Panaghia Theotokos at Galata Cyprus": [Δέξαι δέησιν της σης μητρός οίκτίρμων τη μεσιτρία της των βροτών σωτηρίας; Receive, your mother's prayer; be merciful to the mediatrix of the salvation of mortals]. [Walter 1970, p. 186].

The idea of representation is accentuated in the XI century ekphrasis of *deësis* written by the Byzantine hymnographer John Mauropous. It is written in four voices: the Basileus (king), the Theotokos (Mary), the Prodrome (John the Forerunner), and Christ. In the hour of Judgment, Mary and John find words to present the dead king in a good light. "Possibly," hazards Walter, "these verses were written on behalf of Constantine IX

Monomachus (1042-1055)" [Walter 1970, p. 184].

Mary pleads to Christ: "This man is your handiwork and, at risk of offending you, your creation, your achievement. He knows there to be no God but you. Grant him salvation". John says: "Pardon him. A living creature is drawn towards sin. Nevertheless, he has not gainsaid your faith. Let faith save him, magnanimous one". Christ responds: "The honour due to a mother and the intercession of a friend prevail and sway me not unwillingly. Faithful slave, render thanks to them and enter into the joy of your Lord" [Walter 1970, p. 184]. In Walter's view, Mauropous' poem could have been "responsible for the change in signification of the Deësis from a group of "visionaries" or celestial functionaries to that of a group of intercessors." [Walter 1970, p. 187]. For him, "It is not… sufficient to postulate a simple causal relationship between the invocation of the Virgin and the Prodrome in the liturgy and their representation as interceding for mankind in the Deësis." [Walter 1970, p. 183].

All in all, we should not risk forgetting that the Church is one because it is united in the network of intercession. For young Rowan Williams, "all our intercessory prayer, which we can so easily come to regard as the most 'ordinary' part of our prayer, the part which is most a matter of routine, is prayer in the Spirit, because it is the articulation of communion." [Williams 1974, p. 624]. "In intercession," writes Dietrich Bonhoeffer in *Sanctorum Communio*, "I step into the other's place and my prayer, even though it remains my own, is nonetheless prayed out of the other's affliction and need. I really enter into the other, into the other's sin and affliction" [*Sanctorum Communio*, 1:186-7/124]). Hence, "when one person intercedes in the name of Christ on behalf of the other, the whole community – which actually means "Christ existing as community", to use a modification of the Hegelian concept – participates in that person's prayer'" [*Sanctorum Communio* 1:189/126].

Christian prayer is necessarily representational, the faithful pray *to* the Father only *in* Jesus, *by* the Spirit, and *through* the Saints, whom they ask to present them to the Father.

Both Catholicism and Orthodoxy insist that this "chain of representation" is not superfluous but constitutes the prayer's end-in-itself by drawing the faithful into the "life-in-the-other", into the "pregnant" space of distance and difference, into the ongoing conversation between the Persons of the Trinity and the Saints of the Church. There is no need to cut through the mediation and get "right to the point" of immediate communion with God by sidestepping the historical continuity of networked persons engaged in the same tradition of prayer – if we give in to this anxiety to steer clear of mediation and mediators, we "lose the plot" of what prayer is all about – of prayer as entering into the community of persons who live for one another. As the doctrine of the Trinity makes lucid, there is nothing "beyond" mediation, there is no place where we are set "free" from it, rather, mediation *is* the very ground of freedom and deification.

In the Dismissals at the end of the key Orthodox services, we can see how all worship coalesces into the networked hierarchy of intercession before the Judge – so that, "by the intercessions [πρεσβείαις] of His all-immaculate and all-blameless holy Mother… by the supplications [ἱκεσίαις] of the venerable, glorious Prophet [προφήτου], Forerunner [προδρόμου], and Baptist John, of the holy, glorious, and all-famed Apostles [Ἀποστόλων], of the holy, glorious, victorious Martyrs [Μαρτύρων]… and of all the Saints – may He have mercy on us and save us…" [pp. 135-136]. In the upcoming discussion, I examine the Greek terms I have translated in the prayer usage of Marian titles that may be associated with the practice of representation.

3.2.2. Marian Titles as They Stand in Relation to Representation.

§. Mediator, Broker (μεσιτης). "There is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus" [εις γαρ θεος εις και μεσιτης θεου και ανθρωπων ανθρωπος χριστος ιησους] (1Timothy 2:5). Jesus is Christ because he is the mediator between God and man – both a prophet who represents God to humans and a priest who

represents humans to God; yet his mediation is not his teaching or law but his conduct of life, the totality of his relationships, or simply he as a *historical person*. However, in Orthodox worship, the term "mediator" is most often used to address Mary: "mediation unto the Creator most constant: O despise not the suppliant voices of those who have sinned… Hasten to intercession, and speed though to make supplication, though who dost ever protect, O Theotokos, them that honour thee" [*The Small Entrance*, pp. 113-114].

It is in the prayers to the Mother of God that the performative protocol of representation becomes particularly apparent. The extent to which Mary's significance is affirmed is the extent to which the worthwhileness of representation is affirmed. From the very beginning, the relationship of the Christians to Mary was framed as that between the community and its representative. In the Catholic Church, the strongest emphasis on Mary as mediator is articulated in the proposed "fifth Marian doctrine", partly developed by Hans Urs von Balthasar: "Up to the present time in the history of the church, four Marian doctrines have been defined as central Catholic truths by the Church: the Motherhood of God, the Immaculate Conception, the Perpetual Virginity of Mary, and her Glorious Assumption into heaven. It is now time for the church, at the summit of this Marian era, to proclaim and define the fifth and final Marian doctrine, that is, Mary's universal mediation as Coredemptrix, Mediatrix of all grace, and advocate for the people of God" [Miraville 1993]. According to Mark Miravalle, "Along with mediating the graces of redemption from God to the human family, Mary also acts as the intercessory advocate for the People of God in their return to God. Mary not only mediates the graces of God to humanity as Mediatrix, but *she also mediates the petitions of the human family back to God,* in humble service of both. Mary intercedes to God the Father through the Son and by the Holy Spirit on behalf of humanity as our *Advocate*" [Miravalle 1993, p. 53] This is by no means a radical innovation. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII affirmed that "nothing, by the will of God, is given to us without Mary's mediation, in such a way that just as no one can approach the

Almighty Father but through His Son, likewise no one so to speak, can approach Christ but through His Mother." [Leo XIII, Encyclical of September 22, 1891].

§. Advocate (παράκλητος). According to relevant scholarship, "παράκλητος does not have any independent meaning of its own, it is in fact a calque for the Latin term *advocatus* meaning a person of high social standing who speaks on behalf of a defendant in a court of law before a judge… the word παράκλητos was developed as a precise equivalent to the Latin legal term *advocatus*" [Lochlan 2009]. In the Hebrew Scriptures, the term rendered as παράκλητος is used for angels, prophets, and the righteous who advocate on behalf of other people in God's court. We can see that, from the beginning, παράκλητος referred to persons who speak for those who cannot speak for themselves.

In the Christian Scriptures and worship, the title Παράκλητος is used not only to refer to the Spirit but also to Christ and Mary. In the Gospel of John, "We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ" [παράκλητον εχομεν προς τον πατερα ιησουν χριστον] (1 John 2:1). In St. Irenaeus, we see the Virgin Mary described as the παράκλητος of the virgin Eve, who overrode virginal disobedience by virginal obedience. However, the term is most closely associated with the Spirit. If the "mutual giving" of Father and Son is how God lives, then "the Spirit is the concrete manifestation and communication of the truth that *this* is how God lives… the Spirit makes the mutual giving of Father and Son a giving out, not simply a giving to and an exchange" [Williams 2008a, p. 23].

In *Oratio IV ad Deiparam*, 4th Lesson of the Office of the Feast, St. Ephraem the Syrian unites the offices of mediation and advocacy in the figure of Mary. In a prayer attributed to him, the faithful address Mary by saying that, "after the Paraclete, you are the new Consoler of all; and after the Mediator, you are the Mediatrix for the entire world" [Ott 2018 p. 211].

§. Patron (*praesidium*). The earliest known prayer to Mary reads "We take refuge under thy protection [compassion, patronage, presidency], o holy Mother of God, despise not our petitions [supplications]…" [Υπο την σην ευσπλαγχνιαν καταφευγομεν Θεοτοκε. τας ημων ικεσιας μη παριδης εν περιστασει]. This tradition of prayer must have inspired the most important solemnity besides the Twelve Great Feasts and Pascha for the Slavic Orthodox Churches, the Protection or the Intercession of the Theotokos (Church Slav. *Pokrov*, Ukrainian *Pokrova*, Greek Σκέπη), which attained special prominence in Ukraine due to *Pokrova*'s centrality in the spirituality of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the modern Ukrainian Army. The literal meaning of *Pokrova* is "cloak" or "shroud" and figurative "protection" or "intercession".

The early Latin translation for ικεσιας is *deprecationes*. Church Slavonic often renders it as *hodataistvo* ("intercession"). The Latin word for ευσπλαγχνιαν (protection or compassion) is *præsidium*. This term is connected to the Roman practice of patronage: the relationships in which the patrons and clients exchanged benefactions. In *Philosophy of History*, Hegel describes patronage in the following terms: "those who were poor, and consequently helpless, were compelled to attach themselves to the richer and more respectable, and to seek for their *patrocinium:* in this relation of protection on the part of the more wealthy, the protected are called *clientes*" [Hegel 1991, p. 303].

The patrons provided different kinds of *praesidium* – "mediation, intervention, legal services in court, and securing financial and material advantages" [Nicols 2013, 314]. In return, the clients "celebrated the arrivals and departures of their patron" and "set up monuments and inscriptions to honor them" [Nicols 2013, p. 314]. Patronage was particularly commonplace in the time of the Republic, where there was no formal political party system or elections. Instead, alliances were largely based on personal trust. Wealthy and powerful patricians would rally vast networks of clients to achieve dominance in the political arena.

As Rome was transforming into an empire, certain republican practices lived on in new forms. One of the new forms was the cooptation of patronage that was "deprivatised" and turned into almost a public office, almost a locus of political representation: the patrons "mediated between the community and the central government, defended the community before the Senate, and in the courts, and especially interceded with governors" [Nicols 2013, p. 315.] Moreover, "clients and communities had choice about whom they wished to have as patrons." [Nicols 2013, p. 315]. Whereas in the Republic patronage was more of a private affair (Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote that each client had one patron), in the Empire we see the emergence of *patrocinium publicum*, extension of *praesidium* to the whole communities, such as cities. "It was honorable for the powerful, the patron, to provide *praesidium*, protection, in many forms. It was honorable for the client to recognize publicly the *benevolentia* and *beneficia* provided" [Nicols 2013, p. 313].

"The exchange also generated mutual *benevolentia*, a phenomenon we observed especially in the correspondence of Pliny and in the treatises of Cicero and Seneca on *officia* and *beneficia*. In the Roman version of Stoicism, meeting expectations generated the *benevolentia* that constituted the basis of a peaceful social order." [Nicols 2013, p. 314].

This relationship was not just *quid pro quo*, one-for-one exchange of benefactions, both parties expected a personal relationship of gratuity. There was an element of good faith. One of the Twelve Tables (the fifth century BC) states that a patron who deceives his clients is to be regarded as *homo sacer*, as set apart, beyond law, who can be killed without repercussions. However, in the Late Empire, if the relationship seized being profitable for one of the parties, it was expected to be terminated. Although sometimes sealed by a contract, as a rule, "patrons might 'abandon' clients; and clients 'betray' their patrons" with "impunity" [Nicols 2013, p. 313].

While patronage could provide a specific sort of representation for clients and client communities, it cannot be interpreted as an institute of representation in the likeness of our

representative democracies. The patronage was not a democratic system – since the patrons had more power and influence than their clients, most of the time the system of patronage was used to perpetuate social and economic inequality. This relationship was based on the social and political superiority of the patron. In both cases of representation in Rome, procuracy and patronage, we see the dictate of private profit and personal relations. Jesus stipulated a different kind of representation – one where the ruler is a "servant" (διάκονος) or even a "slave" (δοῦλος) of the ruled.

Notwithstanding these caveats, it is telling that the Christian prayer expedited the language of patronage as a model for addressing Mary since it is this framework that provided at least some room for and some semblance of political representation in the political landscape that was otherwise inhospitable to it.

§. Petitioner, Intercessor, Champion, Ambassador, (πρεσβείαις, προστάτις, etc.). St. Maria Skobtsova wrote about Mary's "significance as the Petitioner for the human race in virtue of her humanity and as the Mediator between God and people in virtue of her glorification and deification. This finally determines the significance of the Mother of God in the Last Judgment, where She will be the Intercessor for sinners. Only by the power of Her prayers can a sinful creature be pardoned, for without Her intercession before the face of the Judge, no one can be justified. In Herself, She elevates mankind and all creation to God." [Skobtsova 2004, p. 185].

In the *Prayer to the Most Holy Mother of God* of the Small Compline, we encounter three representational terms at once. Mary is addressed as a προστάτις, literally "before-standing", the one who "stands for" another as one's protector or champion (Church Slav. *predstatelnitse*) who does two things for the faithful: μεσιτείας (Eng. "mediation", Church Slav. *hodataistvo*) and αντιλήψεως´ (Eng. "intercession", Church Slav. *zastuplenie*). At another point of the Small Compline, we ask Mary, "the Protector of Christians" (Προστασία τῶν Χριστιανῶν), to "present [προσάγαγε] our prayer to your Son

and our God, and plead with Him, that through you [διά σού] He may save our souls." [τήν ημετέραν προσευχήν τώ Υιώ σου καί Θέο ημών καί αίτησαι, ινά σώση διά σού τάς ψυχάς ημών].

The usage of προστάτις in classical Greek connotes a sense of advocacy and political representation. In *Republic* 607d, Plato portrays Socrates as a προστάταις ("advocate", "champion") of poetry. In Chapter 28 of *Atheniensium Respublica* ("The Constitution of the Athenians"), Aristotle methodically counterposes the *prostatai* of the *demos* ("champion" or "head of the people") to the *prostatai* of the elite, beginning with Solon, "the first and original *prostatai* of the people" (ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρῶτος ἐγένετο προστάτης τοῦ δήμου Σόλων), who is contrasted with the leadership [δημαγωγία] "from Cleon onward" that was handed on "by the men most willing to play a bold part and to gratify the many with an eye to immediate popularity" [Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia 28*]. For Aristotle, the "champion of the people" is the one who acts in the interest of the people, not the one who is necessarily "a man of the people". On the whole, ancient Greek usage of *prostasis* was meant to signify something like a champion, advocate, or sponsor of the a community or city.

Antilepsis is the Greek verb form of *antileptikos*, which means "receptive" or "capable of receiving". *Antilavu* (ἀντιλαβοῦ), Church Slav. *zastupi*, "stand in" or "intercede", is a Greek verb form derived from *antilambanomai*, which means "to take up" or "to receive instead".

Another term for "intercession" or "petition" in the New Testament is ἐντυγχάνει. In Acts 25:24, Jewish people are said to petition (ἐνέτυχον) the Roman authorities that Paul "ought not to live any longer". In Romans 8:27, we read that "the Spirit intercedes (ἐντυγχάνει) for the saints according to the will of God". In Romans 8:34, Christ, "also is interceding (ἐντυγχάνει) for us". In Romans 11:12, Paul claims asks, "do you know what the Scripture says in the passage about Elijah, how he pleads (ἐντυγχάνει) with God against Israel? In Hebrews 7:25, Jesus is said to be "able to save completely those who

draw near to God through him, because he continually lives to intercede [ἐντυγχάνειν] for them".

In the Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, Mary's agency is also described as πρεσβείαις, signifying "intercession" or "embassy". The Christians address Mary as Πρέσβευε and pray "through the intercessions of the Holy Theotokos" (πρεσβείαις τῆς ἁγίας Θεοτόκου). Ancient Greek polities sent ambassadors (*presbeis*, "envoys") on missions abroad to deliver and receive messages "on the city's behalf" (*hyper tēs poleōs*) [Aeschines, 2.55, 160; 3.116; Demosthenes, 21.115.]. To account for their actions, the ambassadors ascertained the audiences of the popular courts that they act "on your behalf" (*hyper hymōn*) [Aeschin. 2.24, 2.149; Dem. 19.11, 19.140, 19.165, 19.232, 19.331, 24.138; cf. Din. 1.12]. It is worth noting that the ambassadors were categorised not as "synecdochal" but as "metaphorical" representatives, not "delegates" but "trustees".

To conclude, we can at last turn to the *Kontakion of the Theotokos*, used in the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, which encapsulates nearly all of the representational terms discussed thus far: "*Προστασία* των Χριστιανών ακαταίσχυντε, *μεσιτεία* προς τον Ποιητήν αμετάθετε, μη παρίδης αμαρτωλών *δεήσεων* φωνάς, αλλά πρόφθασον, ως αγαθή, εις την βοήθειαν ημών, των πιστώς κραυγαζόντων σοι. Τάχυνον εις *πρεσβείαν*, και σπεύσον εις *ικεσίαν*, η *προστατεύουσα* αεί, Θεοτόκε, των τιμώντων σε" [*italics mine*]. In the light of what had been said in this discussion, I contend that we can translate Greek προστασία and Church Slavonic *predstatelstvo* as "representation": "O *representation* [*predstatelstvo*] of Christians that cannot be put to shame, *mediation* [*hodataistvo*] unto the Creator most constant, O despise not the *suppliant voices* [*molenii glasy*] of those who have sinned; but be thou quick, O good one, to come unto our aid, who in faith cry unto thee: Hasten to *intercession* [*molitvu*], and speech thou to make *supplication* [*umolenie*], thou who dost ever *represent* [*predstatelstvuyuschi*], O Theotokos, them that honour thee".

3.2.3. Childbirth and Death as They Stand in Relation to Representation.

The "names" we exchange can be compared to seeds with which we become "impregnated"; thus, to "hallow the name" is to "give birth" to the life contained in that "name", to give it a "new body". In the Gospel of Luke, Mary is figuratively and literally impregnated with the Word of God by receiving the name "JESUS". Angel says to Mary: "you will conceive in your womb and bring forth a Son, and shall call His name JESUS." (Luke 1:31); and Mary accepts: "Let it be to me according to your word." (Luke 1:38). Hence, we can see Mary's pivotal role as the *first* human who accomplishes the spiritual work par excellence – giving birth to the life contained in "name" she received into herself. In the Creed [387 CE], Christ is said to be "...incarnate by the Holy Ghost and of the Virgin Mary" [Schaff 1877]. Notwithstanding the variety of representational titles so far discussed, they are dwarfed by the number of references to Mary that address and praise her as the Mother of God, *Theotokos*. The active work of representation, vicarious suffering, "standing in for the other", and all of the "spiritual athletism" so ingrained in the texts like *Philokalia*, is indeed a legitimate part of what the Christians are summoned for; yet lest we forget that our role in the drama of salvation is that of the *saved*, "passive" not in the sense of passivity but passibility and finitude, we shall radically misunderstand the nature of Chrisitan discipleship. We would "not be humble enough to know the humble God", as Augustine puts it in The Confessions: "I sought a way to obtain strength enough to enjoy you; but I did not find it until I embraced the mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus… To possess my God, the humble Jesus, I was not yet humble enough. I did not know what his weakness was meant to teach… They [who want to be saved] are no longer to place confidence in themselves, but rather to become weak. They see at their feet divinity become weak by his sharing in our coat of skin. In their weariness they fall prostrate before this divine weakness which rises and lifts them up" [*Confessiones* 7.18.24].

What is of utter relevance in terms of this study is that childbirth is fully free from wilful arbitrariness, it is impeccably natural, indeed the only "pure act" of representation

that humans are capable of. "What in the end binds us to one another? The cross? No. The child's birthcord." So wrote Inna Lisnianskaya in the poem recently translated by Rowan Williams [2021, p. 143]. It is remarkable that the Church has never lost sight of this reality and never de-centered the language of natural birth-giving from her doctrinal and liturgical life. The Church celebrates the analogy between "heavenly childbirth" and "earthly childbirth" by celebrating the exceptional significance of the Mother of God. An arguably dominant theme of Marian hymnography is the play on the paradox of an apparently incoherent logistics of the Incarnation event – God, whom the heavens cannot contain, takes residence within the womb of a nondescript Jewish teenager; how come? Take this small excerpt: "thou wast shown forth more spacious than all the Heavens. Glory to Him that willed to dwell in thee. Glory to him who came forth from thee. Glory to him that, through thy bringing forth, hath delivered us" [*PB,* p. 138].

Here we have a skein from which a variety of doctrinal threads unfold. First, God wills to dwell in and thus become dependent on the finite female flesh; First, Mary wills to be a "site" wherein God can dwell, grow, and be born. Mary's childbirth is the event that casts a teasing light on the form of Christian discipleship – for God, to come into this world without disturbing its coherence is to become vulnerable to the network of mutual dependence, of which the central case of dependence is childbirth – since no one can give birth to oneself, and for the world to stay coherent, this has to apply to God. We begin to acknowledge and praise Mary when we ourselves begin to be filled with Spirit. "Mary as the archetypal Christian; the archetypal Spirit-filled Christian, is a person we can only understand in the life of the Spirit-filled community, and it's really no use simply pointing out that there's not much about Mary in the New Testament. Of course there's not much about Mary in the New Testament… Mary is the one who brings the Word to birth, and we shall understand her more and more fully as more and more fully the Word comes to birth in us." [Williams 2008a, p. 40]. Rowan Williams avers that the opposite of this generativity, "the state of fallenness […] from which we need deliverance [...] is *sterility*:

we have not acknowledged the gift, we have not adequately glorified the source, and so are incapable of generating new life in others or in our dealings with the rest of the created world, and thus incapable of receiving life as we need to; – or, to come at it from a different angle, we fail to generate new life or liberation, and so are incapable of worshipping as we ought and so of being nourished as need to be" [Williams 2023, p. 5].

Childbirth – giving birth and being borne of something – is the paradigmatic form of representation because it is the paradigmatic form of "making the other present" – the parent makes the child present "out of thin air" and the child makes the parent present "in a new capacity". The Son and the Father "bear witness" to each other and "glorify" each other – "Glorify Your Son, that Your Son also may glorify You" (John 17:1) [Anatolios 2020]. Sergii Bulgakov defined paternity as "the form of love in which the lover desires to have himself not in himself but outside himself" [Bulgakov 2008, p. 98]. From the parent's viewpoint, to be "hypostatic" is to "actualise" something that is at once identical and different. From the child's viewpoint, to be "hypostatic" is to live as "actualisation" of something that is at once identical and different; not just of a parent but also of another person, say a teacher; and not only of a person but also of an idea, say a virtue wisdom, as in "wisdom is justified by her children" (Matthew 11:19).

As beings in relation to Being, humans take on the "role" or the hypostasis of the "child". To say that there is a kind of "receptivity" or "indebtedness" in God, which Christians say about the Second Person of the Trinity, is to say that there is a "place" in the divine life for the creatures whose being is absolute indebtedness, lest we forget that the creative, intellectual, and ethical breakthroughs of humanity are as a rule achieved by persons whose lives are ingrained with the "lessons" and "loves" of persons who precede and surround them, by persons who are heirs to rich traditions and wide communities. Hence, when the Spirit "invites" us into the relations of divine childbirth, it "adopts" us to stand in the place of the Son, to share His 'filial' gratitude, to pray His 'filial' prayer that addresses God as "Father". "To redeem them that were under the law, that we might

receive the adoption (υιοθεσιαν) of sons, and because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father (Galatians 4:5-6). The same motif of adoption is put to use by John: "to those who did accept him he gave power [*exousia*] to become children of God" (John 1:12).

And this taking on the role of a "child" is not so much "a desire to be cuddled forever by a fluffy god, but desire to be a growing child" [Lewis 2010] – it is a desire that stems from the recognition that "we are not yet done growing". Yet in our relationship with fellow humans, we are indeed supposed to "parent" one another, including giving birth to Christ, since he became one of us. It is no accident that Paul uses the language of childbirth to speak of spiritual development: "My little children, of whom I travail in birth [γεννάω] again until Christ be formed [ὠδίνω] in you" (Galatians 4:19). For Paul, the event of Incarnation makes the prosaic act of childbirth the central metaphor for hypostatisation: "the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time" [οιδαμεν γαρ οτι πασα η κτισις συστεναζει και συνωδινει αχρι του νυν] (Romans 8:22). If, as posited in the Liturgy of St. Basil, a human being can indeed be made "more spacious than the heavens" to bear and give birth to God, how much easier should it be for humans to find place inside them to bear and give birth to one another.

However, Paul is also aware that Christian life is incomplete unless childbirth is complemented by dying: "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself up for me". (Galatians 2:20). Birth and death are the two acts where representation is totally beyond human control, where it is most natural and therefore most successful. This is why the Mother of God is associated with the latter as well as the former, since she is said to be to represent humans to God when they die. For example, *Ave Maria* prayer ends with a request that Mary pray "for us now and in the hour of our death" (Latin *in hora mortis nostrae*). In a sense, all spiritual practice consists of giving birth and preparing for death, for the moment when we at last surrender to others

whose task it is to give a new birth to us. Where death and birth coalesce, there is the resurrection. Christ died for others so victoriously, that those who believed in his Name were able to give him a new birth – to become his martyrs, witnesses.

3.3. Jesus Christ as he Stands in Relation to Political Representation.

3.3.1. Three Crowns of Israel in the Psalter.

The ideal political arrangement of Hebrew Scriptures is expressed as the theory of three *ketarim*, the "Three Crowns of Israel". Under the *ketarim* ideology, the prophet represents God to humans, the priest represents humans to God, and the king, "taught" by divine counsel and "touched" by human petitions, merely protects this representational "feedback" and, to borrow Hegel's phrase, "signs his name" on the judgments that organically emerge out of it. Which is to say, the king never acts at will, his duty is to surrender's his will to the will of God and the people laid bare in this "ketarimic" representation. The king's job, if you like, is encapsulated in one of W. H. Auden's poems: "My problem is how not to will; They move most quickly who stand still" [Auden 1945, p. 9].

In *ketarim*, one can see a germ of constitutionalism, which Hegel would describe in the following manner: "[the king] is bound by the concrete decisions of his counsellors, and if the constitution is stable, he has often no more to do than sign his name. But this name is important. It is the last word beyond which it is impossible to go. It might be said that an organic, articulated, constitution was present even in the beautiful democracy of Athens, and yet we cannot help noticing that the Greeks derived their final decisions from the observation of quite external phenomena such as oracles, the entrails of sacrificial animals, and the flight of birds. They treated nature as a power which in those ways revealed and expressed what was good for men. At that time, self-consciousness had not yet advanced to the abstraction of subjectivity, not even so far as to understand that, when

a decision is to be made, an 'I will' must be pronounced by man himself. This 'I will' constitutes the great difference between the ancient world and the modern, and in the great edifice of the state it must therefore have its appropriate objective existence. Unfortunately, however, this requirement is regarded as only external and optional" [Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*; *Zusatz* to §279 of Chapter 3, "The State" in the "Third Part: Ethical Life"].

In the Mosaic Theocracy, we see the clear hierarchy of the three: Prophet - Priest - Military Leader; Moses - Aaron - Joshua. In the Davidic Kingdom, the military leader, i.e. king, came to play a key role. However, the king still had to be anointed by the priest and the prophet. And for a king to be anointed by the priest and the prophet was to be *educated* by the two. Psalter appears to have served as David's dual manual, founded on the priestly concern for honoring God and prophetic concern for standing up for those who cannot stand up for themselves. "All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments: … Love the Lord your God" and "Love your neighbor" (Matthew 22:36-4). In the Psalter, we read how David repeatedly proclaims the pleasure of learning the Law and the necessity of protecting the weak and the poor. The prophetic and the priestly witnesses unite in the judgment of the king because, as one learns the Laws of God, one also learns precisely to do justice to those on the margins of the society – this is how we see that representing God and representing the people is one. By praying and singing the psalms, the Jews address God from the place of the King, thus participating in the same process of royal education of one's judgment with regard to keeping the commandments and to advocating for the wronged.

Psalm 118(119) stands out for its passionate praise of the Law. "Teach me, O Lᴏʀᴅ, the way of Your statutes, And I shall keep it *to* the end." (Psalm 118:33). "Oh, how I love Your law! It is my meditation all the day" (118:97) "The wicked have laid a snare for me, Yet I have not strayed from Your precepts. Your testimonies I have taken as a heritage forever, For they are the rejoicing of my heart. I have inclined my heart to perform Your

statutes Forever, to the very end. I hate the double-minded, But I love Your law." (Psalm 118:110-113).

But what *is* the Law that the king is supposed to learn and keep? In the Law, the consistent insistence is put on doing justice to the wronged, to those who do not have the prestige, means, or might, to receive justice in the usual dispensation that functions under the premise that "might makes right". A rich tapestry of psalms are concerned with the practice of advocacy for the destitute. In one of them, David addresses God as "a father of the fatherless, a defender of widows" (Psalm 64:5). "The helpless commits himself to You, You are the helper of the fatherless" (Psalm 10:14). "The LORD watches over the strangers; He relieves the fatherless and widow" (Psalm 145:9). God commands the king: "Defend the poor and fatherless; Do justice to the afflicted and needy. Deliver the poor and needy; Free *them* from the hand of the wicked." (Psalm 82:3-4).

3.3.2. Three Crowns of Israel on Christ.

"Blessed is the one who comes in the name of Jehovah" (Psalm 118:26, Matthew 21:9, Mark 11:9, Luke 19:38, John 12:13; *my translation*). I hypothesise that the choice of this verse by the evangelists to speak of Christ's ministry indicates the continuity of this ministry with the act that holds the events recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures together – the agency of Jehovah. In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that we can define this continuity as Jesus' faithful "representation" of what Jehovah has done for the elect in the past. Dorothee Sölle commenced her study *Christ the Representative* by connecting theory of the "three crowns of Israel" from the Hebrew Scriptures to the doctrine of the "threefold duty" (*officium triplex*) of Christ, first formulated by Eusebius who praised Jesus as "the only high Priest of all, and the only King of every creature, and the Father's only supreme Prophet of prophets." [*Historia ecclesiastica* 1.3.8]. In John 14:24, Jesus describes his *officium propheticum* or "prophetic office" as *speaking for* and *being sent by* the Father: "These words you hear are not my own; they belong to the Father

who sent me." *Officium sacerdotale* or priestly office is described in the Letter to Hebrews that refers to Jesus as "a great high priest" who "sacrificed for their sins once for all when he offered himself" (Hebrews 4:14, 7:27).

Christ himself claims that his kingdom is the representation of God to people when he says that he "bears witness to the truth" (John 18:37) and the representation of people before God when he says that "not one of those whom I have gathered has perished" (John 17:12). As a man, Christ makes himself accessible to the divine act, becomes the place where God lives. As God, Christ stands in the place of creation to bear its sin and death. Christ represents God by representing those who are unable to represent themselves (not only the "least of us" but all of us).

Officium triplex is also found in the Catholic and Protestant theologies. Catechism of the Catholic Church states that "Jesus fulfilled the messianic hope of Israel in his threefold office of priest, prophet, and king" [Catechism of the Catholic Church 1994, §453]. The Heidelberg Catechism of the Reformed Church states that Jesus is "Christ" because he is "our chief *prophet* and *teacher* who perfectly reveals to us the secret *counsel* and *will* of God for our deliverance; our only high *priest* who has set us free by the one *sacrifice* of his body, and who continually *pleads our cause* with the Father; and our eternal *king* who *governs* us by his Word and Spirit, and who guards us and keeps us in the *freedom* he has won for us." [Heidelberg Catechism 12, 31Q; *emphasis is mine*].

Christ is not just the Prophet, the Priest, and the King, he is the Prophecy, the Sacrifice, and the Kingdom – he does not merely represent, he is *the representation*. Thus, in the wake of the three *ketarim* ("the Three Crowns") ideal of the Torah, Christ is *anointed* by the Priest and the Prophet, by the Θεοτόκος who bears the Sacrifice and by the Πρόδρομος who bears witness to the Prophecy, by Mary who gives birth to Christ and by the John who prophesises Christ. The fact that Christ is anointed by them means that his judgment is to be shaped, informed, counseled, advised, by the priestly and prophetic counsel – Mary and John intercede before Christ on our behalf, they represent us before

Christ "in the best light" so that Christ can judge us with mercy and resurrect us in glory.

Even God, through the incarnation, came to stand in the place of humans to "taste" what God knew not – weakness, suffering, forsakenness, death. And the humans, through Christ, come to stand in the place of God to "taste" what humans knew not – unconditional fidelity, freedom, and immortality. If this is so, if even Christ is not "beyond learning" from the process of representation, so much more for the earthly government. Political representation is the activity in which education meets politics because it is the activity where the representatives and the represented learn off each other, learn to articulate their challenges and interests. The secular politics "are constituted… as a secondary theatre of witness to the appearing grace of God, attesting by their judicial service the coming reality of God's own act of judgment." [O'Donovan 2008, p. 5]. The secular government is legitimate as long as it reflects the kingdom of Christ – insofar as in its hands is only the "last judgment", where the verdict is informed or "educated" by the counsel of representatives – the council of saints and angels, the matrix of supplication and reason. Any government that stands outside this framework of responsiveness and intelligibility, that is not constituted by the consent and counsel of this source of constitutive power, cannot do justice to reality and therefore falls short of the example of Christ.

This interplay of saitly and angelic representation means that the ruler must not err on either side – she should not simply imitate and implement the people's crude assumptions about their interest but she should also not presume that she is already in the know of the true interest of the people of which they have no idea because she has access to a certain ideology that explains everything, rather, a good ruler is always dedicated to the labour of infinite re-discovery and re-definition of what is the "true interest" of the people, the labour that is infinite because its ultimate end is the inexhaustible intelligibility of God. Any government that is non-secular aims to arrest this pursuit and concentrate the public worship on itself, on Caesar.

Jesus claimed that Caesar's power is transient. Secular state is the state that

acknowledsges its transience; the word "secular" simply means "for this age", not "for all ages", as in "the kingdom for all ages" (Psalm 145:13). On this reading, only the secular regimes can be considered genuinely theocratic. As Grzymala-Busse concludes her splendid study of the roots of the European state, "The most secular of state institutions can have the most sacred of foundations" [Grzymala-Busse 2023, p. 183].

How can this representation shape the judgment of the politicians? For the "chain of representation" to function, its "links", its intermediate institutions, have to be independent. If there are no independent courts, no independent media outlets, no independent labour unions, no independent theaters, no independent universities, no independent churches, no independent political parties, no independent local councils, in one word, if there are no independent professional communities between the government and the people, than it is not the actual personal communication connects the but the artificial mimicking of the illiterate "will", the emotions, resentments, frustrations, and fears of the "faceless" multitude. On the other hand, if the chain of representation works properly, it provides the proper scale for slow, quiet, polite, and reasoned debate through which the concerns of the citizens are repeatedly refined and re-articulated, so that they can persude the policy-makers with better arguments and not with sheer numbers and volume.

When, in the Gospel, Jesus encounters the discrepancy between the will of the Father and the will of the people, what he encounters is the radical misrecognition by the people of what constitutes their interest because the will of the Father is simply their very interest, their "life in abundance". This is why, for Jesus to do the will of the Father is to do the will of the people. Yet it does not mean that what is done in this case is just the will of Jesus, for Jesus clearly prays to the Father, "not my will, but yours". The understanding that the people misrecognise their interest does not lead Jesus to fall prey to the illusion that he is now in possession of a clearer vision that allows him to act in opposition to the will of the people; rather, his will is just as potentially arbitrary as any and just in the same

need of the education, even self-sacrifice, as theirs, so that the will he does at the last hour is not his but precisely that of the Other. What is "done" on the Cross is neither the will of the represented, nor of the representative, neither the will of the constituents, nor of the constituted, but – and here we come to the precise difference between the finite and the infinite, between what I rather loosely defined as the constitutive power of God the Father and the constituent power of the people – what is "done" on the Cross is the *constitution* of the divine community but on finite grouns, Christ is *re-constituted* as the new body of the Church, which is precisely the *constitutive will and act of the Father*.

In Christ's ministry, there opens a chasm, a crucial non-coincidence between His representation of God and representation of the people because the will of God and the will of the people are at odds with one another. At the same time, what is demonstrated is that they do not have to be at odds. In Christ, there is a glimpse of the union between the constituent power of the Father and the constituent power of the people, a true identification of *vox populi* with *vox dei*. If this identification is taken seriously, there is no longer "will of God" to be referred to that is not the will for the good of the other, the will that *there be* other and that the other *be other*. To see how this interplay between coincidence and non-coincidence lays itself out in the Gospel, we must attend to its narrations of conspiracy and plebiscite.

3.3.3. Christ the Politician: Conspiracy and Plebiscite in the Gospels.

In this discussion, I read the Gospels as the drama of relations between the constitutive will of the Father and the constitutive will of the people. The duty of a politician is to produce "representations" of the constituent power – in speeches (lectures, parables, teachings) and in actions (gestures, healings, travels, visits, public dinners, sartorial and gastronomic choices). These representations are often not immediately credible or recognisable, often they may even cause outrage. What appears to distinguish the disciples of Jesus from other Jews is that, in Jesus' "representations", they recognise

the God that who is witnessed in the narrative of their Scriptures, that is, they recognise Jesus as the person who continues the same work that Jehovah has been doing for them from time immemorial.

Furthermore, Christ's representations of God is at the same time representations of humanity in its natural, preexilic state. Christ offers representations of a certain anthropology, wherein the disciples can recognise the life that they themselves would love to have. In Christ, they are at last called by their real names, summoned to become themselves; or, to use Pauline language, they are re-presented as righteous.

At the same time, even the disciples and, in Mark, *particularly* the disciples, including Peter, fail to recognise the Father and their true selves in the "representations" Jesus narrates and performs. Thus, for the Second Person of the Trinity, the crucial difference between the life in the heaven and on earth is that, on earth, the power that constitutes His being is not the will of the Father that the other be other but the will of the people that the other be what they say – be it a triumphant conquerer (what Peter wants) or a crucified (what the crowd and authorities wants). Strangely enough, on earth, or at least "in Mark's narrative", it is the "sick, demonized, Gentiles, poor, and sinners" who "play the role of the perfect disciples" [Birac 2023].

Let me quote Williams at length: "[T]hat eternal recognition, which is also the fulfilled and perfect enactment of each of the hypostases, and thus the reflection to one another of abundance and beauty, is in turn enacted in the world's history. Because it is lived out in this world of alienation and violence, it becomes a uniquely costly enterprise for the incarnate Word: the otherness in which the Word must find and recognize both itself and its Source is an otherness of destructive will, an ingrained resistance to the divine love which seeks to cut itself off from recognition and recognizability. For the incarnate Word to live out the 'glorifying' recognition of the other which is the Word's eternal act is for the Word to inhabit the very place where the pressure is strongest to exclude and deny the divine agency, to inhabit the 'godlessness' of the human heart and experience in his

own human sensibility the pain of loss and estrangement." [Williams 2023, p. 10].

But Christ "converts" this gnomic will into the natural will, he teaches his Church to be such a constitutive power on Earth that the Father is in the heaven, saying "Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10). "[F]or those called into the Body of Christ, 'called out' of the world of guilt, rivalry and refusal, the living of the 'deified' life of adoptive intimacy with the Father entails the continuation of that costly 'refusal of refusal', the readiness precisely to abandon the imagined distance of holy living and to recover the calling to inhabit the world of refusal and bear the pain of it in prayer and service and the constant remembrance of glory" [Williams 2023, p. 11].

We can read the story of Jesus's life as modelling a certain kind of political action contraposed against the contemporaneous systems of domination – the Roman Praetorium and the Jewish Temple. The irony of these systems is that they are not political, in fact they eliminate politics, genuine prophetic witness, by eliminating the public square, and they eliminate the public square by divorcing mediation from transparency, intelligent communication from publicity, thereby turning the former into conspiracy and the latter into a plebiscite.

Pontius Pilate was a procurator of Judaea. Latin *procurator* is composed of *pro* ("in behalf of") and *curare* ("to care"), signifying the one who takes care in behalf of the others. We can see Pilate's failure to do justice to Jesus as an instance of the inadequacy of political representation in the Roman Empire. When the state expanded and the time was ripe for the development of representative governance, "the vast extension of the empire had trained the Roman nobles to look upon provincial offices as their fair spoils" [Frank 1919, p. 542]. By then the Roman state was already, says T. Frank, a "parasitic tyranny" [ibid]. The procurator was not meant to represent, not to mention being elected by, the people of the province, he was appointed by the Emperor on the mandate of fulfilling the task the Emperor gave him: "Keep your province pacified and quiet". Consequently, the institute of procuracy looked more like a viceroyship than representation. Under its

auspices, decision-making was debilitated by the complacence and sycophancy of the procurator whose primary task was to carry out the will of Caesar. This structure of governance led to situations in which local officials, like Pilate, repeatedly prioritised the crude following of the rules over *thinking* what acting in the interests of Caesar demand at this particular case, not to mention the interest of the people. In the case of Pilate, it appears that the pressure from the Jewish elders who threatened to report him to Caesar played a pivotal role in his decision to crucify Jesus: "Pilate sought to release Him, but the Jews cried out, saying, "If you let this Man go, you are not Caesar's friend. Whoever makes himself a king speaks against Caesar."" (John 19:12).

This can be read as an example of how the servile representational relationship between local officials and the Emperor jeopardised the ability of officials to act in the best interests of the people under their care. Therefore, it can be argued that the way in which representation was structured in the Roman Empire, with a clear hierarchy of emanating authority and a focus on maintaining the power of the Emperor, contributed to Pilate's failure to do justice to Jesus; (It is worth noting that one of the "learning outcomes" of Christian education was the shift in meaning of the term "procurator" during the early Middle Ages in the Iberian Peninsula, where it was recycled to convey the exact opposite of what it meant for Romans: "Rather than being chosen by the center, and acting in the interest of the center, a procurator was now chosen by individual towns with the goal of acting not only on their behalf but also in their interest." [Stasavage 2021, p. 128].

Jesus preached and taught openly but fell prey to the conspiracy: "When I was daily with you in the temple, ye stretched forth no hands against me: but this is your hour, and the power of darkness" [καθ ημεραν οντος μου μεθ υμων εν τω ιερω ουκ εξετεινατε τας χειρας επ εμε αλλ αυτη υμων εστιν η ωρα και η εξουσια του σκοτους] (Luke 22:53).

In terms of the plebiscite, there were two occasions on which Jesus was let down by it. At first, the plebiscite wrongly demanded that Jesus should not be crucified and then it wrongly demanded that he should be. The first example of the failure of the plebiscite is

the contrast between what Jesus' disciples wanted him to do and what Jesus knew his Father wanted him to do. If Jesus had simply reproduced the "will of his constituents", he would have never fulfilled the will of the Father. Moreover, Jesus identified this unmediated and uneducated will of his disciple Peter with none other than Satan: "He rebuked Peter, saying, "Get behind Me, Satan! For you are not mindful of the things of God, but the things of men." (Mark 8:33).

Another plebiscite has acclaimed the wrong "son of the father" – Barabbas (John 18:40). It is remarkable that Carl Schmitt loved to joke that "liberals would respond to the question 'Christ or Barabbas?' with a proposal to appoint a commission of investigation" [Lewis 2020, p. 44]. It is as if the decision of the immediate plebiscite in the first century Judaea was satisfactory. Indeed, maybe if the crowd took time and appointed knowledgeable representatives to the investigatory commission, they would have come to a better decision. Yet, for Schmitt, sheer decisiveness is more relevant than the quality of decisions.

If the will of the people is erroneous to the extent of fusion with the will of Satan, does this mean that Jesus models leadership that is totally unconcerned with the will of the people? Unlikely. What Jesus indeed pays no attention to is the popular opinion. The will of the people, on the other hand, is something that is to be educated – and the whole enterprise of *teaching* the disciples seems to have to do with the task of cultivating the community that in fact will be able to understand the self-sacrifice of Christ as the act in their true interest, even the act of their salvation. Neither does Jesus carry out his own will, as seen in his prayer at the Gethsemane: "Father, if it is Your will, take this cup away from Me; nevertheless not My will, but Yours, be done." (Luke 22:42).

As we can see, penultimately, neither Jesus nor his followers actually *will* the right thing to be done. At the end of the day, Jesus neither implements his own will nor that of the disciples. Or, if you like, neither does he implement the will of the constituent power nor the will of the constituted power. The "will" of any subject on earth is simply not

sovereign over Christ, not the source of his action. For him, if you like, the "constitutive power" is the will of the Father who is in the heavens, the will of God. And the will of God is simply and always *perichoresis*, co-inherence. In the case of Jesus, to do God's will is to stand in solidarity with the self-inflicted dereliction of the human race. Incarnated in the fallen world, the "hypostatic" act of God translates into the act of being crucified "for us" [υπέρ ημων] and going to hell. Thus the history of the Jewish Monarchy, the history of Jewish confusion of messiahship with the earthly authorities which begins with the parable of the trees who seek a king and find "shelter" in the shade of thornbush (Judges 9:15), as it were subverts itself by consummating in the execution of God (John 19:1), mockingly hailed as the "King of the Jews", *Rex Iudaeorum*, and crowned with the crown of thorns.

Conclusions to Part III.

According to relevant scholarship, the key trait of a representative is a willingness to listen and respond to her constituents, an openness to "reciprocal learning". The citizens in one US sample stated that what they "wanted most" was "that their representative listen to and be available to them" [Grill 2007]. Mansbridge formulates the ideal of representation as the "continuing mutual responsiveness, or recursivity, in which representatives listen to and hear constituents, respond directly and change their minds appropriately, and constituents do the same, in back-and-forth processes that resemble conversations" [Mansbridge 2020, p. 40]. By being "available", the representative makes the "state" (even the proverbial "deep state") no longer "transcendent" but "transparent" to people, makes the state present to people and people present to the state. The representative must be a "site" of conversation between the two, a "site" where the state and the people become one – inseparably but unconfusedly. I have demonstrated that this kind of representation is enabled by Christology. Christology centres on the idea that Jesus Christ indeed renders God present to humans and humans present to God. It is in Christ that we see the life that is made nothing but a pure locus of representation, where Word became flesh and flesh

became Word (John 1:14). As the Word, Christ is the representative par excellence, the mediator between realities at a farthest conceivable distance. All other terms for representation used throughout this study are rooted in this initial, "perichoretic" representation of Christ. Christ's ministry is the original foundation of thinking about περιχώρησις. Christ became the χώρα (Greek "place" or "town") where the "rotation" (περιχώρησις) between Creator and creatures is possible – the place where human beings face God as yet another human being and where God faces the transfigured humanity as yet another "face" of the Holy Ghost. The uniqueness of Christ's representation is that it attains total identity – in Christ, God does not only come to know *what it is like* to be human but *comes to be* human; not only learns *what it is like* to be in hell but *descents* into hell; Christ is the singular "site" where solidarisation turns into the full incarnate presence in the other – where "perspective taking", "exchange of viewpoints", turns into a literal "exchange of standpoints".

Christ became a χώρα for others and others became a χώρα for Christ. In a similar vein, the duty of a Christian is twofold: first, to represent others properly, second, to be represented properly. To make herself a χώρα for others and to make others a χώρα for herself. To do this is to surrender to language, to make one's "name" – that part of us which enables our responsiveness and responsibility because it can be *invoked* by another – the centre of one's being. As wrote W. H. Auden, those "by whom [language] lives" are "pardoned" by time due to being "saved" by God in one another. Auden offers us to consider the death of a poet:

"But for him it was his last afternoon as himself…

The provinces of his body revolted

The squares of his mind were empty,

Silence invaded the suburbs

The currents of his feelings failed:

He became his admirers" [Auden 2009, pp. 88-89].

Of course not only poets are engaged in perichoretic representation – all thinking and loving beings are, all partake in the relations between the persons of the Trinity to one degree or another. The crucial difference is that finite creatures will never achieve an identity with the other that is similar to God's "I will be what I will be" (Exodus 3:14), the Father's eternal identity with the Son. That is, humans cannot help but misrepresent – there will always be a chasm between my life and my life in others, between others and their life in me. The extent to which we are deified is the extent to which this chasm is healed. Politically, this translates into a duty of preventing our "name" from being taken beyond our vigil, to ascertain that those who act "in our name" stay in our sight. Left alone with this task, we are hopelessly in over our heads. Thankfully, in Jesus, everyone's "name" is "saved", is identical to everyone's being since, as the Word, Jesus has his being *in everyone*, he *stands for us*. "Christ truly stands in the place of sinful humanity, freely and deliberately taking on the consequences of its fallenness so that he can give voice to its need in the presence of the Father." [Williams 2018, p. 72].

According to Williams, "Calvin and Aquinas alike insist that Christ wins no merit that is for his own advancement but always and only what he can bestow on others" [Williams 2018, p. 209]. As Jesus himself has put it, "For their sake I sanctify myself" (John 17:19). Dietrich Bonhoeffer argued that the identity of Christ consists of performing the work of *Stellvertretung*, German for "vicarious representative action", "standing-in-for-the-other", or simply "deputyship". *Stellvertretung* is the form God's relation to creation takes in Christ who stands where we stand so that we can stand where He stands: "He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that you through His poverty might become rich" (2 Corinthians 8:9).

My name is a word, which means that only in my name am I "summed up" as one

person to all others despite their diverse experiences of me. My name "opens" me to communication, coordination, and cooperation. My is a subject of politics. Politics is the conversation where we define our common interests. If I have a say in the acts of my government, then it acts "in my name". However, if I am not present in the discourse that shapes my life, if political power shapes my life in a way I do not consent to – then I cannot recognise myself in the will that is imposed on me by the political authorities. This means that I am not present in my name, I am alienated from it – and my alienated name returns to "haunt" me in the form of alien coercive will. This means that I am no longer "one", I am thrown asunder. On the other hand, if I am truly represented in the actions of my political leaders, if I have a say in the making of laws by which I live, then my name "returns" to me in the form of rational policy that recreates me, so that my obscurity to language, the hiddenness of my face from it, my sin, is healed – for I can regain my "face" only if I also regain my "name" – if the two are "at-oned".

According to Gustav Aulén's revisiting of the patristic *Christus Victor* theory of atonement, all the kinds of de-humanising and de-realising systems of relations that unfold after the Fall – tyranny, slavery, coercion – are delegitimised by Christ: "The domination system, understood as something much larger than the Roman governor and the temple aristocracy [...] killed Jesus and thereby disclosed its moral bankruptcy and ultimate defeat" [Borg 2003, p. 95]. The chasm between political language that shapes human relations and the actual human face-to-face relations, the chasm whose name is death, is defeated by Christ's life after death that is in-spired into his new body, the Church. Because Christ is the Word, the whole of his life is in those for whom he stands. As the Word, he gives his life to those whom he represents – and because he gives them the *substance* of his life, flesh and blood, they also can represent him in a "mystical" way, can become his resurrected "body", wherein they are liberated from sin, bondage, death, and the devil. The devil can no longer threaten them with death to keep them in bondage to sin because they no longer fear death – they know that the Spirit resurrects them in those to

whom they give their lives – in those whom they love.

Let us draw the political implications of this theory. O'Donovan calls the space of freedom that Christ "wins" the secular age. The secular government does not pretend to be divine and does not claim sovereignty in the sense of "consummation of the community's identity in the power of its ruler" [O'Donovan 2008, p. 4]. Jesus took away the rulers' sovereignty, their right to act arbitrarily, and instead gave sovereignty to language, the inexhaustible generativity of counsel and councils. The Resurrection is the defeat of the earthly rulers by Christ – now the rulers become the "servants of the people" – not the usual inverse. Now the task of the political authorities is to act in a way analogous to Christ, to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others. The rulers lose their right to dominate and coerce, rather, "the authority of the secular government resides in the practice of judgment" [O'Donovan 2008, p. 3]: "For he is God's minister to you for good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God's minister, an avenger to *execute* wrath on him who practices evil" (Romans 13:4). What is crucial is that their judgment is to be shaped by the network of representation – since even Christ's judgment is shaped by the *deësis*, i.e. the communion of saints who intercede before Christ on behalf of the faithful.

"Too often the Orthodox present themselves, in a rather arrogant way, as the democratic church par excellence, as the church where the synodal spirit pervades its whole life, as the Church of the Synods that positions itself between the authoritarian structure of the Roman Catholic Church and the extreme relativism or fragmentation of the Protestant world" [Asproulis 2022, p. 183]. This self-image is sometimes also used to disregard liberal democracies as not genuinely democratic. Yet the irony is that the pretext for the critique of liberal democracies, the alleged aristocratic detachment of representatives from popular opinion and public audit, does not concern the critics of liberal democracy when encountered in the hierarchical arrangement of the Church. In my view, this confused picture is a product of a failure to see that the transfigurative work of

Christ does not end where abstraction, formality, and mediation begin. To redress this error, I examine the exact shape of democracy that is beckoned by the liturgy and doctrine of the Church. First, liturgy teaches us to appreciate difficulty and formality, it is not immediate in any conceivable way, it is layered. Second, Christian unity is synonymous with the practice of being represented by one another, the practice of mutual intercession that stacks into a hierarchy where individual persons are represented by local saints to universal saints, by universal saints to John and Mary, by John and Mary to Christ, by Christ to the Father. With this in mind, we can embark on discussing which kinds of democracy *do* and *do not* bear witness to the ideal of ecclesial democracy. The succinct walkthrough follows. On the one hand, if democracy becomes too illiberal, instead of the exchange of standpoints, it will drift toward the arbitrary rule of the ruler who establishes an immediate relation with the people in which he merely "mirrors" them instead of genuinely communicating – but what he "mirrors" are the passions, which are the real Sovereign of the populist politics, be they spontaneously sporadic or methodically manipulated. Therefore, the failure of a populist politician is a spiritual failure, a failure to let people "live up" to their "name". On the other hand, if democracy becomes too liberal, the state will fall prey to the economic power of the "civil society", and, instead of coordinated action, instead of representing the people as a whole that has a common good, it will become a playfield of different economic interest groups that lobby for policies at one another's expense and at the expense of the commons. In this case, the sovereignty will slip away into something like the "invisible hand of the market", to what Marx called "the mute compulsion of economic relations". Humans are thus left with something like Agamben's pessimistic reading of the "vacant throne" (*hetoimasia*) iconography as the image of de-personalised, purely "economic" politics.

In the most prefatory terms, liberal democracy succeeds in witnessing to the ecclesial democracy if its "point of departure" is language itself; that is to say, if the "head" of the body politic connects its "limbs" through the "chain of representation"

whose "links" are the conversations in and between the intermediate independent institutions, i.e. all sorts of autonomous communities where the concrete forms of life are cultivated, sustained, and praised as worthwhile. If the society is coordinated around and along this "chain of representation", it bears witness to the representative action of the Spirit that unites individual believers with Christ through the ecclesial "cascade of intercession" comprised of the prophets, apostles, martyrs, saints, and all those who pray not just for themselves but for others, all those who intercede. Another thing it bears witness to is the concrete bundle of challenges the society faces. To be responsive to the environment and reflexive of itself, society has to be governed in the way of subsidiarity. The formative practice of representative democracy – political representation – sustains subsidiarity by making relevant aspects of reality (only one of which is humans) *present* on the appropriate levels of sense-, decision-, and law-making, so as to make sure the whole spectre of reality is taken into account in the "construction of the city with words". Human society does well only if political representation does well – because to say that the government is *representative of* reality is to say that it is *responsive to* it.

Let us conclude by answering the question with was our point of departure: "What is the relation between politics and religion, the state and the church?" "What is the political dimension of the relation between the finite and the infinite — "this age" and the "ages of ages"?" From the vantage point of the conducted research, the kingdom of God, theocracy, is the flawless work of political representation (fully attained only in Christ), since the construction of the city through "making-other-present" is unmistakably the act of the Trinity. From this it can be inferred that the political task of the Church is to make the secular truly secular, not "programmatically" but "procedurally", to use Rowan Williams' helpful distinction [Williams 2012a]. "Procedurally" secular government is the one which refuses the illusion of sovereignty, so that the "chain of representation" is not broken by one of the "links" that imagines itself as having the right to act at will, to decide arbitrarily, i.e. outside of the continuity of counsel and logic. In this way, the *saeculum*,

"the kingdom of this age", becomes properly ordered and oriented toward the *eschaton*, "a kingdom of all ages" (Psalm 145:13). "Procedural" secular politics becomes properly "located" within the wider history of the past and future "ages", since, in the "communion of the Saints" that constitutes the Church, death does not have the last word, does not have the power to interdict solidarity between those who are separated by it. (The icons are there in the church regardless of whether the people are there to remind of and to embed in a larger and longer story of salvation [Williams 2012b]). Paradoxically, the act by which, in this age, the secular constituted power returns the gift of sovereignty to the constituent power of the people without claiming ownership over it because it does not think of itself as divine is grounded in the divine act by which the Son returns the gift of the Father eternally. Therefore, in terms of the discussion that now draws to a close, theocracy and secularity cannot exist without one another.

To connect this section with what was said previously, "corporatism" or "syndicalism" enables politics which gestures toward the liturgy because it enables politics which priotitises communities of conviction and profession, as humans in the "glory" of "hypostatic" interrelatedness, in relations where they receive their "names", in communities which elucidate their real interest, their concrete interdependence with the rest of the state — because corporatist mediation redirects the locus of political life to these communities by obliging representatives to represent "eucharistically", i.e. to "taste and see" the gifts and problems of these communities, to become their "communicants". And because such representatives are nurtured in virtues and entrusted to represent substantively, not descriptively, as trustees, not as instructed delegates, they are enabled to engage in genuinely *philosophical* discourse on the definition of the common good with the *personae repraesentatae* who represent other corporate interests, a conversation whose parties gracefully withdraw from the centre of power, reserved for the dialectic of the Law, the Word, and the Spirit – which is the unfeigned sovereignty of language.

CONCLUSIONS

This study is an attempt to elucidate the language about the relationship between politics and Christian orthodoxy by paying close attention to the concept of representation. In the concluding discussion, I sketch its scientific results.

I.   There was developed the "anthropology of representative democracy based on the developed "orthodox theory of politics" which gestures toward the constitutive theory of representation, where the activity of representation is framed not as an instrument for some higher end but an end-in-itself. I have argued that political representation presupposes *imiaslavie*. On my reading, *imiaslavie* is a discipline or spiritual exercise that lasts from Genesis 4:26 (when "*men* began to call on the name of the LORD"), to Romans 10:13 (when Paul said that "whoever calls on the name of the LORD shall be saved"), and to this day. In terms of theory, it presumes that God is "personal" and that, like it is with any person, we have no other means to enter into communion with God other than to call on God's Name. In terms of practice, *imiaslavie* is linked to a set of techniques that "disarm" and "unchain" the knower to be transformed by the object of knowing. To attain this scholastic ideal of knowing, to be changed by the object of knowing *personally*, we have to approach it personally, and unless it has a "name", unless it is a recognised party to communicative exchange, it is less than personal, even less than fully real (Genesis 2:19). To continually transformed, the knower has to "hallow" the name of the reality she faces – lest she forgets it is always already active and personal, in no sense inanimate and underservient. In the "Lord's Prayer", this discipline is indicated by the words, "Hallowed be Thy Name". In the "Jesus Prayer", it is put into practice. To "hallow the name" is to ensure that the main "protagonist" of the prayer is not the doer of prayer but Christ himself. Hence, *imiaslavie* can be understood as a practice of hallowing the name that preserves the "representative power" or simply the "glory" of the name, i.e. God's presence in it. Yet practice alone is insufficient, since, without the theoretical affirmations

of *imiaslavie* are necessary to set the right background to our undertaking – by affirming that it is a person we are talking about, that this representation is *communicative*. The centrality of the "name" underscores that the relationship in question is a dialogue between persons, that we represent not something passive but active. If the relationship is truly like this, then it starts to function by the rules of language that go past a zero-sum game whose parties live at each other's expense, where one's fulfilment necessitates another's loss. In "perichoretic" representation, the more there are other persons who live in us, there more there is *Lebensraum* for our own growth into personhood, for these persons make up the very "material" from which we are made. We, as it were, are "widened" as we labour to give birth to one another out of the "embryos" of the names which we have exchanged and committed to memory.

There is nothing supernatural or farfetched about this "rich" kind of representation, in fact, it is arguably what is most natural and intimate to us. It has to do with followability and credit. To carry the "logic" of someone's life into a new context, to inbreathe someone's "spirit" into a new "body", I have to know "what follows" in the development of represented life, to know where it is headed. Think of partners who cannot help but finish each other's sentences. A person who truly shares in the life of another is often able to intuit what that person's next step should be, how that person would respond to this or that situation. To one degree or another, we cannot help but represent. Both figuratively and literally, we are made of idiosyncratic interpretations of those who precede and surround us. The question is whether we represent or misrepresent, acknowledge our indebtedness or indulge the delusion of self-createdness, give credit or steal, give thanks or not. These acts are, of course, mutually conditioning. To represent properly is to be in communication with the represented, and to give thanks is to address that which made us by the name, i.e. to be "on speaking terms" with it. Therefore, to represent properly is to give thanks, and to give thanks is to represent properly. Furthermore, if these relations become available to us through the recognition that the name "Jesus" belongs not only to

another human being but also to God, then there is indeed "no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). For those who are saved in Christ, "those whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life" (Revelation 21:27), undergo not birth alone, but resurrection. The emphasis on the "name" makes it clear that it is *this* kind of representation that we are talking about – one that treats "taking time" and "creative freedom" not as wasting of resources but as their ultimate source. If this is the case, then political representation is *worthwhile*, for it sanctions mutual indwelling or simply love. Political representation is the continuation of the liturgy.

II. Representative democracy was conceptualised as a legitimate realisation of "secular theocracy". I have framed the looming global conflict (made visible and violent in the Russo-Ukrainian War) as a conflict between democracy and autocracy, based on the definition of democracy as dysfunctional unless its exercise takes the form of graceful and tactful non-occupation of the "empty throne" (ἑτοιμασία) at the centre of the constitutional arrangement, "prepared" for the sovereignty of the "word" which educates both the constituent and constituted powers by subsuming them within the "cascade of representation", comprised of independent intermediate institutions. This view stems from the "orthodox" theory of politics that calls for the practice of surrender to the "word" at every level of public and private life.I have offered a theological legitimation of representative democracy by tracing its outpouring from the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of the Christian Church: based on the creative "deprivatisation" of the three clauses from the Roman private law, such as *quod omnes tangit*, *plena potestas*, and *corpus mysticum*; and on the doctrinal and practical development of *bona fides* ("good faith") – through the practical enactment of Christ's self-effacement and self-bestowal and through the development of the doctrines that anathemise all "zero-sum" conceptions of relations between the divine and human as heresies, hence cultivating the sense that at the heart of reality lies not a struggle between wills for space but solidarity, interpenetration, exchange

of standpoints, "reciprocal surrender".

We can think of political representation as the "breating space" for learning and growth. Representative democracy subordinates state-building to education because it forces the rulers and people to co-inhere in spite of otherness, which is the very essence of growth, even creation. Our interests have to diverge. Otherwise, if our interests are identical, I have nothing to learn. Moreover, if I am not acting for another but merely for myself, my action is morally empty. But if I have to act for someone who is different from me, strange to me, then I understand that I have to learn and transform, even sacrifice. When I take other's perspective, I see the whole world anew, and the stranger the other, the newer the world. In a representative democracy, the spiritual practice of *perichoresis* becomes the law of statecraft and the duty of rulers. A representative democracy demands the relationship between the state power and people to be one of "perichoretic" representation, the practice of living in the "name" of the other. It is in this sense that representative democracy turns love into the law of the land – it requires all acts of the authorities, indeed all human action that affects other humans, to be judged by the austere standard of "perichoretic" representation, to stand accused of not acting in each other's "name", each other's best interest.

Originally, in the Torah, this "perichoretic" representation was limited to God whose Name "Jehovah" was the token of political representation that allowed Moses to be a conduit of the creation, liberation, and wellbeing of the Jewish nation. This type of representation was as it were "democratised" by Christ, whose Name "Jesus" is both human and divine. This change meant that the same reverent relationships of "perichoretic" representation could become the model for all human relationships. This "worthwhileness" of mediation implies that we should not treat political representation – and politics writ large – as something that its "initial input" (be it the popular "will" or our expert opinion regarding the ideal state) has to go past as quickly and unperturbed as possible so as to be implemented as concrete policies. On an analogy with liturgy proper,

the liturgy of representative democracy is an end-in-itself, not an instrument; it is not a rehearsal before something greater but the very activity that marks us as humans – a pattern of openly relating to one another and God here and now, not a distant vision of parity, purity, or power. If this reading is apt, then what we should attend to is not the state of affairs we want to bring about, that is, the outcomes of our policies, but whether our political arrangement enables and encourages a certain kind of constitutional relationship between the government and the people, the relationship whose centre and actor is the "name" – people's identity as growing and learning community, that "dimension" of people which is their life in rational discourse, in language.

If a politician fails to serve as a "site" where we are meaningfully present, if we do not recognise ourselves in her speech acts and overall performance, her chances for re-election wane. Relations that echo something of the divine *perichoresis* is the focal point of creation, the place where creation is at its most "natural", and therefore, the crucible of human growth. Now the crucial question is "which earthly relations qualify as being analogous to the divine *perichoresis*?". Not any kind of representation is "perichoretic", but only that whose object is not the "likeness" of the thing but its "life", its "organising principle", its "logos". With regard to politics, it is the representation not of our "will", "opinion", "prejudice", "likeness", "feeling", but of our rational and communicative centre, our life in language, our "name". If political representation proceeds in this manner, then it becomes the locus of creation of communities, political bodies, nations, cultures, peoples, that are the "inner forms" of the "names" in which politicians act. If politicians indeed act *in the "name"* and *not in the "inner forms"*, then they foreground and empower not our uneducated opinions, feelings, prejudices, but that "what we are yet to grow into", our "potential". In this case, what is encouraged is precisely that "version" of us that can *learn* – that is communicative and growing (since communication and growth are one), that "version" of us that can be "on speaking terms" with what is other to us, that can participate in the ongoing dialogue that is called

"creation". This is why we can say that political representation is the "breathing space" for learning and growth. It prevents politics from being confined to haecceity, "this-ness", where every identity is irreconcilable with every other. In an unrepresented state, we are totally unique, totally at odds with each other; in a represented state, we meet each other as parties to rhetoric that creates from nothing.

III.   There were examined the orthodox roots of representative democracy. It was demonstrated that foundational doctrines and practices of the Christian Church elucidate the magisterial role of political representation in the whole edifice. The Gospel is read as portraying Christ as a politician in whom the Father's constitutive will and the people's constitutive will are in dramatic yet educational tension. The Divine Liturgy is read as a recapitulation of all the past and future generations into one "hierarchy of representation" at whose pinnacle are the angelic and saintly councils, headed by Mary and John, who intercede for the people before Christ at the hour of the Judgment, as depicted in the icon of *Deësis*. The practices such as the work of the martyrs, saints, holy fools, and all the faithful, are interpreted as the work of transforming their lives into "signs" that point to Christ, thereby making Christ credibly and tangibly present in their conduct – representing Christ by representing those who cannot represent themselves.

Why is liturgy central to Orthodox Christianity? Because this is the only way to represent what is central to Christianity – love. And its representation can be credible only if it enacts a certain kind of change in those who represent it. Those who want to represent it must form a certain kind of relationship among themselves, relationship that "touches" and "moves" them. Furthermore, participants in the liturgy enter into a history of relationships where people live in each other because they pray for each other – through invoking each other's names before God they make each other centres of each other's lives. The subordination of life to this exchange of names is the kingdom of heaven on earth that Christ has established. In the liturgy, the voices of the communicants coalesce

into the intercessory prayer that hierarchically approaches the Judge at the hour of their death. And, in this process, the sinners are saved because they offload the burden of their sins to the saints who represent them as righteous – and who are the saints precisely because they are willing to take these burdens upon themselves.

Accordingly, if the political system is built on this discipline of name-exchange and name-hallowing, it bears witness to heaven. Liturgy does not "symbolise" the concrete workings of the representative democracy; it is the other way around, the liturgy is the only time when representative democracy is fleshed out, when our positions, gestures, voices, comprise the "act" of ultimate representation wherein our representative literally comes to dwell in us and we in him, the "act" by which the Spirit physically presents the Son in bread and wine to us and ourselves to the Father as if we were His Son's Body. The much derided "gate-keeping" institutions (legacy media, regulatory bodies, academy, publishing houses, etc.) cultivate the byproducts of professional life – polite manners, juridic procedures, bureaucratic ceremonies – which emulate something of the liturgy's poise, pace, peace, tact, stillness, punctuality, and reverence of physical distancing, and thus make up for a literate symbolic culture whose "communicants" can "take time" to articulate themselves in a manner that entertains the fulness of human life. To "liturgize" society is to choreograph the social interaction whose parties have increasingly "more to say" to one another. From this perspective, routine civic rituals that might seem to be nothing but pomp and circumstance are emphatically not to be discarded as undue mediation that obfuscates the direct expressions of "will"; in fact, these seemingly boring formalities give *form* to human relations, afford the "breathing space" for graceful exchange, stage the lavish performance of excess that draws us to think past scarcity – the idea intimated by David Foster Wallace in his posthumously published masterwork *The Pale King* [Wallace 2012]. Lastly, this dissertation is an offer to see prosaic protocols of representative democracy as precisely that choreographic discipline that invites the Spirit, public reason, or simply language, to become sovereign, thereby making our secular

democracies more authentically theocratic than all the alternatives tested thus far.

To conclude on a practical note, the outcome of this study is the anthropology of representative democracy (ARD), a theoretical framework whose central tenets make up for a comprehensive playbook which can be used by politicians and activists to see the central aspects of political life in the light of orthodox theory of politics:

1. Constitutive theory of representation: Representation does not de-realize the represented, on the contrary, it creates or "hypostatizes" them into existence. The representative and the represented are not engaged in a zero-sum-struggle for ontological space, instead, they "co-create" one another – provided that they live in each other's "name", that is, engage in the discipline of the *imiaslavic* "name-hallowing" whereby they submit their lives to each other's "names" – which constitutes the concrete enactment of the sovereignty of language and love.

2. Free indirect speech: attendant to the "exchange" and "hallowing" of names is the coalescence of the voices of the representative and the represented into "free indirect speech" that is possessed by neither.

3. Substitutionary atonement: also attendant to the "excange" and "hallowing" of names is the transformation of the relations between a politician and a people into the exchange and expiation of sins.

4. Education of desire: political implication of this view is that representatives must not cater to the preexisting tastes of the public, instead, they have to challenge and cultivate these tastes (*Republic* 488a- 495c).

5. Distance and abstraction: the further political implication of this view is that the distance and difference between the government and the people is the space where we learn to think and love the other as other, where we learn to exercise solidarity and generosity. Consequently, the things that keep this distance – the juridic norms, formal protocols, bureaucratic routines, and other rituals of representative

democracy – help to sustain the liturgical poise in the social interaction between the government and the people which is prerequisite for the development of the public intellectual discourse whose abstractness does justice to the complexity of the problems faced by the state. In simpler language, direct democracy cannot be the system of choice in dealing with the difficulty of modern life.

6. The "trinitarian" aspect of perichoretic representation gestures toward the "circumambulation" of the "empty throne" that affords the simultaneous sovereignty of the constituent, constituted, and constitutional powers of the secular state: *quod omnes tangit* of the people, *plena potestas* of the politicians, and *corpus mysticum* as the "spirit" of the constitution or the "rule of law" that unites the two into one body politic.

7. The "Christological" aspect of perichoretic representation gestures toward the "mutual indwelling" of the two natures, political and personal, in the figure of the politician, who is thus construed as a "verbal icon" of the people. On the willingness of the two to undergo "substitutionary atonement" – on the willingness of the representatives to stand accused personally for the political conduct of the people and on the willingness of the people to stand accused politically for the personal conduct of their representatives – depends whether the two can undergo "co-education" and "co-redemption".

8. The "pneumatological" aspect of perichoretic representation gestures toward the "corporatist" or "syndicalist" model of representation mediated by the free institutions or corporations which are turned into juridic *personae repraesentatae* capable of collective political action in the act of "kenotic" representation. Lastly, this "kenotic" act of representation by which the representatives become the "communicants" of the gifts and problems of the communities they represent is a spiritual exercise that expands the same "liturgical act" of the Spirit that constitutes the Church – "liturgy outside the church walls" [Skobtsova 2003, pp. 80–83].

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ДОДАТКИ

ДОДАТОК А

СПИСОК ПУБЛІКАЦІЙ ЗДОБУВАЧА ЗА ТЕМОЮ ДИСЕРТАЦІЇ

Наукові праці, в яких опубліковані основні наукові результати дисертації:

публікації у фахових виданнях України:

• Bakirov, D. (2021). 'Big History' of Education: Our Path to Listening Society. Part ⅕: The Stone Age. The Journal of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Series "Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science", № 63 (2021), pp. 77-85. https://doi.org/10.26565/2306-6687-2021-63-09

• Bakirov, D. (2021). 'Big History' of Education: Part ⅖: The Bronze Age as the "Prison of the Will". ISSN 2306-6687 Вісник Харківського національного університету імені В.Н.Каразіна Серія «Теорія культури і філософія науки», № 64 (2021), pp. 79-90. https://doi.org/10.26565/2306-6687-2021-64-09

• Бакіров, D. (2022). Rex Iudæorum: від тернового куща до тернового вінця. Вісник Харківського національного університету імені В. Н. Каразіна. Серія «Філософія. Філософські перипетії», № 66 (2022), с. 47-51. https://doi.org/10.26565/2226-0994-2022-66-5

• Bakirov, D. (2023). The "ages" of civilization as the structures of political representation. Філософія освіти. *Filosofiya Osvity. Philosophy of Education*, *28*(2), 197–213. https://doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2022-28-2-11

• Bakirov, D. (2023). The Character of Russian Elite: Intelligence and Intelligentsia, Dictatorship and Contradiction. The Higher Education of Ukraine. Вища освіта України. № 1 (2023), pp. 18-23. 2023-05-01 | Journal article DOI: 10.32782/NPU-VOU.2023.1(88).02

публікації в іноземних наукових виданнях:

• Bakirov, D., and Filonenko, O. (2021). Science, Law, Art, Their Feedback. Збірник наукових праць ΛΌГОΣ. № 2 (2021), pp. 122-128

https://doi.org/10.36074/logos-10.12.2021.v2.39

Особистий внесок: Автором описано процесс, за яким певні "форми життя" продовжуються через людей, чиї способи пізнання та кодекси поведінки пристосовані до порядку складності, який орієнтований на його мимовільне відтворення. Автор продемонстрував, що свідомість є "дивною петлею" двох соціальних процесів - абстракції мови та розширення права. Також автор запропонував гіпотезу, що абстрагування мови і розширення права запрошують людство до все більш творчих "форми життя", тому що абстракція привертає нашу увагу до вищих перспектив, з яких речі розглядаються як такі, що можуть "сказати більше" в якості учасників все більш складних розмов.

• Bakirov, D., and Filonenko , O. (2021). Consent or Contest? Dating Appts and Sexual Choice. Збірник наукових праць ΛΌΓΟΣ. № 1 (2021), pp. 87-89. https://doi.org/10.36074/logos-26.11.2021.v2.27 .

Особистий внесок: Автором описані критерії повноцінного поняття згоби як коммуникативної зрозумілості вибору. Таким чином, автор концептуалізував критерії викорінення маніпулятивних змагань у людських стосунках: маніпуляція завжди ховається за аутсорсингом суджень на змагання, прихованих від відкритої розмови; також, нерівність потенційних сексуальних партнерів унеможливлює розумну розмову. Щоб бути повноцінно консенсуальним, вибір партнера має бути винесений за межі ринкової конкуренції. Це відбувається лише тоді, коли життєві потреби людей задовольняються на рівні держави - їжа, охорона здоров'я, психологічна підтримка, спільнота, дозвілля.

• Bakirov, D. (2023). The Deathcamp Realism as a Source of Putinism. On the Platonic Hierarchy of Human Faculties in Varlam Shalamov's GULAG Stories. Grail of Science, (24), pp. 493–497. https://doi.org/10.36074/grail-of-science.17.02.2023.093

ПРОТОКОЛ
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